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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
DECENTRALIZATION AND CITIZEN PARTICIPATION 
IN MÉXICO 
by 
Ilyana Albarran 
Florida International University, 2015 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Jean-Claude Garcia-Zamor, Major Professor 
During the past few decades, decentralization efforts in México have coincided 
with efforts to democratize the administrative decision-making process. Adopted in 1988, 
the Programa Nacional de Solidaridad (National Solidarity Program; PRONASOL) 
required citizen participation in decisions involving the use of federal resources for 
regional development and poverty alleviation projects.  In 1998, Section 33 of the Ley de 
Coordinación Fiscal (Fiscal Coordination Law; LCF) placed Social Infrastructure Funds 
(SIF) directly under the supervision of municipalities and retained the requirement that 
citizens participate in decisions involving the allocation of funds. 
The present study seeks to understand the factors that affect the participation of 
citizen committees (composed of community members; organized to address a particular 
cause) in SIF allocation decisions and assess the impact of this form of citizen 
participation on government performance. To pursue this objective, the study analyzes 
the implementation of LCF with respect to the role of citizen committees in SIF 
allocation decisions at two different locations: the township of Santa Maria Tonantzintla, 
 vi
located in the municipality of San Andrés Cholula, in the state of Puebla, and the rural 
municipality of Tenango Del Aire, located in El Estado de México (the State of México).  
The study finds that gender, church participation, and personal economy play 
major roles in the formation of citizen committees.  Although the citizen committees have 
been instrumental in getting their SIF projects prioritized, they have had little effect on 
the quality or efficiency with which the projects were carried out. In general, the 
municipal decision-making process in both municipalities lack mechanisms to guarantee 
citizen participation and thus to ensure consideration of the broader public interest 
beyond the interest of organized groups. Because SIF can be used for various economic 
development projects, such as water, sewage, electrification, emergency clinics, and 
schools, it was of particular importance to determine whether the participatory 
mechanism was functioning correctly. Given the nature of the projects carried out by 
municipalities, flaws in the implementation process, including failures to include the 
broader public, could hinder not only local economic development, but also the economic 
growth of the nation.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION   
1.1 Objectives of the Study 
The objective of this dissertation is to analyze critically the implementation of 
decentralization policies that required the incorporation of citizen participation and the 
impact of these policies on the governance of rural Mexican municipalities. The study 
seeks to provide a better understanding of the development and operation of citizen 
committees in rural areas, and their influence on the governance/decision-making process 
of municipalities. The findings of the research will contribute to at least three bodies of 
literature. First, they will shed additional light on decentralization processes in rural 
México. Second, by assessing the extent and impact of citizen committees on allocation-
decisions involving infrastructure funds, the dissertation will contribute to the research 
literature on public participation in administrative decision-making. Finally, by focusing 
on México and the processes of democratization of administrative processes at the local 
level, the work will ultimately contribute to the literature on comparative public 
administration. 
Specifically, the present study analyzes the formation of citizen committees and 
their impact on allocation-decisions involving Social Infrastructure Funds (SIF) in two 
municipalities in México. It traces several citizen committees in their attempt to obtain 
SIFs for potable water projects, road pavement, and the creation and expansion of 
schools. In pursuing its main objective, the study answers a number of interrelated 
questions: What is the current governance structure of municipalities? How are SIF 
allocation decisions made? What role do citizen committees have on the allocation of 
SIF? Do citizen committees vary from one municipality to another? What affects the 
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formation of citizen committees? Have decentralization policies that require the creation 
of citizen committees met their objectives?  By answering these questions, I hope to 
contribute to the literature on participatory democracy and decentralization, and 
simultaneously enhance knowledge about the performance of municipalities. It is 
important to understand the effects of these reforms, if any, and their implications for the 
performance of municipalities. The broad value of this work lies in the interplay between 
decentralization and citizen participation and how this affects good governance.   
1.2 Research Problem 
Over the past decades governance has become a popular topic of discussion and 
study. Authors, such as Box, have preferred to use the word governance rather than 
government or administration because the term “include[s] the entire range of activities 
of citizens, elected representatives, and public professionals as they create and implement 
public policy in communities” (1998). However, the definition of governance varies. For 
example, according to the World Bank, governance is “the process and institutions 
through which decisions are made and authority in a country is exercised” (n.d.: 3 cf. 
Grindle 2007: 556-557). According to the United Nations Development Program, 
governance “comprises the mechanisms, processes and institutions through which 
citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their 
obligations and mediate their differences” (1997: 12, cf. ibid.). Other definitions of 
governance include: 
‘how the institutions, rules, and systems of the state—the executive, 
legislature, judiciary and military—operate at central and local level and 
how the state relates to individual citizens, civil society and the private 
sector’ (DFID 2001:11, note a, cf. ibid.).  
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‘The ability of government to develop an efficient, effective, and 
accountable public management process that is open to citizen 
participation and that strengthens rather than weakens a democratic system 
of government’ (USAID 2005: 1 cf. ibid.). 
 
‘The formation of stewardship of the formal and informal rules that 
regulate the public realm, the arena in which state as well as economic and 
societal actors interact to make decisions’ (Hyden et al. 2004: 16 cf. ibid.). 
 
Although Huillet—in the forward of the book “Participatory governance: 
planning, conflict mediation, and public decision-making in civil society”—explains that 
the term governance describes an intricate composite of organizational mechanisms, 
administrative processes, and ever-changing relations and interactions between 
government and non-profit organizations, citizens, and the general private sector, put 
simply, governance can be defined as being “about processes of making decisions” 
(Lovan, Murray and Shaffer 2004, xvi). “In other words, [governance] is concerned with 
processes focusing on the distribution of public responsibilities across multiple 
stakeholders” (ibid.). Furthermore, governance is a term that focuses on the “fundamental 
question of how the processes of democracy (citizen involvement, decision-making 
procedures and administrative functions) can be adapted to help countries resolve the 
complex issues with which they are challenged” (ibid.).  
Although, non-profit organizations and the private sector influence the decision-
making process of government, increasingly, studies have begun to focus more on the 
role of citizens. However, until recently, citizen participation in government has been 
limited to indirect participation through voting (Nabatchi 2012). In democratization 
efforts, the “focus of citizen participation was on gaining and guaranteeing the rights of 
all citizens to vote for representation in government” (Keyssar 2000 cf. Nabatchi 2012). 
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However, after those rights were secured, “the focus shifted from an emphasis on ‘the 
representative nature of government’ to an examination of ‘direct participation by 
citizenry in day-to-day activities of the state’” (Stewart 1976 cf. Nabatchi 2012). The 
more recent shift in ideology encouraging decentralization has shifted the conversation 
on the impact of citizen participation and good governance from the national to the local 
level. 
Unfortunately, studies on the current governance of rural Mexican municipalities 
and the impact that decades of decentralization policies has had on the role of citizen 
participation in the decision-making process are lacking detail and substance. Few works 
(e.g., Goldfrank, 1998) have analyzed the links between decentralization, 
democratization, and the promotion of good governance. In Goldfrank (1998), the focus 
was on a general comparative analysis of several countries in South America. In the case 
of studies conducted in México, the literature analyzing the links between 
decentralization and improved governance were available but focused mostly on large 
cities (Cabrero, 1996; Guillen, 1996; Habers, 2007; Ramirez Saiz, 1998; Ziccardi, 1995). 
Moreover, of these studies, only Habers (2007) was conducted in México City and 
integrated democratization—specifically defined as increases in the level of citizen 
participation in the administrative decision-making process. The work of Beneria and 
Mendoza (1995) examined the role of citizen committees in the decision-making process 
but focused on the regulations of an outdated program no longer in operation. 
Few works, including that of Bazdresch Prada, 1994; Diaz Montes, Zafra, and 
Gonzalez Menchor, 1994; Cabrero, 1995; Rodriguez and Ward, 1995 mentioned small 
municipalities in México (c.f., Rowland, 2001). Of these studies, only Rowland (2001) 
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was conducted in rural México, integrating all three areas of interest—decentralization, 
democratization, and governance. However, Rowland’s work accounted for the 
democratization of administrative decision-making through municipal use of 
COPLADEMUNs (Comités de Planeación para el Desarrollo Municipal), local planning 
meetings carried out with representatives of local non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) as well as neighborhood organizations and other civil associations. Moreover, 
although Rowland (2001) mentioned that “in México there is no single law which 
delineates the scope of citizen participation in local government, and each state may have 
its own mechanism to encourage it in its Constitution” (p. 1380), he made no reference of 
municipal use of citizen committees as a means of incorporating citizen input into 
decision-making processes. According to the literature, decentralization efforts in México 
were undertaken to democratize the government process and promote good governance. 
By devolving decision-making authority to the municipalities and increasing citizen 
participation in the administrative processes, it was hoped that the needs of society would 
be better met. However, several questions remained unanswered, such as: Are these 
groups composed of a representative sample of the community they represent? Are the 
legal mandates regulating the formation of citizen committees accessible for community 
representatives? What kind of citizen committees do most resemble in practice: advisory, 
supportive, put-off, or put-on committees? In other words, what exactly is the role of 
citizen committees in the municipality’s decision-making process for SIF allocation? 
Does the current participatory process promote good governance?  
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1.3 Study Focus 
This present study focuses on two major policy shifts occurring in México that are 
the result of decentralization efforts. The first is the inclusion of citizen participation in 
the process for determining SIF allocation. The second is the devolution of authority over 
SIF allocation to the municipal level. By devolving decision-making authority to the 
municipal level of government, and passing legislation to institutionalize citizen 
participation, it was hoped that the needs of marginal groups in society would be 
effectively met. However, several questions remained unanswered, such as: How 
successful have municipal governments been at institutionalizing citizen participation? 
And does the current participatory process promote accountability, improve governance, 
and deliver all the benefits promised by decentralization reform?  
The aim of the research is to understand the formation of citizen committees and 
examine their impact on rural municipal decision-making. The dissertation specifically 
examines municipal decisions regarding Social Infrastructure Fund (SIF) allocation for 
potable water projects, road pavement, and the creation and expansion of schools. In 
carrying out the research, the theoretical arguments for decentralization and direct 
participatory democracy are critically analyzed. The outcomes of the legislation are 
compared with the desired impacts, specifically: the promotion of accountability and 
improved governance—ethics, efficiency, effectiveness, and responsiveness—as well as 
the establishment of cost recovery mechanisms for certain infrastructure/service 
provision projects.    
The evolution of the research interest arose as follows. After several years of 
dedicating themselves to the situation involving potable water in the community of San 
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Isidro Buenos Aires in Santa Maria Tonantzintla, México, the citizen committee of 
potable water was finally able to capture the attention of their representatives and add the 
project to the long list of public works to be completed by 2006.  It was by no means a 
simple process to prioritize this public project. The steps needed to obtain some of the 
paperwork were complicated, requiring time and money from the citizen committee. I 
became interested in understanding what the process of obtaining potable water was and 
how it fell into the general scheme of what is intended according to the new legislation 
that emerged from the decentralization process. However, it became apparent that in 
order to make generalizations about the process, more case studies needed to be included. 
As a result, this research analyzed the story of two additional citizen committees in the 
area as well as the story of three schools that continually battle to obtain SIF.  In addition, 
the present study compared the experiences of these three citizen committees with the 
experiences of additional citizen committees in another rural municipality, Tenango del 
Aire, in the State of México. Through process tracing for each case and in-depth 
interviews with municipal authorities, citizen committee members, and community 
members, I aimed to understand the mechanisms through which SIF allocation occurs 
and is affected by citizen committees.  
1.4 Research Questions 
Little is known about the impact of this form of citizen participation in the 
administrative process on government performance in rural México. Scholars argue that 
incorporating citizen participation in the administrative decision-making process can 
improve overall government performance (Bringham, Nabatchi and O’Leary 2005; Dahl 
1989, 1992; Ebdon and Franklin 2004, 2006; Habermas 1996; Kernaghan 1992; Roberts 
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1997; Stivers 1990; Olsen 1986; Urbinati and Warren 2008; Neshkova and Guo 2009; 
Garcia-Zamor 1985). However, not all authors agree that direct citizen participation in 
the administrative process is necessary or conducive to better policy outcomes.  
Traditional representative and bureaucratic governments advocate a more “decisional” 
approach to policy setting through technocrats (Waldo 1948).  From the theoretical 
perspective, lack of citizen participation is justified because the public lacks the know-
how to implement policy effectively (Dahl 1989, Stivers 1990). Moreover, there is the 
concern that participation outside the electoral process represents the narrow interest, 
rather than the established general interest (Boyton, Patterson, & Hedlund 1969, cf. 
Riedel 1972, Ebdon & Franklin 2004, c.f. Neshkova & Guo 1990). The present study 
aims to contribute to the current debate by investigating the following questions:  
   
1. What factors affect the formation and involvement of citizen committees in México? 
2. What is the impact of citizen committees on the governance of municipalities, 
specifically, government performance: the promotion of accountability and improved 
governance, ethics, efficiency, effectiveness, responsiveness, and the establishment of 
cost recovery mechanisms for certain infrastructure/service provision projects? 
3. What factors determine the degree to which municipalities will adapt the new 
mechanisms for incorporating citizen participation in SIF allocation decisions? 
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The main hypotheses are: 
1.  The formation of citizen committees in rural México will be a function of individual 
characteristics such as gender, income, religious affiliation, political participation, 
and the feelings individuals have about the responsiveness and efficiency of the 
government administration at the local level, as well as factors pertaining to the 
municipal willingness to collaborate with citizens.  
2. If municipalities operate under the traditional representative and bureaucratic 
government perspective (which advocates a “decisional” approach to policy setting 
and implementation through the use of technocrats), it is not likely to observe 
improvements in accountability, governance, or the establishment of cost recovery 
mechanisms for infrastructure/service provision projects. 
3.  Municipalities belonging to a state with a history of social movements and controlled 
by opposition will be more likely to introduce participatory mechanisms than those 
with a history of social movements but controlled by the majority party and aligned 
with the central government. 
 
1.5 Contribution to the Literature 
In México, the political decentralization process has succeeded in democratizing 
every level within the government structure. Ranging from the executive to the local 
level, elections are held to select the nation’s president and municipal presidents, 
respectively. The current debate over citizen participation is, thus, not about gaining the 
right to elect citizens’ representatives. Rather, the debate concerns the impact that 
increasing citizen participation in the administrative decision-making process has on the 
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establishment of economic development policies. The present study will analyze the 
implications of Section 33 of the Fiscal Coordination Law (LCF), which regulates the 
process through which citizens participate in the municipal decision-making process. 
Through Section 33, citizen participation is channeled through citizen committees. This 
study investigates the process through which citizen committees affect decisions 
regarding Social Infrastructure Fund (SIF) allocation. The SIF can be used for diverse 
economic development projects such as water, sewage, electrification, and the 
construction of emergency clinics and schools. If the process is not functioning correctly, 
it can hinder not only the local economic development, but also the economic 
development of the nation. 
My research will shed light on efforts to promote economic development at the 
local level by decentralizing control over SIF allocation decisions to the municipal level. 
In particular, I will focus on decentralization efforts designed to increase citizen 
participation in the municipal decision-making process. The present study will elaborate 
on a possible typology that can be used by researchers to describe expected municipal 
reactions to citizen committees under particular circumstances. By doing so, the study 
will directly contribute to the comparative administration literature on decentralization 
and participatory democracy. Moreover, the current study will analyze the advantages 
and disadvantages of the current participatory process contributing to the creation of 
more effective, equitable, and efficient policies. 
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CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW  
2.1 Introduction 
 This chapter traces the development of decentralization policies and assesses their 
impact on the governance of rural Mexican municipalities—specifically, the impact of 
the policies requiring citizen participation in the allocation of Social Infrastructure Funds 
(SIF). The literature review in this chapter is divided into several sections. The first offers 
a theoretical analysis of the main arguments behind decentralization reform. It posits the 
suggested links between decentralization and citizen participation. The second section 
offers a debate on the pros and cons of citizen participation in bureaucratic processes. 
The third section reviews the institutionalization and incorporation of decentralization 
policy and participatory planning and management (PPM) practices in México. 
Moreover, the third section identifies potential determinants affecting the incorporation 
of citizen participatory mechanisms at the local level. The fourth section offers a 
highlight of the decentralization policy that gave rise to citizen committees in México. 
The last section of this chapter is dedicated to describing the determinants of citizen 
participation as posited in the research literature.  
2.2 Shifting Ideologies: From Centralization to Decentralization  
The liberal doctrines of the Enlightenment, which fueled the French Revolution, also 
influenced the wide range of administrative reforms and institution building that 
transformed Europe, North America, East Asia, and other parts of the world during the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The convergence of the ideologies and 
reforms of that time culminated in the emergence of bureaucratic model as we know it 
today (Argyriades 2010). 
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“The bureaucratic model was manifestly a composite of many diverse 
elements. The model represented an early response to the emerging problems of 
complexity and scale in government, the quest for cost-effective service delivery, 
but also for legality, objectivity, integrity, consistency and coherence in the 
discharge of the functions of public management.” (ibid.: 277)  
 
As noted by Argyriades (2010), the process of “bureaucratization” can be linked to 
the decline of patrimonial states secured on prescriptive rights, the transition from an 
agrarian to an industrial society and the conversion from a feudal aristocracy to capitalist 
democracy. A product of its time, the bureaucratic model pushed for reason in the 
structuring of organizations and their scientific management thereafter. In such a manner, 
bureaucracies, like machines, could secure speed, predictability, accuracy, and efficiency 
(Argyriades 2010). Bureaucracy, the ideal-type configuration of an organization proposed 
by Weber, was characterized by a hierarchical structure with unity of command at the 
apex, a division of labor based on task specialization, the merit-based appointment and 
promotion of employees, formal rules and regulations, formal communication systems, 
and proper access to records for informed administrative decision-making (Farazmand 
2010). Bureaucratic centralism was an unmistakable part of the scientific claims of the 
classical management doctrines (Argyriades 2010). For example, the twentieth century 
‘classical’ management literature such as; C. I. Barnard, The Functions of the Executive 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1938, repr. 1968); H. Fayol, General 
Industrial Management  (London: Pitman, 1949); L. Gulick and L. Urwrick, eds., Papers 
on the science of administration (New York: Institute of Public Administration, 1937); 
 13
and F. W. Taylor, The Principles of Scientific Management (New York: Norton, 1911) all 
advocated centralization through scientific management as a way to organize private and 
public organizations (Albarran and Garcia-Zamor 2010). 
After World War I, the pursuit for unity and standardization through scientific 
management was followed by the push to advance centralized public service management 
(Argyriades 2010: 279). In the United States for example, during the Great Depression, 
scientific management was utilized to strengthen the administrative capacity of the 
country (Albarran and Garcia-Zamor 2010). World War II—and its wartime 
administrations managing evacuation schemes, propaganda campaigns, production 
battles, etc.—required countries to centralize government functions even further (ibid.). 
“The economic boom that followed the war created a consensus over the efficiency of 
centralized systems of management” (ibid.: 133). Thus, “beginning in the 1920s, the 
establishment and strengthening of central management agencies continued unabated 
well after World War II, becoming in this process one of the most abiding features and 
commonest concerns of public service reform, for more than half a century” (Argyriades 
2010: 279).  Because centrally managed mixed economies promoted growth, 
organizations like the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
endorsed centralization in the developing world well into the 1970s (Albarran and 
Garcia-Zamor 2010). 
The promotion of centralized bureaucracies was not thought to conflict with 
democratic principles. According to classical management doctrines—the traditional 
representative and bureaucratic government perspectives—politicians/elected officials 
would establish policy through democratic means and technocrats/bureaucrats would 
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execute policy faithfully and in accordance with pre-determined directives. In other 
words, there would be a politics-administration dichotomy. The perspective has its 
origins during what Waldo called the classical orthodox period in public administration 
(1968). Wilson advocated a politics-administration dichotomy in government, along with 
authors such as Goodnow (Waldo 1968) and Weber (Kweit and Kweit 1984, c.f. 
Neshkova & Guo 2009). According to these perspectives, there was no room for public 
involvement in the administrative/bureaucratic process (Neshkova and Guo 2009, Peters 
2010). From this theoretical perspective, lack of citizen participation in administrative 
process was justified because the public lacked the understanding of how to implement 
policy effectively. On the other hand, bureaucrats were seen as possessing specialized 
knowledge and skills—which they gained through the tenure of their career—allowing 
them to gain expertise on the best way to execute policies “effectively” (Meier 2000). In 
other words, bureaucrats gained legitimacy as executors of public will on the basis of 
their expertise (Dahl 1989, Stivers 1990, c.f. Neshkova and Guo 2009). Implicit in the 
classical management perspective was a trade-off between democratic and purely 
administrative decision-making; mainly efficiency. Citizen involvement was thus limited 
to the democratic process of election of representatives who would then establish policy.  
As stated by Peters; 
“The public was involved at the level of selecting (albeit indirectly) the 
minister through the electoral process […] but even the clients would be excluded 
from any direct involvement in designing the services. This model of governing 
assumed that the public had little of importance to say about the policies being 
delivered to them, and that their involvement actually might undermine both the 
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technical quality and the legality of the services being rendered” (Peters 2010: 
214).   
 
However, no contradiction was seen between democracy and centralized 
bureaucracies. In assuming a well-functioning representative government, policy would 
represent the broad interests of the people who elected representatives that would select 
policies to meet their needs. Moreover, by having bureaucracies follow policies 
explicitly, and administer the law, one guaranteed that policies democratically decided on 
would be safeguarded (Peters 2010).  
Therefore, the linkages between democracy and bureaucracy could be viewed as 
complementary. Expanding on the work of Suleiman (2003), Peters explains how both 
effective democracy and effective bureaucracy are required for good governance (2010). 
Specifically, he explains how “the responsiveness of democratic governing must be 
balanced with the predictability and impartiality assumed to reside within bureaucratic 
institutions” (Peters 2010: 210). In addition, expanding on the work of Day and Klein 
(1987), Peters points out that the “linear relationships between voters, ministers, their 
civil servants, and the service delivered made enforcing accountability over programs 
relatively easy” (2010: 212). 
The complimentary relation of bureaucracy and democracy is not surprising when 
one recalls that bureaucratic structures were “developed in the wake of the Age of 
Enlightenment, […] with strictly limited purposes in mind. One such primary objective 
was the rule of law and protection against arbitrariness (d’état de droit). [… In fact] it 
would be fair to argue that, more than other values, legality, objectivity, regulation, and 
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accountability presided over the shaping of bureaucratic structures” (Argyriades 2010: 
281). Nonetheless, the bureaucratic hierarchical process, central planning, and integration 
gained escalating pressure for change in and after the 1980s. As noted by Argyriades, the 
shifting of ideologies were to a great extent the outcome of declining faith in 
organizational structures as a result of the crises confronted during the period.  
“Sharp economic downturns in certain parts of the world, student and labor 
unrest, and political convulsions in others have greatly undermined the credibility 
of the institutional framework. Events in Eastern Europe, culminating in the 
implosion of the USSR, the emergence of kleptocracies and ‘failed states’, the 
current global crisis, and failure of some countries to keep their competitive edge 
compounded by growing indebtedness; all in different ways occasioned a 
reordering of national priorities, accompanied at times by pressures for 
retrenchment in light of perceived scarcity ” (2010: 281). 
 
In Latin America for example, top-down military and bureaucratic governments were 
unable to adjust to changing conditions. According to North (1990), centralization 
undermined a country’s ability to escape path dependency. As the feeling that “adaptation 
to new social conditions [… became] the sine qua non of survival” (Argyriades 2010: 
292) centralized governments began experimenting with decentralization. For many 
governments, decentralization policies were adopted as a way of establishing service 
delivery on a “demand led” basis versus following a national established provision of 
entitlements with secured expenditures from the center (Levaggi and Smith 2003). The 
view assumed that information asymmetries are reduced when administrative agencies 
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with the most contact with the citizenry take responsibility for determining the “bundle of 
services” that would be provided. Because of proximity, the assumption was made that 
sub-national governments are better positioned to gather information on local preferences 
and respond more efficiently to variations in demand than the remote national 
agency/government (e.g., Albarran and Garcia-Zamor 2010, Hayek 1945, Musgrave 
1959).  
 However, the view is not without its critics. For example, Oats warns that allowing 
sub-national governments to determine the “bundle of services” that will be provided can 
lead to statewide inequalities, as variation across jurisdictions is not only because of 
differences in local preferences but also to cost differentials (1999). Thus, in the presence 
of regional inequalities, if there is a component of the service provision that is mandated 
from the top, states will undercut their spending to match federal funds in an attempt to 
keep benefits “more or less constant” across states. As a result, overall benefits of welfare 
are reduced (Peterson 1999). Thus, concentration of certain types of services in certain 
locations will only lead to welfare gains as constituents are able to vote with their feet in 
accordance with their preferences (Tiebout 1956). However, there may be factors that 
limit mobility, giving rise to concerns over equity.  
Behind the push for institutional decentralization were several considerations. Among 
these was an attempt to increase allocative efficiency by improving the government’s 
ability to absorb and adapt to changes in local preferences for development, but also an 
effort to maintain legitimacy and faith in the system (Manor 1999). By bridging the gap 
between government and civil society, it was believed that greater political accountability 
could be achieved and marginal groups would be better served (e.g., Nickson 1995, 
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Rondinelli 1998). Following the humanist perspective, allowing for citizen participation 
in administration should help validate the premise and effectiveness of programs.  Some 
authors believed decentralization could help promote accountability and reduce 
corruption as a result of constituent pressure on government because of their newly 
gained awareness of subnational governments’ actions versus the remote national 
government (e.g., Ostrom, Schroeder, and Wynne 1993). As mentioned above, although 
counterarguments presented in the work of Olson (1993), McGuire and Olson (1996), and 
Schleifer and Vishny (1993) indicate that coordination from the center reduces 
misgovernance and corruption, not decentralization, Latin American countries began 
decentralizing1 in the 1980s (Montero and Samuels 2004).  
As noted by Argyriades, decentralization was part of a larger world trend of 
“debureaucratization”—a shifting of managerial ideologies from closed to open systems 
(2010). Bureaucracies were no longer seen as isolated machines operating in a vacuum. 
Rather, they were seen as being affected by outside environments. Unable to adapt to 
                                                          
1 “James Manor (1999) identified three different processes that could be taken individually or conjunctly to 
achieve decentralization: de-concentration or administrative decentralization, fiscal decentralization and 
devolution or democratic decentralization. In order to achieve these goals within a political system, James 
Manor identified three different processes that could be taken individually or conjunctly to achieve 
decentralization: de-concentration or administrative decentralization, fiscal decentralization and devolution 
or democratic decentralization. The first process, de-concentration, was defined as the dispersal of agents 
from higher levels to lower levels within the government structure. However, James Manor noted, when 
defining de-concentration as simply the relocation of agents, it is easy to see that this process, occurring 
alone, without the transfer of power to the lower administrative levels, can result in further centralization, 
with the agents simply re-enforcing the demands/desires of the higher authority. Fiscal decentralization was 
defined as the downward fiscal transfer over budget and financial decisions from higher levels to lower 
levels within the government structure and the third process, devolution, was defined as the transfer of 
authority and resources to independent lower level authorities. However, a consensus has further specified 
the categories into deconcentration, delegation and devolution (Cohen and. Peterson 1999). And, as in 
James Manor’s analysis of decentralization, decentralization by default (a reaction by non-governmental 
organizations to supply goods and services as a result of the lack or under provision by the government) 
and inadvertent decentralization (occurs when a new policy accidentally grants resources and power to 
lower levels of government as an unforeseen by-product) have been omitted as valid processes that lead to 
institutionalized decentralization” (Albarran and Garcia-Zamor 2010, p. 135).  
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changing economic conditions centralized/hierarchal/closed bureaucracies received 
continued attacks for being unresponsive.  With the rising number of “think-tanks, 
consulting firms, universities,” etc. who knew as much as those in the bureaucracy, 
public officials could no longer claim that their views carried special weight (Argyriades 
2010: 285). 
“Under these new conditions, openness, consultation, and participation 
[…became] essential daily facets of organizational life [… and] policymaking.  
No longer [could] decisions be reached, as in the past, by managers or ‘experts’ 
acting in isolation, and then communicated to a passive body of underlings. Staff-
management relations, but also the conditions for sound policy-planning [… 
changed] so much that, in most present-day successful organizations ‘Collegial 
not command structures’ become the natural basis for the mandatory modes of 
getting things done’ (Cleveland 1985: 188). Inclusion, social dialogue, 
participative management, and consultation, [… became] widely accepted facets 
of public administration and good governance” (Argyriades 2010: 285). 
 
Although the term “participation” began to gain currency in the decision-making 
processes of bureaucracies in industrialized societies in the 1930s, “it is only since the 
late 1960s and the 1970s that the concept started to be used in the context of the 
newly developed sub-discipline of ‘development administration’” (Garcia-Zamor 
1985:5). 
Again, it is important to note that in addition to the promised benefits that 
decentralization could afford to adaptability, efficiency, and accountability, 
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decentralization policies were also carried out because of their potential to promote 
‘participatory’ development and democracy more generally.2 According to the United 
Nations; “More than increasing efficiency, decentralization seeks to bring government 
back and closer to the citizen, a feature that has made it one of the critical facets of the 
transition processes and administrative reform.” (2000:7 cf. Argyriades 2010: 290).  
Moreover, as noted by Goldfrank; 
“Scholars with a democratizing approach […] appreciate that decentralization 
may open the way for popular participation […] in making decisions about policy 
design and implementation, not just consultation. […] For democratizers, the 
emphasis is on transferring responsibilities, resources, and participation in 
decision-making to the lower levels of government because of the value they 
place on participation itself as an extension of citizenship (Felicissimo 1994: 50-
1; Perez Pierra 1992)” (1998: 9).  
 
The push for increasing citizen participation within the processes of a decentralized 
bureaucratic structure directly challenged the assumptions behind classical management 
theories. Moreover, they bring into question the linear yet complimentary relationship 
between democratic process and administrative compliance with predetermined 
directives.  
Nonetheless, local municipal bureaucracies have increasingly become the locus point 
for public involvement (Peters 2010).  By allowing citizen participation in bureaucratic 
processes, Peters—expanding on the work of Rothstein (2008)—posits that “the nature of 
democracy itself may be shifting away from concern with making political inputs into 
decision-making towards more direct control over outputs” (Peters 2010: 211). The view 
is not without merit; two decades earlier, Garcia-Zamor noted that “with the emergence 
                                                          
2 Other works advocating decentralization because of its purported effects on levels of democracy and 
development are Putnam, 1993; Rondinelli, 1990; Smith, 1985; World Bank, 1997, 2000.  
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of the issue of participation, [… conversation] moved away from an input orientation to 
program management and towards an output emphasis, where the recipient of program 
benefits occupies a focal role” (1985:5). Moreover, drawing from the work of Paharr and 
Putnam (2000), Peters notes that the trend toward output oriented democracy coincides 
with the declining levels in traditional political participation and the resulting increase in 
“disaffected democrats” (2010). In other words, there is a decreasing number of people 
who turn out for elections and a decreasing level of party membership while citizens are 
simultaneously being expected to participate more in bureaucratic processes (ibid.). 
Moreover, Peters (2010) notes that the nature of political parties is also shifting from a 
representational role to a single-issue status. In addition, he notes that the “floating nature 
of parties” is becoming more prevalent. Within this context, he contends that there is an 
immediate threat to accountability (ibid.). Peters bases his claim on the fact that: 
“Parties and party leaders that come and go will tend to be less effective […] 
in enforcing accountability over public bureaucracies than will more established 
parties that have an electoral incentive. [Moreover] the single issue parties maybe 
interested in accountability in that single policy area, but generally not in broader 
policy issues nor in the continuing effective operation of democratic 
accountability considered very broadly”  (Peters 2010: 213). 
 
In either case, Peters is quick to expand on a point made by McFarland (2007) and 
claim that this new form of citizen “involvement will not, of course, be done by the 
average citizen acting autonomously but rather will be done by organized groups, 
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whether in network structures or through a more pluralistic manner requiring some 
competition for access” (2010:215).3 
Although scholars like Truman (1971) viewed interest groups in the American 
political system as a feature innate to its democratic process, explaining how early writers 
such as Madison—in the federalist papers—and de Tocqueville, viewed the presence of 
such groups as not only “the essence of the political process,” but also a positive element 
of American democracy, direct participation in the administrative process has been 
viewed from two very different theoretical perspectives. The participation of “citizen 
committees” or interest groups in administrative decision-making can be predicted to 
have a positive or a negative impact on program/government efficiency depending on 
what theoretical perspective one is using. Some authors (e.g., Peters) warn that this 
“output oriented version of democracy is more individualistic, non-deliberative, and non-
mobilizational. Thus, this style of democracy shifts away from aggregating interest and 
collective decision-making toward merely responding to the demands of each individual 
(very much like the general conceptions of New Public Management)” (2010: 211).  
                                                          
3 On the subject of organized groups, authors such as Lane (1959), Almond and Verba (1963), Milbrath 
(1965), Olson (1970) and others, have attempted to explain why citizens participate in the political process. 
Most of these case studies have been based on surveys measuring attitudes that will or will not be likely to 
lead to active participation (Riedel 1972). However, the work of Truman (1971) helps explain interest 
group formation in complex societies and how they can achieve their goals effectively. Truman not only 
provides us with a definition for interest group as “any group that, on the basis of one or more shared 
attitudes, makes certain claims upon other groups in the society” (p. 33) but he provides us with a typology 
for classifying groups. Moreover, Truman puts claims on the theory “that the rate of association formation 
can serve as an index of the stability of a society” (p. 57), placing interest groups in a positive light. In 
addition, this author emphasizes the increasing need for interest groups to work through intermediary 
institutions (government), and how the extent to which these groups can achieve their goals depends on “1) 
factors relating to a groups strategic position in the society, 2) factors associated with the internal 
characteristics of the group, and 3) factors particular to the government institutions themselves” (p. 506).  
Lastly, by placing emphasis on the non-structural characteristics of interest groups, Truman validates future 
studies focusing on the role of leadership and other criterion under which group member selection might 
occur. 
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Without broad mobilization, one cannot guarantee that the general interests of the 
population are being represented. 
 
 
 
2.3 Citizen Participation in Bureaucracy: A Theoretical Framework  
As noted in the previous section, while citizen participation in the decentralized 
bureaucratic processes can serve as an avenue for increased accountability over outputs, 
replacing traditional hierarchical and political accountability mechanisms, the viability of 
such approaches is highly contentious.  
For those advocating the use of models of organization using a participatory state 
or what has been called an “empowered state” perspective, greater citizen involvement in 
the administrative decision-making process is encouraged (Kernaghan 1992). Corporate 
pluralist literature also represents a theoretical perspective that seeks to encourage 
innovative ways in which to incorporate the special knowledge of social groups (Olsen 
1986). In addition, authors such as Linder and Peters have advocated a “dialogical” 
process that would permit citizens to play a more substantial role in the policy setting 
process (1995). Through the dialogical process Linder and Peters advocate, citizens 
would bargain directly with each other in attempting to set policy.  
For these authors, as with others—Dahl (1989, 1992), Stivers (1990), Habermas 
(1996), Roberts (1997) Bringham, Nabatchi & O’Leary (2005), Ebon & Franklin (2004, 
2006), Urbinati & Warren (2008) and Sirianni (2009), Neshkova & Guo (2009), Garcia-
Zamor (1985) etc.—there are several reasons why governments embrace the concept of 
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citizen participation and citizen involvement in the decision-making process. One reason 
for engaging the public in technical policy matters is to establish procedural justice in 
accordance with democratic ideals and basic human rights (e.g. Laird 1994; Perhac 1998, 
cf. Rowe & Frewer, 2000). In the case of Dahl (1989) and Urbinati and Warren (2008), 
for example, the need for enhancing citizen participation stems from the principle that in 
order to be fair, those affected by policy outcomes should have an equal voice in the 
process. For authors such as Roberts (1997) and Salomon (2002), the desire to increase 
citizen engagement stems from the belief that there are benefits associated with the 
participatory process itself—in particular, educating the citizenry on the inner workings 
of government. Through education, the populous not only becomes empowered, but they 
also build capacity to innovate and create new and better solutions that will invigorate the 
bureaucracy (Roberts 1997). By participating, citizens not only gain knowledge of the 
trade-offs associated with the policy process (Halvorsen 2003, Kathlene and Martin 
1991), but they gain appreciation for administrators’ work (Ho and Coates 2006). Put 
another way, government can resist protest and increase legitimacy by obtaining 
information on the public’s preferences and establishing service delivery on a demand 
basis through direct citizen participation (e.g., Kasperson, Golding, and Tuler, 1992, cf. 
Rowe and Frewer 2000).  
However, not all authors agree that direct citizen participation in the 
administrative process is necessary or conducive to better policy. According to the 
“classical management” traditional representative and bureaucratic government 
perspectives, a more “decisional” approach to policy setting through technocrats is 
advocated. Contemporary authors also argue against direct public participation in the 
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policy process for several additional reasons. For starters, there is said to be a problem 
with attempting to motivate citizens to participate in a task that requires energy, 
commitment, time, and inconvenience (Bollens and Schmandt 1965, cf. Riedel 1972). 
Others state that our political system favors well-organized groups (coalitions, parties) 
(Lowi 1969, Riedel 1972), leaving direct citizen participation groups disadvantaged, even 
if they chose to participate. Moreover, there are concerns that participation outside the 
electoral process represents the narrow interest of a single perspective, rather than the 
established general interest (Boyton, Patterson, and Hedlund 1969, cf. Riedel 1972, Box 
1991, Curry, 2001, Ebdon & Franklin 2004, c.f. Neshkova and Guo 1990). Some believe 
that polarization in society might increase as a result in public deliberation (Fiorina 2005, 
Stasavage 2007, cf. Neshkova and Guo 1990). In addition, there is also an increasing 
recognition that there are monetary costs associated with citizen participation (Robbins et 
al. 2008, Ebdon and Franklin 2006, Irvin and Stansbury 2004, Thomas 1990, c.f. 
Neshkova and Guo 2009). There is cost associated with the time required to educate the 
public on the policy at hand, but also, “the per-decision cost of citizen participation 
groups is arguably more expensive than the decision-making done by a single 
administrator” with the appropriate experience and experience (Irvin and Stansbury 2004, 
58, c.f. Neshkova and Guo 2009). As noted by Nabatchi (2012), “empirical evidence does 
little to resolve this debate, suggesting at least one reason why more and better evaluation 
of citizen participation processes is needed,” (p.4) especially because citizen participation 
in public administration has become a reality in many countries.  
In an effort to redefine and expand the boundaries of participative planning and 
management (PPM), Garcia-Zamor (1985) summarized the promises and concerns of 
 26
PPM in the development context—specifically, the experience of international donor 
organizations in applying such techniques. A synopsis of Garcia-Zamor’s points on PPM 
is provided bellow: 
1. PPM is used for its ability to promote the integration of local community 
interests and the goals set forth by development projects. It provides a space 
for dialogue of various perspectives and thus helps prevent misinterpretations 
and conflict. However, it is important to confirm that beneficiaries have 
sufficient information to define their role in the participatory process and to 
make informed decisions.  
2. By promoting the involvement of beneficiaries, project performance increases. 
This is because affected members of the community have an intrinsic stake in 
the functioning of the project and will thus have greater incentive to accept 
and meet the performance criteria. Moreover, because beneficiaries had their 
voices heard during the early stages of the project, they are more likely to 
accept the outcomes and promote project continuation. 
3. PPM helps develop trust between project managers (outsiders) and 
community members. It provides a space for open communication, 
identification and resolution of community needs, and conflicting viewpoints. 
PPM empowers the community by providing members with a space to use 
their skills and creativity, thus avoiding problems associated with alienation 
and opposition to projects. It contributes to the sustainability of the projects 
because beneficiaries play an important role in allowing for the continuation 
of the project.  
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4. By allowing for the input of citizen input, one increases the chance of 
developing more targeted, useful solutions to problems faced in the 
community. By creating a built-in feedback mechanism, PPM allows for the 
early identification of problems associated with the project and helps to open 
the gateway for identifying more effective ways of resolving quality output 
issues and promotion the longevity of the project.  
5. PPM reduces information asymmetries between project managers and affected 
communities. By allowing dialogue, project managers can learn of the 
effectiveness of their practices in the field while simultaneously increasing the 
possibility that the outlook of beneficiaries on such practices will be 
positive—because they feel their concerns are being heard. 
6. By allowing for the use of local human resources versus imported inputs, 
PPM reduces the cost of project operation. It helps promote self-sufficiency 
and avoid dependency on outside regions (Garcia-Zamor 1985). 
 
Garcia-Zamor (1985) moved on to indicate that although PPM is now widely used as 
a management technique and it has excellent potential, it can fail if not applied properly. 
He then identified the potential dangers that can occur when applying PPM techniques. 
They can be summarized as follows: 
1. The creation of a bias toward one group over others occurring for various reasons. 
The most obvious was that in identifying potential project beneficiaries, those 
who were most articulate in an open forum context would most likely get their 
concerns addressed while overshadowing the majority. Thus, PPM could result in 
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the expression and pursuit of narrow individual interest rather than community 
interests. Moreover, the tendency in society to have one prominent group firmly 
in control while the rest are only moderately active was also noted as a potential 
pitfall for PPM practices. If the dominant group was not identified and measures 
were not taken to guarantee equal representation of all in society, PPM could 
simply reinforce the prestige and wealth of one group over the rest, over-
representing the interest of those with power positions in society and essentially 
giving them the power to manipulate local residents to accept their will. However, 
Garcia-Zamor (1985) noted that even if all people were given the chance to 
participate, PPM practices may still lead to oligarchic dominance and a non-equal 
distribution of benefits. This is because citizens vary in their ability to express 
their opinions. 
2. The second potential pitfall to PPM practices noted by Garcia-Zamor (1985) was 
that this approach did not identify a way to motivate members of society to 
participate—specifically, those struggling with economic hardship. Because the 
PPM approach does not give out immediate financial rewards, it is difficult to 
motivate beneficiaries that are at or near the subsistence level. The poorest of 
local residents often find it the most difficult to take time away from work 
because the economic impact of doing so is harder felt. Thus, they often feel 
content to allow the more educated local elites negotiate such projects for their 
community.  
3. Garcia-Zamor (1985) noted that for the PPM approach to be successful, one needs 
to hold prior educational campaigns to gain confidence of local residents and 
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educate poor and apathetic members of society on the importance of participation. 
These practices can be time consuming. 
4. Lastly, it was noted that PPM requires institutional restructuring that is exogenous 
to most political and administrative systems in place within developing countries. 
 
Identifying the benefits and potential drawbacks of PPM is useful program 
implementation. Garcia-Zamor’s framework is useful because the concerns about 
participatory mechanisms have not changed much over the last three decades. Moreover, 
the “values” for the practice of public participation are long-standing and agreed upon. 
For example, if one analyzes the list of core values from the International Association for 
Public Participation (IAP2), the seven points outlined below (all points are quotes from 
Tina Nabatchi’s Manager’s Guide to Evaluating Citizen Participation, Fostering 
Transparency and Democracy Series, 2012 IBM Center for the Business of Government) 
sum the pro arguments stated previously in this chapter advocating for increased citizen 
participation in public administration.   
1. “Public participation is based on the belief that those who are affected by a 
decision have a right to be involved in the decision-making process.” 
2. “The participation of those who are potentially affected by or interested in a 
decision should be sought out and facilitated.” 
3. “Public participation should seek input from participants in designing how they 
participate.”  
4. “Public participation includes the promise that the public’s contributions will 
influence the decision.” 
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5. “How public input affected the decision should be communicated to participants.”  
6. “Public participation should recognize and focus on the needs and interest of all 
participants, including decision-makers.” 
7. “Public participation should provide participants with the information they need 
to participate in a meaningful way” (Nabatchi 2012:6-7). 
The values for the practice of public administration have not changed; however, 
participatory programs do vary in their ultimate purpose and the level of empowerment or 
shared decision-making authority granted to participants (Nabatchi 2012).  In addition to 
offering a list of core values for the practice of public participation, the IAP2 provides a 
five-point Spectrum of Public Participation indicating the variance in design, 
assumptions, and levels of shared decision-making authority granted to citizens in a 
program (ibid.). The points or levels on the spectrum are outlined below (all are quotes 
from the IAP2 2007 with adaptations by Nabatchi cf. Nabatchi 2012:10-12). 
1. “Inform: At the first level of the spectrum are processes that inform, or 
‘provide the public with balanced and objective information to assist them in 
understanding the problem, alternatives, opportunities, and/or solutions.’ At 
this level the public has virtually no shared decision-making authority; thus 
the promise made by government to the public is simply, ‘We will keep you 
informed.’ Some examples of informational processes include static websites, 
mailings, bill stuffers, fact sheets, 311 call centers, and open meeting 
webcasts.   Social media tools such as Facebook and Twitter are also 
sometimes used to inform the public.”  
 31
2. “Consult: At the second level are processes that consult with the public, or ‘obtain 
feedback on analysis, alternatives, and/or decisions.’ Consultation processes 
provide minimal, if any, shared decision authority, and promise only to ‘listen to 
and acknowledge [citizens’] concerns and aspirations, and provide feedback on 
how public input influenced the decision.’ Some face-to-face examples include 
traditional public meetings and focus groups. Other consultation processes are 
done remotely through citizen surveys or various public comment devices; still 
others are done through specific interactive websites such as SeeClickFix.com, 
FixMYStreet.com, or LoveLewishman.org, as well as through numerous other 
general websites that use social media and Web 2.0 technologies.” 
3. “Involve: At the third level are processes that involve the public, or ‘work directly 
with the public through the process to ensure that public concerns and aspirations 
are consistently understood and considered.’ Involvement processes promise that 
public ‘concerns and aspirations are directly reflected in the alternatives 
developed;’ thus, they have an inherent level of shared decision authority, though 
this can range from low to moderate. Public workshops are a general example of 
face-to-face involvement processes, and National Issues Forums (e.g., Melville, 
Willingham, and Dedrick 2005) are a specific example. Deliberative Polling (e.g., 
Fishkin and Farrar 2005) is a specific example that may be done face-to-face or 
online, and Wikiplanning (www.wikiplanning.org) is a specific online example.” 
4. “Collaborate: At the fourth level are processes that collaborate with the public, or 
‘partner with the public in each aspect of the decision including the development 
of alternatives and the identification of the preferred solution.’ Collaborative 
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processes promise that public ‘advice and recommendations’ will be incorporated 
‘into the decisions to the maximum extent possible;’ thus, they have a moderate to 
high level of shared decision authority. Some citizen advisory committees may be 
structured as collaborative processes. The AmericaSpeaks 21st Century Town 
Meeting (Lukensmeyer, Goldman, and Brigham 2005) and the Citizens Jury 
(Crosby and Nethercut 2005) are specific examples of face-to-face collaborative 
processes.” 
5. “Empower: At the highest level are processes that empower the public, or ‘place 
final decision-making in the hands of the public.’ Empowerment processes have 
the highest level of shared decision authority because the promise made is that the 
government will implement what the public decides. Participatory budgeting, 
which may be done online or face-to-face, can be an empowerment process, 
particularly when done in the style of Porto Alegre, Brazil, where citizens make 
neighborhood-level decision on budgeted items (see, Abers 1998; Baiocchi 2001; 
Wampler 2007). Other processes that guarantee delegated decision authority can 
also be considered empowerment processes” (Nabatchi 2012:10-12). 
 
Different levels of engagement characterize different public participation methods. 
Moreover, as noted by Rowe & Frewer (2000), and indicated above, at the lowest level of 
engagement, the public may be targeted with enhanced information about the particular 
risks associated with a project or service that the government is providing. At higher 
levels of engagement, the government might actively solicit, through consultation 
exercises, focus groups, and questionnaires the public’s opinion on a particular service or 
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project the government has completed. At the highest level of engagement, members of 
the public can be selected to take part in exercises that provide them with a degree of 
decision-making authority. It is this level of citizen participation, the highest level of 
engagement, which in theory describes the participatory process for service delivery of 
Social Infrastructure Funds (SIF) in México.    
 
2.4 Institutionalization and Incorporation of Decentralization Policy and 
Participative Planning and Management (PPM) Practices 
The degree to which countries have successfully decentralized and incorporated PPM 
practices varies significantly. Rowland argued that the degree to which decentralization 
reaches its stated goals will vary among and within countries depending on the 
characteristics of the country and the area where power and responsibility is devolved 
(2001). Moreover, Rowland posited that within countries the variability in the “success” 
of adoption of decentralization reform is related to the population size of the local 
jurisdiction. Specifically, she posits that while the benefits of decentralization policies 
have been felt in urban areas in México, small towns and rural municipalities— which 
suffer from concentrated poverty—have not benefitted from decentralization reforms 
(2001). The present study is specifically interested in analyzing the effects of 
decentralization reforms in rural municipalities where implementation may have faced 
more difficulties.  
In addition, the successful adoption of participative mechanisms by municipalities has 
varied according to the nature and history of interaction among political parties within a 
country. Specifically, while summing the works of Abers (1996), Schonwalder (1998), 
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Nylen (1996), and Berry et al. (1993:50), Goldfrank suggests that “the strategies the 
ruling parties use and the degree to which conflict among and within parties is played out 
within participatory programs [… can] explain their relative success” (1998:10). For 
Goldfrank, accounting for the local history of social movements and political parties in 
municipalities and their relationship with the ruling parties at the national level is 
imperative when accounting for the success or failure of municipalities attempting to 
incorporate participatory mechanisms in their administrations. In conclusion, Goldfrank 
posits that in municipalities “where social movements operate in an oppositional, 
revindicative mode (or “expressive-disruptive” rather than “integrative-corporatist”) and 
are strongly allied with the party in local government, participation will be more difficult 
to institutionalize” (1998: 11-12).  
In the case of México, an understanding of México’s history of political parties and 
social movements may be reached by analyzing the developments stemming from the 
Mexican Revolution (1910-1920). The 1917 Mexican Constitution presumed a multiparty 
system and despite the Institutional Revolutionary Party’s (Partido Revolucionario 
Institucional, PRI) control of the presidential seat for 70 consecutive years prior to the 
year 2000—which characterized Mexico politically as a single-party state—the façade of 
free elections was maintained throughout the 20th century. The National Revolutionary 
Party (Partido Nacional Revolucionario), the predecessor of the PRI, was founded in 
1929. It was founded after the execution of president-elect Álvaro Obregón in 1928, 
which threatened the stability of the country and institutional changes made after the 
revolution. In 1936, during the presidency of leftist president Lázaro Cárdenas (1934 to 
1940) the National Revolutionary Party changed its name to Party of the Mexican 
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Revolution and eventually, the party settled on its present name (PRI) at the end of 
Manuel Ávila Camacho presidency (1940-1946). 
  Founded to safeguard the revolutionary cause, the PRI hegemony saw the 
centralization of economic and political resources as a requirement for the autonomous 
decision-making required to transform the nation (Mainwaring & Scully 2003). In other 
words, “in the scheme of things established by the revolutionary experience, political 
parties and party competition threatened to get in the way of the overriding goals of [the 
revolution. Moreover,] the existence of an alternative system outside the PRI, through 
which particular interest could be represented—trade unions, business organizations, 
religious associations, and other pressure groups—rendered parties unnecessary” (ibid. 
199). Thus, for decades, PRI carried out fraudulent elections and created its own 
“opposition” political parties (Mainwaring & Scully 2003).  As a result, “the right of 
opposition could not be exercised because other parties were either not ‘real,’ having 
been sponsored by the government, or being ‘real,’ that is, independent, they were too 
weak to be considered useful instruments of political participation” (ibid. 200). Thus, the 
PRI’s commitment to promoting the façade of a multiparty system, combined with their 
exercised political unanimity, resulted in the creation of short-lived political parties 
subordinated to the state that “worked as limited interest groups, without either the ability 
or the desire to widen their horizons” (ibid 200).  
The main goals of the National Revolutionary Party (the PRI predecessor) had been 
to provide lay education and agrarian reform, and to secularize the state. As mentioned 
above, most political parties served to either disseminate the main political views upheld 
by the party, having been created by the party itself, or served as interest groups 
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promoting a particular short-term goal. It was not until 1938, during the presidency of 
Lázaro Cárdenas, that the development of a cooperative government—which unified 
workers, peasants, and the military—was seen the advance of socialism and raised 
enough fear to trigger the creation of the first long-lived political party, the Political 
Action Party (Partido Acción Nacional, PAN) (Mainwaring & Scully 2003: 209).  
Although, from the beginning, PAN opposed the secularization of the state and 
liberalism, its institutionalization was mostly “a response to President Lázaro Cárdenas 
economic reforms, which included the nationalization of the oil industry, a far-reaching 
agrarian reform, and the expansion of the role of the state in regulating every aspect of 
economic activity” (ibid.: 256). The party strongly held that industrialization should be 
promoted but not through extensive government intervention outside the realm of 
regulating social antagonisms (Mainwaring & Scully 2003). Moreover, although from its 
inception the teachings of the Catholic Church had inspired the party’s doctrine, it was 
not until 1987 that the party joined the Christian Democratic Organization of Latin 
America (Organización Democrática Cristiana de América Latina) and not until much 
later (1998) that the party became a full member of the International Christian 
Democratic Organization (ibid.). Because the party formed as a rejection to the key 
achievements of the revolution (the provision of lay education, agrarian reform, and the 
secularization of the state), it was perceived to be a “real” opposition party compared to 
those that were created by the state or those that simply co-opted for collaboration with 
the state to meet the demands of a particular interest group (ibid.). Moreover, the 
‘reactionary’ party strongly denounced the antidemocratic electoral practices of the ruling 
party.  
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Put simply, “PAN was born afflicted by a ‘dilemma of participation’—a dilemma that 
all opposition parties face in choosing between co-government and opposition. The 
former involves contributing to the workings of the institutional arrangements of which it 
is part, thereby supporting the functions of government through ‘loyal opposition’; the 
latter involves blocking the functions of government—at times even those of political 
institutions—with a view to achieving power” (Mainwaring & Scully 2003: 201). 
Although the party was seen as possessing an ideology in opposition to that of the PRI 
predecessors, giving it legitimacy as a “real” opposition party, its commitment to the 
electoral process and its lack of action to block government functions in protest, gave the 
PAN the label of what Linz coined in 1978 as “loyal opposition” (ibid.). The party’s lack 
of active protest or contention for power outside the electoral system led to its survival 
during the PRI hegemony while many other parties failed to survive the reappraisal from 
PRI during the same period (ibid.). 
The main actions of PAN focused on gaining votes. By the 1964 parliamentary 
elections, PAN won 20 seats in parliament and did not label the elections fraudulent, 
focusing instead on pressing for new legislation and creating more space for itself in the 
press (Mainwaring & Scully 2003). By 1977 some of PAN’s initiatives relating to the 
composition of political parties in the Chamber of Deputies were included in the 
constitutional changes made by PRI through the Ley Federal de Organizaciones, Partidos 
y Processos Electorales (1977 Electoral Law, LOPPE) (ibid.). The law gave a 
proportional number of seats in the Chamber of Deputies to oppositional parties. By 
1979, PAN was established as the “second largest force in Mexican politics [… 
moreover,] PAN was the only opposition party that obtained majority seats in the 
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Chamber” (ibid. 221.). Its strategic position within the Chamber of Deputies (gained by 
its role as “loyal opposition,” focusing only on gaining ground through the electoral 
process) gave the party a degree of legitimacy and a great degree of influence over the 
legislation that could be passed to pursue its neoliberal ideology.   
In the interim, during the 1970s, under the leadership of Luis Echeverría, and with 
recommendations of international institutions such as the World Bank and the Inter-
American Development Bank, the highly centralized federal State of México began the 
arduous process of decentralization (Mizrahi in Chapter 5 of the book by Tulchin & Selee 
2004). The initial steps toward decentralization included a series of attempts at spatial, 
economic, and administrative decentralization. Under the presidential administration of 
Luis Echeverría (1970-1976), polos de desarrollo (development poles) were established 
in order to spur development away from central cities and into poorer areas. Under the 
presidency of José López Portillo (1976-1982), efforts to achieve spatial and economic 
decentralization became more targeted. By 1978, the Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 
Urbano (National Urban Development Plan, PNDU) was announced, formalizing the 
effort to re-orient growth away from the capital city and into designated “zones,” middle-
sized cities demonstrating potential for economic and social advancement (Rodriguez 
1997). In addition, progress toward administrative decentralization was made. Programs 
such as the Desconcentración de la Administración Pública Federal (Deconcentracion of 
the Federal Public Administration) were passed, promoting, as the name implied, the 
deconcentration of the federal public administration (ibid.). 
However, despite the previous efforts to achieve spatial, economic, and 
administrative decentralization in the 1970s, efforts to achieve political 
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decentralization—often equated with democratization and the granting of decision-
making authority to citizens and their elected representatives—did not begin until the 
1980s (Rodriguez 1997). As noted previously, political decentralization policies have 
been formulated with several goals in mind, such as increasing allocative efficiency, 
accountability, and legitimacy. In México, attempts at reform, in particular efforts to 
achieve political decentralization in the 1980s and 1990s, have been viewed as being 
primarily focused on regaining the legitimacy of the administrative and political process 
(Rodriguez 1997). After all, decentralization reforms during that period were “formulated 
in response to the problems and realities that surfaced during the 1980s: macro-economic 
adjustment, negative economic growth, the fiscal crisis of the state, the collapse of the 
tacit alliance between the state and corporative-bureaucratic groups, the globalization of 
the economy, growing inequalities in the distribution of resources, the decomposition of 
social classes and class alliances, and the demands of new social movements to 
participate in decision-making procedures” (Beneria and Mendoza 1995:65-66).  
Nonetheless, some authors have stated that in México, because the 
Institutionalized Revolutionary Party (PRI)4 functioned mainly to serve elite party 
supporters, and attempts to reform would have threatened the establishment, reforms 
were merely superficial. They were designed primarily to appease workers and the 
masses by creating the impression of change.  For example, Coleman and Davis argue 
that reforms in México would be “preemptive in nature, designed to do what seems 
necessary to avert the threat of uncontrolled mobilization, [and would] probably stop 
short of producing sufficient change to induce gratitude among intended beneficiaries” 
                                                          
4 PRI dominated the political process for 80 years, characterizing the country as a single-party state. Not 
until the year 2000 was a president from a different political party elected into office.  
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(Coleman and Davis 1983, p. 22). For this reason, it is important to note the impact, if 
any, political decentralization efforts have had on local government functions. 
As mentioned above, attempts to achieve decentralization prior to the 1980s 
focused on fostering spatial, economic, and administrative decentralization. It was during 
the presidency of Miguel de la Madrid that the rhetoric of political decentralization 
became official and thereafter its transition into policies self-evident. Rodriguez (1997) 
has cited several statements from the president exemplifying the official rhetoric of 
political decentralization, such as; “‘Descentralizar es democratizar y democratizar es 
descentralizar (To decentralize is to democratize, and to democratize is to decentralize) 
and ‘La modernización de México avanzara por el camino de la descentralización. La 
fortaleceremos… para ampliar la democracia’ (México’s modernization will advance by 
means of decentralization. We shall strengthen it in order to increase democracy)” 
(Rodriguez, 1997 p. 7). Thereafter, the presidency of Miguel de la Madrid and the later 
presidencies leading up to Vicente Fox formalized the rhetoric into concrete policies, 
advancing the country toward becoming a decentralized polyarchal democratic state. 
Moreover, decentralization efforts became increasingly focused on establishing an 
institutionalized process through which to incorporate citizen participation in the 
development of economic development policies/projects/initiatives. The social policy of 
the 1990s followed a demand-driven approach that accompanied the neo-liberal 
economic policies of the last decade (Beneria and Breny 1995). “This approach 
represent[ed] a shift in social policy orientation: from one that views the state as being 
responsible for redistributive mechanisms and social services affecting all citizens, to one 
that targets only specific groups and projects [Stahl, 1994]. It also represent[ed] a shift in 
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the responsibility for policy implementation from state institutions to local governments, 
community groups and non-governmental organizations” (ibid.:55).   
During the presidency of Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994), El Programa Nacional 
de Solidaridad (the National Solidarity Program; PRONASOL), was announced as a new 
program requiring citizen participation to implement a wide range of economic 
development programs such as infrastructure for potable water, roads, schools, 
electrification, and hospitals. “The objectives of the new social policy therefore had to be 
compatible with the ongoing processes of modernization, privatization, deregulation, and 
liberalization. They also had to (a) build a new solidarity with the have-nots; (b) foster 
co-responsibility between the state and the beneficiaries of the new social policy; (c) fit in 
with the requirements for a high-quality and efficient state sector; and (d) build 
impartiality in the delivery of social services” (Beneria and Breny 1995:66).  
PRONASOL was a section of the Ley de Coordinación Fiscal (Fiscal Coordination Law, 
LCF), a law that hoped to achieve greater efficiency in government operations through 
the coordination of national and state affairs. The allocation of resources directly from 
this Social Infrastructure Fund (SIF) to the projects stipulated by the Planning 
Committees for Development (COPLADES)5 and approved by the federal executive in 
Social Development Agreements (in Spanish, CDS) was said to resolve the problems 
created by a lack of community support (Tulchin & Selee, 2004). The PRONASOL 
approach to determining service delivery of economic development projects required the 
                                                          
5 COPLADES had been formed during the presidency of Lopez Portillo (1976-1982) as one of the first 
steps toward decentralization. They are composed of all the municipal presidents in the country and 
presided by the governors of each state. The projects proposed by the COPLADES were to come directly 
from the request of the Solidarity Committees, which in turn were composed of ordinary civilians 
organized at the local level (Tulchin & Selee, 2004). 
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highest level of citizen participation. Community members had to organize themselves 
into Solidarity Committees and channel their requests to the COPLADES. However;  
“critics of PRONASOL have repeatedly claimed that the program is shaped more 
by political concerns than by a serious intention to eliminate poverty. It has been accused 
of being aimed at recovering the votes lost in the 1988 elections by the governing party 
(PRI) […]. In this sense, PRONASOL is viewed as attempting to waken the opposition 
by concentrating its projects in areas of dissatisfied groups, even if they are not among 
the poorest. It has also been pointed out that the official message seems to be that the 
PRONASOL is made possible by the privatization and liberalization processes tied to 
structural adjustment, thereby making more acceptable an economic program that has 
impoverished or intensified the poverty of a large portion of the population” (Beneria and 
Breny 1995: 69-70). That said, Beneria and Breny indicate that the defenders of 
PRONASOL exalt the program’s political nature because of its ability to facilitate 
democratization of the state and civil society and democratization in turn is a requirement 
for poverty alleviation (ibid.). 
During the presidency of Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000), “New Federalism” was 
announced as the strategy that would reform intergovernmental relations in the country. It 
intended to reduce the power of the president, promote transparency in the election 
process, and strengthen the local (e.g. state and municipal) governments (Rodriguez, 
1997).  The process of fiscal decentralization that occurred under the banner of New 
Federalism increased the transfer of funds from the national government to states and 
municipalities. Up to this point, “80% of all resources collected by the federation 
remained in the center, while 17% went to the states and 3% went to the municipalities. 
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In 1998, the federal government reduced its share by almost 10 percentage points, 
reserving 70.9% of all resources for itself, and allocating 24.4% to the states and 4.7% to 
the municipalities” (Martinez & Ziccardi 2000, c.f.  Tulchin & Selee 2004, p. 154). More 
importantly, the modification of Article 115 in the Constitution granted discretionary 
power over the use of these finances to the municipalities such that “powers exclusive to 
the municipality that before were held concurrently with the state, such as public works, 
the preventive police, and potable water, were recognized” (Guerrero and Guillen 2000, 
cf. Martinez & Ziccardi 2000, Tulchin & Selee 2004, p. 154). 
By 1998, Section 33 officially replaced Section 26 (formally PRONASOL). 
Through this new program, Section 33, SIF resources were transferred directly to the 
municipalities, bypassing the state governments. From 1998 to date, no modifications to 
Section 33 have been made. The new program, like PRONASOL, dictates the use of SIF 
resources by municipalities (Martinez & Ziccardi 2000, Tulchin & Selee 2004, p. 154). 
The responsibility over the allocation of SIF—used to provide the public with economic 
development projects such as potable water, sewage, expansion and construction of 
schools, and other basic services—was devolved to the municipalities and decentralized 
to include citizen participation in the process.  
A keystone of the PAN ideology was its promotion of the municipality as the “natural 
community,” which in turn translated into support of decentralization policies 
implemented by the de la Madrid (1982-1988) administration in the 1980s (Mainwaring 
& Scully 2003) and those implemented thereafter. The decentralization policies 
implemented granted new sources of income and autonomy to the municipalities as well 
as increased inlets for citizen participation in the decision-making process of the local 
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administrations. The new spotlight placed on the municipality resulted in increased 
involvement of PAN in local elections. “Between 1966 and 1982, the party participated 
in elections in less than 20% of municipalities nationwide; after 1982, this rose to 
between 31% and 58%. In 1993, it presented candidates in 88% of all municipalities, in 
1997 in 96% of them” (ibid. 224). The PAN’s support for decentralization policies 
implemented at the national level by the PRI administration leads one to speculate that 
PAN municipalities might be more inclined to comply with the implementation of 
participatory mechanisms as mandated by federal decentralization legislation during this 
period than municipalities controlled by other opposition parties.  
In any case, the main base of support for the party during the 1980s was from the 
wealthier states and groups with high income and status who brought to the table “their 
own resources for electoral campaigns” (ibid. 223). In addition to supporting the 
decentralization policies implemented by the de la Madrid administration, PAN showed 
support for the administration’s role in decreasing the role of the state in economic 
affairs. Thus, during this decade, PAN lost support from México City—whose support 
was shifting to left-wing leaning candidates (ibid.). The presidential administration of de 
la Madrid (1982-1988) signaled a period of congruence in ideology on economic policy 
between PAN and PRI, however despite the similarities in economic ideology, the 
leading role of PAN as the opposition party remained. However, the earthquake of 1985 
marked the emergence of a new opposition that would institutionalize itself soon after 
and usurp PAN’s role as the leading opposition party during the 1988 presidential 
elections.  
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The inadequate response of PRI in the aftermath of the devastating earthquake caused 
civil society groups to organize themselves to aid in the rescue process in México City 
(Harbers 2007). These civil society groups were tied to the individuals, groups, and 
smaller political parties that were to unify themselves to form the Partido de la 
Revolución Democrática (Democratic Revolutionary Party, PRD) in 1989 (ibid.). The 
founders of PRD (i.e., Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, Heberto Castillo, Marco Rascón Córdova, 
Gilberto Rincón Gallardo, Porfirio Muñoz Ledo, etc.) were former left-wing PRI 
members who unified many smaller parties, such as: the Partido Comunista Mexicano 
(Mexican Communist Party), Partido Socialista Unificado de México (Unified Socialist 
Party of México), Partido Mexicano Socialista (Socialist Mexican Party) and Partido 
Mexicano de los Trabajadores (Mexican Workers' Party) into one, the coalition of center-
left parties called National Democratic Front (Frente Democrático Nacional). After the 
1988 election, the National Democratic Front became the Democratic Revolutionary 
Party (PRD). As mentioned previously; “one of the PRI’s defining characteristics [in the 
20th century] was its ability to undermine, accommodate and co-opt social movements in 
order to prevent mobilized citizens from challenging the party. Fear of co-option ha[d] 
led many social movements to be distrustful of political parties and avoid alliances, even 
with parties of the opposition (Davis, 1997, p. 178; Gilbert and Gugler, 1992, p. 185; 
Ward, 1990, p. 91). [Thus,] during the PRI regime almost all access to the political 
system was channeled through party-affiliated corporatist organizations. Under these 
conditions most participation was either regime-supportive or compromised of 
petitioning and contacting of public officials to influence the allocation of public goods 
(Cornelius and Craig, 1991.) (Harbers 2007: 43). Thus, the unification of left-wing 
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opposition into PRD, as a result of the frustration with PRI’s inability to deal with crisis, 
changed the political dynamic and the ability of the PRI hegemony to monopolize the 
electoral process. Moreover, it affected the role of PAN in the process. 
On October 14, 1987, Cárdenas was nominated to run for president in the 1988 
elections representing the predecessor of the PRD, the National Democratic Front (FDN). 
Poll figures recognized that FDN had received 31% of the vote, almost double PAN’s 
share (Mainwaring & Scully 2003).  “Moreover, the share of votes that went to the FDN 
were enough to win the election, however, through fraudulent means, the PRI declared 
their candidate, Salinas de Gortari, victorious” (ibid.: 235). FDN had become the new 
leading opposition party.  Both PAN and FDN rejected the presidential election results. 
Cardenas, the FDN candidate, organized street protests and pushed for the annulment of 
elections. The PAN, who had for years authored and advocated electoral reforms, 
recognized irregularities in the electoral process, but settled for their role as ‘interlocutor’ 
for the government (ibid.). While rejecting the legitimacy of the presidential results, PAN 
“defended the advances it had made in the Chambers of Deputies [and] thanks to its 
participation in all the procedures of the electoral process-and to […] not follow[ing] the 
protest movement orchestrated by Cardenas—the new congress could be inaugurated and 
so comply with the timetable prescribed by the Constitution” (ibid.). “During the Salinas 
government, the [PAN] party gained an unprecedented capacity of influence. Not only 
did it have real strength in the Chamber of Deputies, but also the ill will between the 
president and the followers of Cuauhtémoc Cardenas opponents afforded the PAN the 
privileged position to act as an arbiter between irreconcilable adversaries. It thus assumed 
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functions of political leadership and created the conditions for negotiation and dialogue” 
(Mainwaring & Scully 2003:235).  
Through concertaciones, a term coined for the compromises between PRI and PAN 
in resolving the irregularities of the electoral process, PRI recognized the victories of 
PAN candidates in various states without having to annul elections (ibid.). Moreover, 
“between 1988 and 1994, the PAN was a party to many government decisions” 
(Mainwaring & Scully 2003: 236) including constitutional amendments that impacted 
rural collectives and the relationship between church and state as well as the promotion of 
market-oriented reforms and policies that further pushed for fiscal decentralization. “In 
fact, during those years, many PAN politicians themselves used to claim that the 
president had actually stolen their party’s economic platform and was implementing most 
of the economic policies and reforms the PAN had long ago proposed” (Mainwaring & 
Scully 2003: 257). While PAN worked within ‘the institutional arrangements’ 
strengthening its role as “loyal opposition,” PRD worked to block functions of 
government through protest. In 1994, PRI won the presidential seat with no apparent 
fraud being committed; in 2000, the first non-PRI candidate was elected president. The 
presidency went to Vicente Fox from PAN. However, the 2006 and 2012 elections for 
president were labeled as fraudulent by PRD and organized protests occurred in the 
aftermath of both elections.  
These two different strategies for contesting power, “co-government and opposition 
[…] the former [which] involves contributing to the workings of the institutional 
arrangements of which it is part [and] the latter [which] involves blocking the functions 
of government […] with a view to achieving power” can be observed in the PAN and 
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PRD strategies designed to deal with perceived electoral fraud (Mainwaring & Scully 
2003: 201). Following Goldfrank (1998), one could argue that PAN’s ability to 
compromise with PRI and adopt a co-government position would make it more likely to 
incorporate participatory mechanisms in the municipalities it controls. Moreover, the 
ability of PAN to work slowly through the electoral process, gaining control of positions 
of power, in order to effect change through the institutional arrangements of which it is 
part, utilizing Goldfrank’s (1998) framework, would also lead to the conclusion that it 
might be more likely to incorporate participatory mechanisms in the municipality it 
controls. On the other hand, PRD’s adoption of an opposition strategy in dealing with the 
PRI administration in the 20th century and PAN after the election of 2000 would indicate 
that the municipalities governed by PRD would be less likely to incorporate participatory 
mechanisms. 
During the study period of this dissertation, PAN presidents controlled the executive 
branch of government. While the decentralization doctrine of promoting municipal 
autonomy, promulgated by PAN leadership, flowered in municipalities and states 
controlled by PAN, during the same period, municipalities and states controlled by 
opposition parties (PRD and PRI included) fought against the ideological tide to gain or 
regain control. This dissertation attempted to shed light on how the political reality 
shaped the formation and involvement of citizen committees in the areas under study. 
Summarizing the arguments presented in this section, the suggestion that the 
historical relationship between opposition parties and local government administrations 
should affect the willingness of municipalities to incorporate citizen participation in the 
administrative processes is not farfetched. In México, the Institutional Revolutionary 
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Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, PRI) controlled the presidential seat for 70 
consecutive years, essentially characterizing México’s political system as a single party 
state prior to the year 2000. The slow political opening was a result of continual pressure 
by the people who were represented by two major opposition parties, the Political 
Action Party (Partido Acción Nacional, PAN) and the Democratic Revolution Party 
(Partido de la Revolución Democrática, PRD).  These two political parties had and 
continue to have very different political agendas and historical relationships with the 
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). The presence of each political party, with its 
unique political platform and relationship to the ruling party at the executive level, could 
indeed impact a municipality’s incorporation of participatory mechanisms. More 
recently, Rowe and Frewer have considered the process through which citizen 
participation has been channeled to account for a certain degree of participation (2000). 
In particular, they have established two criteria for evaluating citizen participation 
methods, the acceptance criterion and the process criterion; the acceptance criterion 
concerns features of a method that make it acceptable to the wider public, and the 
process criterion concerns features of the process that is liable to ensure that it takes 
place in an effective manner (Rowe & Frewer 2000). 
  
2.5  Solidarity Committees in México: The Legacy of PRONASOL 
As noted by Rowland, “in México there is no single law which delineates the 
scope of citizen participation in local government” (2001:1380). States can encourage 
participation in their municipalities by creating mechanisms that allow for it in their 
Constitutions, municipal laws, urban planning laws, etc., but they are not obliged to do so 
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(ibid.). However, “the PRONASOL [National Solidarity Program] program (1988-94) 
imposed its own scheme for citizen participation in local government” (see Cornelius, 
Craig & Fox, 1994; Dresser, 1991) (ibid.). As noted by Brenia and Breny (1995), 
PRONASOL was created to promote decentralization and citizen participation. 
Specifically, the goals were to: 
“a) to institutionalize the principles and methods of PRONASOL at the 
level of municipalities for the purpose of strengthening local governments; 
b) to facilitate a major institutionalization and coordination of activities 
linking the federal, state and municipal actors; and c) to energize local 
social organizations” (Beneria and Breny 1995: 67). 
 
To promote these objectives, PRONASOL allowed for NGO representatives or 
other neighborhood associations to become part of a COPLADES (Planning Committees 
for Development) whose stipulated projects had to then be approved by the federal 
executive in Social Development Agreements (in Spanish, CDS). Moreover, 
“PRONASOL’s methodology […] emphasized the creation of solidarity committees 
(SCs), democratically elected by members of a possible community to project 
beneficiaries at the micro-regional level” (Beneria & Breny 1995: 67). This was the first 
instance in México where citizen committees were legislated to form part of the decision-
making process. “The SCs [were to] formulate the demands of their communities and 
prioritize projects, thus beginning at this point what PRONASOL has called a process of 
‘participatory planning’” (ibid.) The process involved in PRONASOL’s “participatory 
planning” were the following: 
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• “First, the SCs evaluate social demands through direct participatory 
methods. 
• Second, representative interlocutors (that is, SCs and official members of 
the Planning Ministry and SEDESOL) prepare a technical document 
specifying the nature of projects. 
• Third, SCs and representatives of regional and local planning agencies of 
SEDESOL plan public works and estimate cost. At this stage, the federal, 
state, municipal and community contributions and commitments are 
stipulated. The community contribution may take the form of money, 
materials or labor. 
• Fourth, the final stage deals with the implementation, control, and 
evaluation of the projects. To these activities, one must add the 
supervision of the project at the community level, which involves 
overseeing the selection of a contractor, the quality and cost of materials, 
and time schedules” (Beneria and Breny 1995: 67). 
As noted by Beneria and Breny, “an interesting feature of PRONASOL’s discourse is 
that it relie[d] heavily on ancient cultural practices of Indian communities, such as 
solidarity and mutual aid, and on notions of social justice associated with the Mexican 
Revolution” (1995:66). Thus, promotion of co-responsibility for projects funded through 
PRONASOL would be thus facilitated in areas where participants already had a culture 
of solidarity.  
“Under co-participation schemes, program beneficiaries are encouraged to 
participate in defining program priorities and to co-finance projects with 
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their own resources, particularly labour. As such, poor rural and urban 
organizations enter into a new relationship, involving partnership, with 
governmental institutions. By placing co-participation at the center of the 
new social policy, PRONASOL’s intellectual authors claim not only that 
they are leaving behind past practices that favored the exchange for 
political support for social favors; but also that they are struggling against 
old practices of paternalism, bureaucratization, and corruption. In this 
respect, they speak about a new political equation that includes the state 
and civil society and about the creation of a new political culture” (ibid.) 
 
The assumption behind co-participation, or what is the active involvement of affected 
citizens aiding in the improvement of their own communities, was that it eradicates 
paternalism, boosts the dignity of the poor, and contributes to co-responsibility of raising 
communities out of poverty and promoting the sustainability of efforts to combat poverty 
(ibid). “According to PRONASOL, the new social policy not only democratizes relations 
between state and society, it also strengthens the social organization of the poor. [… 
Thus], PRONASOL can be viewed not only as a channel through which social demands 
can be articulated, but also as a space where the poor gain civil consciousness and thus 
become real subjects of civil and economic rights” (Beneria and Breny 1995:69). 
According to Tiburcio (1992), co-participation in PRONASOL “resulted in a high level 
of community identification with the projects, so that the communities themselves [were] 
more likely to take responsibility for the quality and sustainability of projects” (c.f. 
Beneria and Breny 1995:71). 
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As mentioned above, PRONASOL was a section of the Ley de Coordinación 
Fiscal (Fiscal Coordination Law, LCF), a law that aimed to achieve greater efficiency in 
government operations through the coordination of national and state affairs. Currently, 
“the closest thing in México to national legislation on citizen participation in local 
government is found in the National Democratic Planning System (Sistema Nacional de 
Planeacion Democratica), which was established in 1982 as part of the [LCF] Planning 
Law. The system [which regulated PRONASOL] provides the basis for citizen 
participation in local planning [… but, the] precise rules […] vary from state to state, as 
to their duties and prerogatives. Under such circumstances, it is difficult to know exactly 
what procedures, if any, are actually followed at the municipal level” (2001:1380). 
Moreover, in 1998, Section 33 replaced Section 26 (formerly PRONASOL). Through this 
new program, Section 33, SIF resources were transferred directly to the municipalities, 
bypassing the state governments. However, because “the Solidarity Program 
[PRONASOL] received a great deal of attention from the international development 
community and from national governments” (Beneria & Breny 1995:54), its effects, as 
we will see in the next chapter, had a lasting influence in shaping municipal decision-
making and the inclusion of citizen committees in the allocation of SIF resources.  
Currently, at the municipal level, elections are held every three years. Once 
elected, the municipal president selects, at his/her discretion, a group of “technocrats” 
who will compose part of his/her cabildo (city council). Section 33 of the Fiscal 
Coordination Law (LCF) allows this city council to make decisions on SIF allocation. 
Decisions on allocation can also be made by the coplademun (Municipal Development 
Planning Committee) or by citizen committees (as interest groups/citizen committees).  In 
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a study by Hernandez-Trillo and Jarillo-Rabling (2008) on SIF allocation in about 2,429 
municipalities, 69.2% of decisions examined in the study were made by cabildos, 29.5% 
by coplademun, and .7% by other participatory forms, including citizen committees (the 
descendants of Solidarity Committees). After conducting their study, Hernandez-Trillo 
and Jarillo-Rabling also noted that SIF is subject to elite capture and that it is positively 
related to population size, a proxy for voter registration. The bigger the municipality, in 
terms of population, the larger the share of funds it receives.  Moreover, the study also 
found that “SIF is disbursed toward communities with larger populations within the 
municipality, regardless of the social infrastructure level of coverage” (Hernandez-Trillo 
& Jarillo-Rabling 2008, p. 1556).  
As mentioned above, of particular interest to the present study is the allocation of 
SIF resources through citizen committees in rural municipalities. According to 
Hernandez-Trillo and Jarillo-Rabling (2008), SIF allocation decisions made by citizen 
committees [which, as described in the next section of this chapter, are included in the 
category “committees for community improvement” in the 2010 Latin American Public 
Opinion Project (LAPOP) and whose members could also have indicated in the study that 
they solicited or demanded a service at the local level] living within rural areas are the 
least likely to occur. Under current legislation, in order for SIF resources to be allocated 
through Section 33 by citizen committees, households have to prioritize the work, 
households have to organize themselves to form the citizen committees, and the 
municipality must prioritize the project in response to the request of the citizen 
committees. Due to lack of research, it is not clear how these citizen committees operate 
in different regions, what role these interest groups have in the municipal decision-
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making process, and what impact they have on SIF allocation decisions. In other words, 
what kind of advisory committees do these solidarity committees most resemble in 
actuality; do they resemble the advisory, supportive, put-off or put-on committees as 
described by Riedel (1972)? 
  
2.6 Determinants of Citizen Participation in México  
Authors such as Lane (1959), Almond and Verba (1963), Milbrath (1965), Olson 
(1970) and others, have attempted to explain why citizens participate in the political 
process. Most of these case studies were based on surveys measuring attitudes that may 
or may not be likely to lead to active participation (Riedel 1972). During the 1960s and 
1970s, studies that analyzed the civic culture and political attitudes in México found an 
apathetic, cynical, and at times antidemocratic attitude predominating among Mexican 
adults (see, for example, Scott 1965; Hansen 1971; Needler 1971; and Segovia 1975). 
Almond and Verba (1963) found that two-thirds of the participants in their study were 
“subjects,” one-quarter “parochial,” and “participants” seemed to be almost non-existent. 
A study by Fromm and Maccoby (1970, 89-90) on political culture in village life found 
that only 7% of participants had a democratic orientation while the predominant 
sociopolitical relations present among villagers were of authoritarianism, with 
submissiveness toward traditional authority being quite common. Moreover, in a study 
designed to question the pre-established “authoritarian nature” of political culture, Fagen 
and Tuohy concluded that political attitudes that predominated in their study were 
characterized by apathy and indifference to democratic principles, in particular among 
women of lower classes (Fagen & Tuohy, 1972). A later study found that “the prevailing 
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political culture in México expresses comparatively low support for democracy and 
relatively high support for non-democratic government, on the one hand, and low 
interpersonal trust, low levels of tolerance, and a strong emphasis on deference, on the 
other” (Mendez & Moreno 2002: 350). These attitudes were viewed as resulting in a lack 
of participation in the electoral process and thus the persistence of a less than democratic 
government.  
More recently, in a study of citizen participation from 2004-2010, investigators 
Paras García, López Olmedo, Vargas López, & Seligson, of the 2010 Latin American 
Public Opinion Project (LAPOP 2010), found three main significant variables that affect 
citizen participation in the Mexican electoral process. The first is age. Older individuals 
are more likely to vote.6 The second variable is political interest. However, as mentioned 
in the LAPOP study, although one would believe that this relationship would be positive 
—the more interested an individual is in politics, the more likely he/she will vote—that is 
not always the case (2010). As the authors of the LAPOP study indicate, sometimes not 
voting is a form of protesting or politically manifesting one’s opinions (ibid.).7 The third 
variable is gender. However, in contradiction to other studies (Almond & Verba, etc.) the 
data obtained by the Barometer of The Americas and utilized by the LAPOP 2010 study, 
women are more likely to vote than men (ibid.).8 Of lesser statistical significance, the 
                                                          
6 This positive relationship between age and voting is also present among the variables age and 
participation in civic organizations (ibid.). 
 
7 The study found that one in four Mexicans interviewed disclosed that they had no interest in politics vs. 
one in ten who said they were very interested. 
 
8 It is important to note that the LAPOP 2010 study did not consider urban vs. rural women participating in 
the electoral process, which might have produced different results. 
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level of education was shown to have a positive effect on participation in the electoral 
process (ibid.).  
The authors of the LAPOP 2010 study found that political participation did not 
change significantly from 2004 to 2010 (ibid.). Authors such as Crow (2009) indicate that 
the less than enthusiastic participation in elections is a result of citizen disenchantment 
with politics. Crow argues that citizen disenchantment with politics in México “is 
widespread: Mexicans profoundly distrust parties, politicians, and parliament. […He 
argues that] widespread and deep dissatisfaction with democracy may jeopardize the 
survival of some new democracies, but the more immediate concern raised by 
dissatisfaction is its detrimental impact on political participation” (2009: xiii). In addition 
to the work of Crow (2009), “there has been a lot of focus on the role that ‘social capital’, 
and in particular the degree of trust—interpersonal and institutional—in society has on 
citizen participation. Utilizing Fukuyama’s (1997) definition of social capital as “norms 
and values that permit cooperative behavior in groups,”9 investigators Paras García, 
López Olmedo, Vargas López, & Seligson of the 2010 LAPOP study elaborate and 
comment that participation is dependent on the existence of channels for participation, as 
well as the disposition of individuals to collaborate. Moreover, they theorize that citizens 
who participate in civil society learn to work together and to trust one another but that a 
minimal amount of interpersonal trust is needed to allow for collaboration in the first 
place. They conclude that a strong civil society, as measured by its citizen’s trust and 
participation in the system, contributes to the establishment of democracy.  
                                                          
9 English translation of Fukuyama (1997) in Pablo Paras García, Carlos López Olmedo, Dinorah Vargas 
López, & Seligson 2010 work in Spanish.   
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Expanding on the analysis of the degree of interpersonal trust to México, the 
LAPOP study found that an estimate of 60.5% of the national population feels that the 
people in their area are very trustworthy (2010). However, compared to other countries in 
the region, México has an aggregate low level of interpersonal trust (LAPOP 2010).  The 
LAPOP study found that the most statistically significant determinant of interpersonal 
trust is the perception of public safety. When the perception of public safety decreases, so 
does interpersonal trust (ibid). However, according to this study, despite the increasing 
levels of violence and the worsening economic conditions since the global financial 
crisis, the level of interpersonal confidence has remained statistically constant since 2004 
(ibid.). The second determinant, according the authors of the LAPOP study, is the level of 
education of the individual—the higher the level of education, the higher the level of 
interpersonal trust. Lastly, age also influences the level of interpersonal trust, as older 
individuals have a higher level of individual trust (ibid.)  
According to the above noted LAPOP study, most citizen participation in México 
in 2010 occurred within religious organizations; all religions taken into consideration, 
approximately 44.2% of Mexicans participate in this kind of civic organization. The 
second most popular form of public participation in civic organization in México, being 
comprising roughly 24.4% of the population, is participation in school-related parent 
groups. This level of participation varies among schools, but occurs in both public and 
private schools. The next most popular form of public participation occurs in 
“committees for community improvement.” Around 13% of the Mexican population 
participates in this kind of civic organization. Committees for community improvement 
can include citizen committees, which form to promote a particular public infrastructure 
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project and are of particular interest to this study, and any other type of committee that 
forms to resolve specific problems in neighborhoods and can come to be controlled by 
political parties as part of a clientelistic strategy to control popular zones in large urban 
locations (LAPOP 2010). It is participation in these “committees for community 
improvement” that this study is interested in. The present study hopes to analyze their 
operation in rural areas and their influence on the governance/decision-making process of 
municipalities and ultimately create a typology of citizen committees that would 
contribute to the comparative administration literature on the topic.  
 In any case, monitoring the variations of participation in the above noted civic 
organizations from 2004-2010, the LAPOP study indicates that although participation in 
religious organizations has dropped during the period, it is not likely to be a sign of the 
reduction of participation; it continues to be the primary form of participation in the 
country, but rather a result of secularization (ibid.). In the case of participation in school-
related parent groups, participation was similar from year to year and the measures for 
2004 and 2010 were also nearly identical (ibid.). However, unlike the participation in the 
above-noted civic organizations, which remained very similar during the period noted, 
participation in committees for community improvement, which is the area this particular 
study is interested in, changed dramatically during the time in question. In 2004 
participation in committees for community improvement was 16.9% and by 2010 it was 
13%. As noted in the LAPOP study, the decrease in participation was not oscillatory, 
with sharp ups and downs, but rather signaled a clear downward trend in participation 
through time (ibid.). The downward trend is important to note because the purpose of 
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decentralization policies was to distribute funds for infrastructure projects dictated by the 
input of these groups. 
 In addition to citizen participation in civic organizations, citizen participation in 
local government is very important. As stated by Paras García, López Olmedo, Vargas 
López, & Seligson of the 2010 LAPOP study, “it is the local municipal governments who 
are in charge of receiving the majority of the demands from the population and who are 
responsible for responding to a good portion of those demands, especially those related to 
public services like transportation, security, maintenance of public spaces, etc., in 
summary, they are immediately responsible for the quality of life in society” (English 
translation of LAPOP 2010: 139). Decentralization efforts hoped to bring the government 
closer to the people by transferring decision-making authority to municipal governments 
who are “closer to the people.” In an attempt uncover how close Mexicans are to their 
local government, the LAPOP 2010 study asked if they had participated in any municipal 
meeting/assembly or session—the study found that México placed below half of the other 
countries in the Americas. Only one out of ten Mexicans stated that they had participated 
in local government during the year (LAPOP 2010). Participation in local government 
meetings/assemblies etc. have remained stable at around 9% since 2006, having dropped 
from 2004 when 12.8% of the population had participated in local government (ibid.).  
To contrast participation in local government—an indicator of cooperation 
between citizens and government officials in the decision-making process—with the one-
way exertion of pressure from citizens on government officials to carry out their 
demands, the LAPOP study analyzed how often citizens sought out, solicited, or 
petitioned local government officials/functionaries during 2010. The study found that 
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16.4% of those interviewed solicited help or presented a petition to the local government.  
This finding contrasted with the level of participation in local government 
meetings/assemblies/sessions, which was around 9% (ibid.). In other words, a significant 
number of Mexicans engage with their local municipal government soliciting services. 
However, the percentage of people who petitioned or solicited a service to the local 
government had decreased from 2004 to 2010 (ibid.).   The next question asked by the 
LAPOP 2010 study was who was more inclined to seek help or solicit local government 
in México. The variables considered were the size of the municipality, wealth quintiles, 
age, gender, education, the perception of economic situation of the family, whether the 
individual assisted local government meetings, and the degree of trust the individual had 
in his/her local government. The study found that the significant determinants to whether 
an individual sought out the local government’s assistance or made a petition was 
whether or not the individual participated in local government meetings/sessions, age, 
and, to a lesser extent, level of education (ibid.). Interestingly enough, one in every two 
people who assisted a local government session/meeting presented a petition. The 
LAPOP analysis of the data from the Barometer of the Americas 2010 concluded that 
there is a lack of participation in local government and that, in general, the population 
mostly decides to participate in local government solely to solicit or demand a service 
(LAPOP 2010:147). Unfortunately, the study found that only approximately four out of 
ten Mexicans who presented a petition to local authorities had their petition resolved 
(ibid.).  
With regard to citizen satisfaction with local government services, the LAPOP 
2010 study found that one in every two individuals interviewed felt that services rendered 
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in their municipality were neither good nor bad, but rather satisfactory in quality (41.3% 
of Mexicans) (ibid.). On the other hand, 29.4% believe that the services are good and 
22.4% believe the services rendered are low quality or bad. “The percentages in the 
extreme categories, very good or very bad, make up less than 10% and represent 1.4% 
and 5.5% respectively” (Translated LAPOP 2010: 147). Compared to other countries in 
the Americas, whose citizens were asked to rate their satisfaction with services rendered 
by local governments, México scored worse than half of the other countries in 2010 
(LAPOP 2010).  Moreover, average level of satisfaction with services rendered by local 
governments in México from 2004-2010 has not changed significantly over the period 
(ibid.).  
After conducting a multiple regression, LAPOP researchers found gender to be a 
determinant of satisfaction in local government services, finding that women are more 
satisfied than men (ibid.). Moreover, there is a significant relationship between 
satisfaction with government services and citizen support of that system (ibid.) Crow 
argues “that a main cause of political dissatisfaction is a citizen concept of democracy, 
‘substantive’ democracy, emphasizing economic improvement and social equity, 
combined with poor government performance in just those respects. [In other words,] for 
citizens who conceive of democracy as an instrument of economic equality, their 
governments' failure to ameliorate poverty leads to disengagement from politics. These 
citizens vote and engage in institutional participation less often. Dissatisfaction also 
predisposes a small but significant minority of citizens to contentious political 
participation” (2009: xiii). The hope of decentralization efforts was to increase citizen 
participation in the decision-making process and thus channel citizen demands through 
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official channels. Moreover, the hope was to bring the government closer to the people to 
decrease the more ‘contentious’ political participation. In any case, most studies 
analyzing citizen participation in México have been quantitative in nature. Although the 
aggregation of data to find predictors of participation is very useful, in depth qualitative 
case studies—focusing on the formation of groups and their experience with petitioning 
the local government—provide us with the opportunity to improve official channels of 
participation. Qualitative studies also provide us with an opportunity to find the missing 
determinant variables to participation and identify the location specific information that 
affects the channels for participation available at the local municipalities. Case studies 
also help us understand the inner workings of local governments, the governance of 
municipalities. The present study aims to fill this particular gap in the literature. 
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
The present study aims to model the complex pattern of roles and interactions that 
comprised the municipal decision-making process, the creation of citizen committees, 
and ultimately the involvement and impact of these groups in SIF allocation decisions of 
rural Mexican municipalities. In order to answer the questions set forth in the study, and 
understand the “governance” of rural municipalities in México, it was necessary to 
conduct field research where the events were occurring. The behavior and beliefs of the 
public officials, citizen committee members, and citizens interviewed in the selected 
municipalities were studied as they occurred naturally. Prior to arriving at the study sites, 
I assumed that there are multiple realities represented in the perspectives of study 
participants. Participant perspectives would thus build on each other, defining what was 
“real.” Situational context was a key, necessary element to understanding the behavior of 
study participants.  
Data were collected directly from the source, through observation, interviews and 
document analysis, to describe and answer questions on the how and why behavior 
occurred during the process of interaction among participants. The goal of the interviews 
was to obtain rich narrative descriptions of the interaction between residents of the 
municipality, citizen committee members, and government officials. The emerging 
research design was flexible, allowing research questions to change and evolve as data 
were collected, analyzed, and brought to an understanding of how SIF is allocated. Thus, 
several of the assumptions made in the preliminary study design classified the intended 
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methodology as qualitative in nature. Moreover, the study is exploratory, aiming to 
utilize both inductive and deductive reasoning to contribute to theory building.  
The use of a qualitative methodology was justified because it would provide an 
in-depth description of the decentralization reforms in México, specifically the 
implementation Section 33 of the Ley de Coordinación Fiscal (Fiscal Coordination Law, 
LCF). As noted in the previous chapters, Section 33 placed Social Infrastructure Funds 
(SIF) directly under the supervision of municipalities. Moreover, Section 33 introduced 
citizen committees into a municipality’s decision-making process, allowing citizens to 
voice their demands and potentially gain access to SIF through Section 33. The present 
research set out to examine the decentralization policies and evaluate the specific 
outcomes. Moreover, I set out to provide an analysis of the factors that affect the impact 
of citizen committees on the decision-making process for SIF allocation.  
A non-experimental qualitative approach was favored because it allows for an in-
depth inquiry into the role of “context” in a selected number of cases (Neuman 2000).  
The emphasis on context helps determine the unique elements that pre-determine a 
specific outcome for a specific policy under a particular situation. By highlighting the 
role of “social context,” qualitative methods give meaning to “social action” (ibid). In 
this particular study, a preliminary analysis of the literature indicates that decentralization 
reforms in México were implemented in the context of increasing pressure to re-gain 
legitimacy in the system (Rodriguez 1997). In other words, the context of the situation 
played an important role in the administrative decision to devolve authority over SIF 
allocation to the municipalities. Because of the need to understand the social context 
behind the decentralization reform, a qualitative methodology would need to be 
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employed. In other words, a qualitative methodology would be utilized to link social 
context to the implementation of specific decentralization policy and later, to the specific 
policy outcomes.  
Although quantitative methods utilize a large sample of cases, and as a result, 
conclusions can be generalized to the broader population without regard to context, a 
qualitative approach was favored for this study because of its ability to produce detail and 
context specific information. According to Rosenbloom (1995), when studying reform 
implementation, case study methods are particularly useful because they provide 
information and details within a policy that are—and are not—effective under particular 
circumstances. In other words, the contribution to the literature made by this research, 
which will describe the specific details of the participatory process that facilitates/hinders 
SIF capture through Section 33 in rural México, can only be made through qualitative 
analysis. The current study analyzed the advantages and disadvantages of the current 
participatory process in two rural municipalities. It highlights the best practices regarding 
citizen involvement in economic development policies. By doing so, it contributes to the 
creation of more effective, equitable, and efficient policy. 
 The study design incorporated elements and assumptions of ethnographic 
methodology, phenomenology, and case study analysis. The following chapter is divided 
as follows: Section 3.1 re-iterates the problem statement, Section 3.2 describes the 
process behind the selection of research sites, Section 3.3 describes the process behind 
the selection of participants for the study, Section 3.4 describes the data analysis process, 
and Section 3.5 defines the steps taken to improve the external and internal validity of the 
study.   
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3.2 Defining the Problem Statement 
In México, states are divided into municipalities, which are roughly equivalent to 
counties in the United States. If a particular municipality extends over a large area and 
contains more than one city or town (collectively called localidades), one of the cities or 
towns is selected to become the cabecera municipal (head city, the seat of the municipal 
government). The rest of the localidades become juntas auxiliares (auxiliary juntas; 
roughly equivalent to townships in the United States). These auxiliary juntas are not 
considered a third-level administrative division because they depend fiscally on the 
municipalities in which they are located. However, residents elect, every three years, 
representatives to lead their presidencia auxiliar or junta auxiliar (auxiliary presidency or 
town council) within the municipality. 
As noted by Rodriguez (1997), there was, and I would add that there continues to 
be, an urgent need for new systematic research initiatives that examine the decision-
making procedures of rural Mexican municipalities. The small and mostly rural 
municipalities, which continue to be a significant portion of the 2,412 municipalities in 
México, remain neglected by most researchers. Moreover, the population of medium- and 
large-sized municipalities tends to be concentrated around the municipal seat of 
government (ibid.). So, while this immediate area may be urban, the municipality may 
contain some auxiliary juntas that are rural. Thus, there is a need not only to focus on the 
decision-making processes of small and overall rural municipalities, but also the 
decision-making process of the larger more populated municipalities, particularly those 
decisions that concern their rural auxiliary juntas. The present study aimed to fill this gap 
in the literature.  
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The major question of the study was how rural municipalities make decisions on 
how to allocate SIF in the decentralized context in which they operate. Because, as 
mentioned above, some medium-sized municipalities are comprised of rural auxiliary 
juntas, this study was also interested in understanding how larger-sized urban 
municipalities make decisions regarding how to allocate SIF in their rural auxiliary 
juntas. Moreover, this study was interested in the impact that citizen participation through 
citizen committees had on that process.  
The sub-questions and hypotheses that arose are the following: 
1. What factors affect the formation and involvement of citizen committees? 
2. What factors determine the degree to which municipalities will adapt the new 
mechanisms for incorporating citizen participation in SIF allocation decisions? 
3. What is the impact of citizen committees on government performance, 
specifically: the promotion of accountability and improved governance, ethics, 
economy, efficiency, effectiveness, responsiveness, and the establishment of cost 
recovery mechanisms for certain infrastructure/service provision projects? 
 
The a priori hypotheses were: 
1.   Socioeconomic factors such as sex, income, and religious and political affiliation, as 
well as factors pertaining to the municipal willingness to collaborate with citizen 
committees, affect citizen committee formation in rural México. 
2. Municipalities belonging to a state that has a history of social movements who 
operate in an opposition mode to the political party in control of the central 
government will be more likely to incorporate participatory mechanisms than those 
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with a history of social movements that are aligned with the central government 
(Abers 1996, cf. Goldfrank 1998, p. 14). 
3.  Taking the traditional representative and bureaucratic government perspective (which 
advocates a more “decisional” approach to policy setting through technocrats), one 
would not expect improvements in accountability, improved governance, or the 
establishment of cost recovery mechanisms for certain infrastructure/service 
provision projects (Huntington 1975, Moynihan 1969). 
The focus was on in-depth description and understanding of the single major question 
and the several sub-questions. 
3.3 Selection of Research Sites 
The present study aimed to understand SIF allocation decisions made by overall 
rural municipalities as well as those decisions affecting rural auxiliary juntas within urban 
municipalities. The major sources of data for this research were thus drawn from the rural 
auxiliary junta of Tonantzintla, located in the municipality of San Andrés Cholula in the 
state of Puebla, and the municipality of Tenango del Aire in the Estado de México (State 
of México). Both locations were considered to be rural according to the 2010 Institute of 
Geography and Statistics (INEGI, 2010). However, the municipality in charge of the 
presidencia auxiliary of Tonantzintla and the municipality of Tenango del Aire are very 
different. These municipalities belonged to states with very different socio-political 
histories; Puebla has had a strong alliance with the PAN (National Action Party) political 
party, which has controlled the presidential seat since 2000; and, the State of México has 
and continues to have a strong alliance with the PRI (Institutionalized Revolutionary 
Party) party, which controlled the presidential seat for 70 years prior to the year 2000. As 
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such, an analysis of citizen committee involvement in both municipalities provides an 
interesting comparative study. Through this study, I aimed to understand if the political 
history of a state’s municipality affects the experiences of citizen committees attempting 
to obtain SIF allocations through Section 33 of the LCF. 
The municipality of San Andrés Cholula, located in the state of Puebla, is 
composed of six auxiliary juntas. Among the most important is the cabecera municipal of 
San Andrés Cholula. The other five auxiliary juntas are Santa María Tonantzintla, San 
Francisco Acatepec, San Luis Tehuiloyocan, San Rafael Comac, and San Bernardino 
Tlaxcalancingo. San Andrés Cholula is the eighth most populated municipality within the 
state of Puebla (INEGI, 2010). Its annual growth rate of approximately 6.5% is the 
largest growth rate in the state. In 2000, San Andrés Cholula had 56,066 inhabitants, and 
by 2005 the population had grown by 42.90%. By 2010, the population had expanded to 
100,439 inhabitants (INEGI, 2010). According to population growth projections 
calculated by CONAPO, by 2015, the municipality will have a total population of 
126,127.  
The cabecera municipal of San Andrés Cholula, San Andres, comprises 43.9% of 
the total municipal population, or what is equivalent to 35,206 inhabitants (Programa del 
Ayuntamiento de San Andrés Cholula 2005-2008, Program for the Municipality of San 
Andrés Cholula 2005-2008). Unfortunately, the information available in the 2010 census 
of the population of Santa Maria Tonantzintla was not consistent. According to the 
INEGI, the population of Santa Maria Tonantzintla in 2010 was 135 inhabitants (Octubre, 
2011). The same number of inhabitants in 2010 was recorded by the Catálogo General de 
Localidades (SEDESOL, 2011). However, according to the Program for the Municipality 
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of San Andrés Cholula 2005-2008 (the latest version available), there were 5,697 
inhabitants in the township of Santa Maria Tonantzintla. Moreover, according to an 
interview conducted with the municipality’s Director of Urban Planning in September 
2010, the number of inhabitants was approximately 20,000. After visiting the township 
however, it is clear that the number of inhabitants is between 5,697 and 10,000 
inhabitants—compared to the 135 individuals reported by both SEDESOL and INEGI.  
Santa Maria Tonantzintla further divides into three principales (barrios): San 
Miguel, San Diego de Alcala, and San Pedro. Moreover, it contains two colonias—San 
Isidro Buenos Aires and San Martin Cuachitla—and one ejido: Cuachitla.  
After earning a bachelor’s degree in economics from Cornell University in 2002, I 
moved and lived in San Isidro Buenos Aires of Santa Maria Tonantzintla until 2006. 
During this time, I participated in township meetings until I became the treasurer of a 
citizen committee dedicated to obtaining potable water in the area. Moreover, I 
eventually became a hired consultant for the auxiliary junta working to promote specific 
public works in the area. This experience granted me insight into the cultural 
determinants that affected the implementation of public policy. After four years of 
dedication to prioritizing potable water in the community of San Isidro Buenos Aires in 
Santa Maria Tonantzintla, the citizen committee for potable water (in which I 
participated) captured the attention of representatives, who added the project to the long 
list of public works to be completed by the year 2006.  It was by no means a simple 
process to prioritize this public project. The steps needed to obtain some of the paper 
work were complicated, requiring the time and money of the committee. This study arose 
from the desire to document, as a doctoral student, the perspectives and experiences of 
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the other citizen committee members during the process of obtaining potable water. 
Moreover, my goal was to understand how the process of implementing this particular 
infrastructure project fell into the scheme of what was supposed to happen according to 
the new legislation that emerged from the decentralization process. As such, Santa Maria 
Tonantzintla became the projected township/study site, where in addition to retracing the 
steps of the potable water citizen committee, two additional citizen committees—in 
which I did not participate, but who achieved prioritization and completion of desired 
projects—would be analyzed. In combination with the data obtained from the potable 
water committee, these additional citizen committees would provide information on the 
factors that affect the formation of these groups. Moreover, interviews with government 
officials at the auxiliary and municipal level of government would provide information 
on the decision-making process and the impact these groups have on it. The research took 
place four years after the citizen committee for potable water successfully completed its 
objective. 
Because of concerns regarding limited ability to generalize findings on the 
decision-making process from only one site, and to understand and isolate the impact of 
an area’s social-political history on the formation and involvement of citizen committees 
in municipal decision-making, a multi-site study of two very different municipalities was 
imperative. In order to contribute to theory development on the impacts of political 
history on municipal decision-making and use of participatory mechanisms, the study site 
of Tenango del Aire was chosen. As mentioned previously, the municipality of Tenango 
del Aire is distinctly rural; 39% of the population dedicate themselves to agricultural 
work and 51.37% of the municipal territory (38.09 km squared) is dedicated to 
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agriculture. Moreover, the political history of the state in which Tenango del Aire is 
located, Estado de México, is very different from that of Puebla, the state where the 
municipality of San Andrés Cholula is located.  
In Tenango del Aire, mining and other manufacturing activities comprise 10% of 
the economic activity and 34% to commerce and tourism. As of the 2005 census, the total 
population was 9,432 (Conteo INEGI 2005). By 2010, the population was 10,578 
inhabitants. It is the distinct rural character of this municipality in the State of México 
that makes it of particular interest to this study. The municipality governs over the 
following communities: San Juan Coxtocan, Santiago Tepopula, Rancho Aculco (El 
Paraíso), San Luis Aculco, Tecuatitla (Colonia Nueva Tecuatitla), Rancho el Paredón, 
Cerro de las Campanas, Rutilo Herrera, El Pedregal (Teotoxtipan), Rancho Chavarría 
(Paraje Puerta), Tecorral, Tlatelpa, Rancho San Isidro Labrador (El Piaje), Rancho 
Saturnino (Tepalcapa), Tres Platos, La Casa del Puente, Colonia el Mirador and Barrio 
San Miguel (Las Espinas). The present study aimed to identify citizen committees in 
Tonantzintla, and through process tracing and in-depth semi-structured interviews, 
determine the unique characteristics of citizen committees and the general role they play 
in the decision-making process for SIF allocation in their municipality. 
3.4 Selecting Participants and Obtaining Data 
Participants were identified as part of the study site and internal sampling, that is, 
the selection of specific participants, times, and documents within the two sites were 
conducted. The selection of cases and participants was comprehensive in each site—that 
is, all relevant individuals were chosen to be interviewed and all relevant “cases” were 
selected to draw data from. Participants selected to participate in the study belonged to 
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one of three groups: community members, citizen committee members, and government 
officials. Citizen committees were treated as nested cases, cases from which information 
could be gathered to create a typology of the citizen committees present in rural México 
to elucidate the factors that affect citizen committee formation and involvement in rural 
Mexican administrative decisions. The cumulative information gathered from the 
interviews with community members, auxiliary and municipal government officials, and 
the citizen committees (treated nested cases) from each municipality would provide 
information on the decision-making process in the two cases, the municipality of San 
Andrés Cholula and the municipality of Tenango del Aire. 
In obtaining the data from the research site of Santa Maria Tonantzintla, 
observation was comprehensive, continuous, and concluded over an extended period of 
time. The role of research varied from complete participant in one of the citizen 
committees (2002-2006) to complete observer of the two additional citizen committees. 
The data collection from the study site of Santa Maria Tonantzintla took place between 
August and November 2011. In obtaining data from Tenango del Aire, observation was 
less comprehensive, although continuous, because data collection occurred during a 
shorter period of time. The first visit to Tenango del Aire occurred in December 2011, 
and the first interviews conducted at this site were unstructured in nature. The goal of 
those initial interviews was to identify the key informants. Later interviews with 
community members, government officials, and citizen committee members occurred 
from January to March 2012. My role as researcher in Tenango del Aire was of complete 
observer.  
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In selecting participants from both communities to interview, the snowball 
sampling (i.e., network) method, borrowed from ethnographic research techniques, was 
utilized. That is, initially selected participants, or key informants who were selected 
because of their reputation for being particularly knowledgeable about the setting and 
topic, were asked to recommend other members of the community to be interviewed. 
Interviews with key informants were unstructured in nature. They began with general 
questions about the municipality, their involvement in the community, the municipality, 
politics, etc. and progressed to more specific questions about the functioning of the 
government administration, the process required for SIF allocation in their community, 
the role of citizen participation, and the factors that affected the formation and 
involvement of citizen committees in the decision-making process, etc. The questions 
then moved to specific questions generated by interview responses. Audio-tape recording 
and use of extensive notes while the interviews were being transcribed provided the basis 
for elaborating more questions to be asked in the future as well as afforded the 
opportunity to study the data carefully. Information was gathered from descriptions of 
what occurred and reflections on what the descriptions meant (i.e., speculations, 
emerging themes, patterns, problems).  
In the selection of participants from citizen committees, it was noted that because 
summative evaluations of a particular policy are best done after a policy has had time to 
stabilize (Patton 2002), only citizen committees formed after 2002 would be analyzed. 
The goal of this research is to evaluate the impact and effectiveness of incorporating this 
form of citizen participation into the decision-making process. By only studying citizen 
committees formed after 2002, the research allowed four years for the policy to stabilize 
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before being evaluated. It granted four years since Section 33 of the LCF transferred 
decision-making authority over the allocation of all SIF to the municipalities and 
ultimately made them accountable to citizen committees before evaluating their 
performance.  
When possible, citizen committees were treated as focus groups—as they would 
be treated in an ethnographic study—when all members are interviewed simultaneously. 
Ultimately, each citizen committee became a case within a case study of the formation, 
involvement, and treatment of citizen committees within two municipalities (our two 
cases). The each citizen committee was seen as a bounded system composed of 
interactions of group members and their environment. Participant observation and 
situational analysis of a specific event, experience, episode, or interaction—for example, 
a specific meeting with municipal authorities, a process required (paperwork needed to 
get a particular project carried out by the municipality), etc.—was recorded from multiple 
perspectives and analyzed to gain an in-depth analysis of reality. In interviewing citizen 
committee members, I maintained the phenomenological assumption that a single 
experience can be interpreted in multiple ways and the meaning of that experience is 
what constitutes reality. Participants were selected because they have lived or are living 
the experience of being citizen committee members and because they could articulate 
their feelings during semi-structured interviews. 
In total, seven citizen committees were chosen from both municipalities. Three 
public works committees were chosen from the rural auxiliary junta of Santa Maria 
Tonantzintla, located in the municipality of San Andrés Cholula in the state of Puebla, 
and four citizen committees were chosen from the overall rural municipality of Tenango 
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del Aire in the State of México. In addition, personnel from three different schools in 
Tonantzintla were chosen to be interviewed to understand the role that citizen committees 
play in the process of getting SIF allocated in their institutions. In-depth, semi-structured 
interviews and process tracing were carried out to understand the factors involved in the 
formation of citizen committees (factors such as an individual’s frustration with elected 
representatives, sex, income, and religious affiliation). Factors within the legislative 
process that affect the ability of citizen committees to organize and get their demands 
heard by the municipality were also analyzed extensively. The resource allocation of the 
twelve cases was analyzed extensively and the reconstruction of the process of local 
capture by citizen committees will be carried out to fill the gap in the research literature 
linking policy to outcome. 
Government officials were treated as key informants and selected according to 
their position and decision-making authority within the municipality and/or auxiliary 
junta. Municipal presidents from both municipalities were chosen to be interviewed as 
well as trustees and directors of specific departments related to public works, 
infrastructure, and citizen participation. Lastly, I analyzed the decision-making process 
municipalities use to determine allocation of SIF to understand the role of citizen 
committees.  
3.5 Data Analysis 
As in a phenomenological study, analysis of data emerging from interviews with 
the citizen committees was concerned with being able to reflect the shared meaning and 
consciousness of the participants. When analyzing emerging data, there was first the 
writing of a statement of a particular event and then a separation of what was experienced 
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from who it was experienced. The records kept on the six citizen committees in the two 
municipalities were translated and ordered chronologically. Process tracing for the twelve 
cases was carried out and analyzed extensively. Open-ended interviews with the citizen 
committee members helped to understand some of the un-documented as well as some 
documented steps that need clarification.  The interviews thus included a narration of the 
process utilized by group-members to form into citizen committees and accomplish their 
particular goal. Through the narration process, information on the key factors that 
determined the selection of members was revealed. Factors that were seen as affecting 
group formation were coded and documented. Moreover, detailed and varied information 
on the legislative process followed by these nine independent citizen committees was also 
gathered.  
Through process tracing, the present study hoped to understand the factors within 
the legislative process that affect SIF capture by citizen committees. The process tracing 
step, therefore, required content analyses of various official government documents and 
the selection of pertinent material to record—both steps required by qualitative analysis 
(Neuman 2000). When completed, the steps taken by the citizen committees were 
compared with the legal procedures mandated by the municipality. It was important to 
verify if the steps taken by the citizen committees followed the legal mandates. If they 
did not, it was noted that one cannot draw conclusions on the effectiveness of the 
participatory process required by the municipality. If the two processes lined up, one 
could draw generalizations from the cases to the overall participatory process. Interviews 
were also conducted with municipal authorities to determine the legal participatory 
process required by the municipality. By combining the information gathered from the 
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municipality and the citizen committees, this study was able to identify a causal 
relationship between a specific legislative procedure and specific outcome. Moreover, it 
allowed for the drawing of a causal relationship between a specific action taken by a 
committee, and a specific outcome. 
To evaluate the participatory process, as mandated by each municipality, I used 
the two criteria established by Rowe & Frewer (2000): the acceptance criterion and the 
process criterion. As noted above, the acceptance criterion concerns features of a method 
that make it acceptable to the wider public, and the process criterion concerns features of 
the process that are liable to ensure that occurs in an effective manner (ibid). The process 
of SIF capture by a citizen committee was deconstructed into the various steps needed for 
that process to be carried out. For example, in order for public work to be carried out, 
under current legislation, the following steps need to be taken: households must prioritize 
the work, the municipality must prioritize the project in response to household opinions, 
and local activism must translate into Legally Recognized Participation (citizen 
committees must be formed and they must follow certain steps to get their demands 
heard). In the present study, the process through which local activism is translated into 
Legally Recognized Participation was of particular interest. I analyzed how this step 
occurs and if this step satisfies the acceptance and process criteria as summarized in the 
work of Rowe and Frewer (2000).  
Once the evaluation process was completed, data analysis took on a different 
route. Document analysis of primary data, minutes from meetings, articles and 
government documents were re-analyzed. New information was also gathered, 
transcribed, and analyzed extensively. Interviews conducted with municipal authorities, 
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auxiliary government officials, citizen committee members, and other individuals from 
the community were re-analyzed. Information from each interview was divided into 
categories according to the various questions sought in the research—particularly, 
questions regarding the factors that influence the formation of citizen committees and 
questions regarding the municipal decision-making process, the treatment of citizen 
committees in the decision-making process, and information gathered regarding the 
views about the efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability with which SIF projects 
were carried out. My goal was to construct an overall description of the experience of 
each participant. As in an ethnographic study, data analysis occurred in three stages. The 
first stage was coding, that the organizing of data into reasonable, meaningful units that 
were coded with words or very short phrases that signify a category. The coding was 
done according to etic categories—that is, my interpretation of emic data or what is 
equivalent to information provided by the participants in their own language and 
organizational units. Coded data were then summarized by examining all similarly coded 
data and summarizing it with a sentence or two that conveyed its essence.  
Pattern seeking and synthesizing occurred as follows. Relationships among the 
categories and patterns that suggested generalization were first identified. While pattern 
seeking occurred, findings were interpreted inductively, synthesizing the information and 
drawing inferences. Interpretation began by following informed hunches and ideas that 
led to the identification of tentative patterns and identified holes in the data that needed to 
be filled. That is, the identification of additional data that needed to be analyzed to 
determine if there was consistency in the patterns identified.  By adding the new data 
from a different source, there was an enlarging, combining, subsuming, and a creation of 
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new categories that made sense. I aimed to uncover how responsive the municipal 
cabildos were to the demand of citizen committees. By analyzing municipal response to 
citizen committees from the perspective of citizen committees and municipal authorities, 
I was able to construct a typology of ‘motives’ relating to municipal reaction to citizen 
committees in rural México. 
This typology can be used by researchers to describe expected and probable 
municipal reactions to citizen committees under particular circumstances. By doing so, 
this study will directly contribute to the research literature on participatory democracy. 
Moreover, through the synthesizing of data collected, I was also able to determine how 
rural municipalities make decisions over SIF allocation and how the participatory process 
affects them. In addition, the research provided information needed not just to understand 
the decision-making process and how it is affected by including the participation of 
citizen committees, but also the impact of such participatory policy on government 
performance as preserved by its citizenry, that is the quality, efficiency, transparency, 
economy, and effectiveness of the completion of SIF projects in the eyes of its citizenry.  
3.6 Reliability, Validity and Potential Limitations 
Several steps were taken to guarantee the reliability of the data and validity of the 
study—that is, to guarantee the processes in question were indeed being studied. Drawing 
on the categorization schemes provided by McCall and Simmons (1969, p. 78) and 
Simon and Burstein (1985, p. 242-248) for classifying the main threats to validity and 
reliability in field studies, McKinnon (1988) designated four main types of threats: 
observer-caused effects, observer bias, data access limitations, and complexities and 
limitations of the human mind. In this section, I will discuss the definitions of the four 
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threats, as defined by McKinnon (1988), and describe the application of the tactics and 
strategies recommended by this author, and others, to counteract some of the threats in 
the present study.   
The first threat identified by McKinnon was observer-caused effects, or the 
altering of “natural behavior” by participants as a result of the presence of the researcher. 
As noted by McKinnon, “it is the role attributed to the researcher by the participants that 
is instrumental in producing or avoiding observer-caused effects” (1988, p. 37). Thus, 
McKinnon noted a need for constant monitoring and management of how the role of the 
researcher is being represented in the research setting.  
The second threat, observer bias, was described as “the distorted effects of the 
researcher’s selective perception and interpretation” (ibid.) of data obtained from the 
research setting. The threat of observer bias was noted by McKinnon to be present during 
the process of observation, interaction with research subjects, and document analysis, or 
simply put, the “registering, interpreting, and recording” events (Schwartz and Schwartz, 
1955, p. 91, c.f. ibid.). A researcher’s “cultural background, occupational and general 
training, and prior experiences of the specific phenomenon under investigation” 
(McKinnon, p. 38) were noted as factors that affect the formation of “political and 
philosophical” biases in the researcher, altering his/her intake of information as well as its 
interpretation. Because the “political and philosophical” views of an individual are 
thought to be part of the “psychological make-up” of the researcher, McKinnon describes 
that the biases cannot be eliminated but rather “managed” by accepting their presence and 
working to control for them in the study.  
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Data access limitations, the third threat to the reliability and validity of a study 
identified by McKinnon, were elaborated from the work of Zelditch (1962).  The threat of 
data access limitations was seen as arising from the time constraint imposed on the 
researcher as well as from the research hosts themselves. Firstly, because the researcher 
can only be present on the site for a limited time period, the researcher can only witness 
what is occurring at the moment and cannot travel in time to obtain the needed historical 
antecedents to the phenomenon under study. Moreover, the moment the researcher is 
present in the study site may “coincide accidentally with an exaggerated or abnormal 
instance of the phenomenon […] Hence, although the researcher may have taken to 
choose a ‘typical’ site, they may in fact end up observing an ‘atypical’ period in the life 
of that site” (ibid.). Thus, the timing of the research might limit the data available and 
thus bias the results of the study. Furthermore, the researcher can be restricted 
(intentionally and unintentionally) to the access of data; documents, events, sites and 
people by the research hosts, leading to an incomplete picture of the phenomenon under 
study. 
Lastly, the complexities and limitations of the human mind were identified as the 
fourth threat to the reliability and validity of a study. The manifestation of this threat was 
seen as twofold. The first form of this type of threat emanates from participants’ 
“conscious” or “unconscious” misinterpretation of events, environment, and self-portrait 
in an attempt to mislead those around them. McKinnon clarified that this deception was 
not intended to mislead the researcher specifically but rather the general public. The 
second source of this threat was seen as emanating from the natural limitations of the 
human mind: a participant’s natural forgetfulness, political and philosophical “make-up” 
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(which can lead to interpretations of events through a biased lens), etc., which, taken 
together, hamper the accuracy of accounts.  
Drawing on a point developed by Black and Champion (1976), McKinnon (1988) 
noted that in the social sciences, the phenomena under study is usually composed of 
abstracted concepts and as such “there are no objective standards against which 
measurement of these concepts can be compared for verification” (p. 41). Moreover, 
because each concept usually manifests itself in an infinite number of ways, there exists a 
universe of indicators for each concept to sample. As a result, McKinnon noted that 
“researchers in the social sciences can never attain perfect validity and can speak only of 
degrees of validity” (ibid.). However, to improve the degree of validity, McKinnon 
suggests utilizing multiple methods “such as observation, interviewing and document 
analysis, in order to gain access to those multiple indicators” (p. 42). Moreover, drawing 
from Kidder (1982), McKinnon notes to check for validity—the variables chosen “should 
have high correlations with other measures of itself, even though the methods of 
measurement are maximally different (Kidder, 1981, p. 245)” (ibid.). 
  On the other hand, to check for the reliability of a study, McKinnon (1988) 
suggested checking for the “consistency of observations […] by taking repeated measures 
of the same trait, or variable, with similar or identical methods” (ibid.). However, 
McKinnon noted that despite the researcher measuring the same trait various times, 
because “the researcher and the phenomena of interest exist and occur in real time and 
context, […] the researcher nor the event can be represented as identical” (ibid). Thus, 
the concept of attaining reliability in a study must also be described in terms of degree.  
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It is important to note that the steps taken to improve the reliability of the study 
can affect the validity of the study, and vice-versa. In other words, often times, the 
soundness and dependability of the study can be addressed simultaneously with one step. 
For example, as mentioned by McKinnon; 
“observation of repeated instances of a phenomenon [… can be] an approach to 
reliability because it serves to rule out accidental or chance circumstances 
[however,] it is also […] an approach to validity because, to the extent that the 
repeated observations are different manifestations of the phenomenon, the 
researcher is able to verify the existence of the phenomenon and to delineate its 
boundaries more comprehensively” (p.43). 
As a result, this study takes the posture of McKinnon (1988) and I will not distinguish 
issues of validity and reliability too strictly. However, the steps taken to mitigate and 
protect against the four main threats to qualitative studies, as discussed by McKinnon, 
will be discussed thoroughly.  
To protect against the complexities and limitations of the human mind and 
improve internal validity and reliability, specifically the accuracy of observations, 
interviews were audio recorded. Participants interviewed during the study were asked to 
verify their responses to questions and when needed, clarify their position or perspective 
a topic question. The verification and clarification step was done to check the consistency 
of an individual’s responses and avoid “accidental circumstances of the respondent’s lack 
of concern or care which [could] prejudice the credibility of those responses” (McKinnon 
1988, p. 36). Moreover, copious filed notes were taken between interviews and coded 
utilizing the schema developed by Schatzman and Strauss (1973) and discussed by 
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McKinnon (1988). In other words, notes were coded as either Observational Notes (ONs) 
Theoretical Notes (TNs) or Methodological Notes (MNs). The use of ONs was limited to 
literal and precise record keeping of what was seen and heard in the field. Ideas emerging 
on theory development or the relevance of hypothesis set forth in the preliminary stages 
of the research were coded as TNs. The use of MNs was restricted to the description of 
steps taken during the collection and analysis of data as well as forthcoming plans 
concerning the manipulation of data. The coding restriction was done in an effort to 
separately record and maintain any opinions and inferences made as a researcher from the 
facts obtained from the data, thus limiting the potential for observer bias.    
Verbatim accounts recorded during interviews were transcribed shortly after the 
interviews occurred to ensure that a substantial amount of detail and information was 
available. Another technique used to enhance credibility was triangulation—the 
comparison of results obtained from different sources and different data collection 
methods. Triangulation was used to offset some of the threats to validity and reliability 
because of its ability to integrate repeated instances of phenomena from different data 
collection methods, including interviews, participant observation, and document analysis. 
These data collection methods were seen as “capable of capturing indicators and 
manifestations of phenomena from more of the indicator types, as identified by Black and 
Champion (1976, p 224), than typically available through other research methods” 
(McKinnon 1988, p. 43). Interviews from citizen committee members, municipal 
authorities, and members of the community were triangulated to guarantee that we are 
getting an accurate picture of the process taken by the different citizen committees and 
the required process regulating citizen committee involvement in the municipal decision-
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making process. Moreover, triangulation of data was also able to provide a more accurate 
picture of the effectiveness in which the SIF projects were carried out. If interviews, 
observation, and document analyses did not lead to a similar conclusion, a red flag was 
placed and a re-analysis of data occurred to identify the differences, document clearly 
where they appeared, and then identify possible reasons for a divergence in conclusion.  
During this process, caution was taken not to lose sight of the context in which 
each account was taken. As McKinnon [1988, p. 44 drawing on the potential dangers of 
utilizing multiple methods or observations in field research identified by Silverman 
(1985) and Garfinkel (1967)] noted, exactly because multiple observations and methods 
are utilized to confirm and discard accounts, the importance of each account and the 
specific context in which it occurred is often lost. However, authors such as Campbell 
and Fiske (1959) and McKinnon (1988) have recommended multiple methods and 
multiple observations in field studies to counter threats to validity and reliability in field 
studies more generally. The recommendation is made because by “testing” hypotheses 
emerging from one source of data against data emerging from another method, “the 
research is able to detect, and therefore, compensate for his or her own interpretational 
and perception biases which may have distorted the shape of hypotheses” (McKinnon, 
1988 p. 43). Moreover, evaluating “what a subject does against what a subject says is a 
strong counter to the threats of observer-caused and human mind effects” (ibid.). Lastly, 
multiple observations and multiple methods, including interviews, observations, and 
document analyses, allows the researcher to obtain a more complete dataset, thus limiting 
the threat to reliability and validity caused by data access limitations (McKinnon, 1988). 
 88
As mentioned above, data were collected in the natural setting after prolonged and 
persistent fieldwork in both Tenango del Aire and Santa Maria Tonantzintla. Because I 
was a participant in one of the citizen committees of Tonantzintla, there was a possible 
increased threat of observer bias. As noted by McKinnon, the “choice of type of 
participant observation (PO) affect degree to overcome validity and reliability” (1988, p. 
46). However, “the choice of type of PO is a dynamic process” (ibid. p.49). From 2002 to 
2006, I was treasurer for the potable water committee of Tonantzintla, one of the citizen 
committees included in this study. During this time, my role in the community was not as 
researcher but as resident. Although it was through that experience that I was able to 
attain familiarity and acceptance within the community of Tonantzintla, it was not until I 
began my doctoral studies, two years after the potable water project was completed, that I 
began to re-examine my experience within the context of the literature available. 
Moreover, it was not until four years after my experience in that committee that I began 
to formulate hypotheses for this study. It was not until August 2011 that I arrived to 
Tonantzintla as a researcher, participating with “limited interaction,” trying to obtain data 
for this study. 
As McKinnon (drawing from the work of Gold, 1958, pp. 217-223; Schatzman 
and Strauss, 1973, pp. 59-63) indicates, there is a PO continuum with the various roles 
the researcher can assume moving along a continuum that mark the different degrees and 
threats to validity and reliability for each role. At one extreme of the continuum, there is 
observing from outside, moving from left to right there is passive presence, followed by 
limited interaction, active control, observer as participant and at the opposite extreme of 
the continuum the role of researcher as participant with a hidden identity. While 
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observing from outside may have a positive impact in limiting the threats to validity and 
reliability due to observer caused effects, it has negative implications for observer bias, 
data access limitations, and threats due to the complexities and limitations of the human 
mind. Moving along the continuum, the implications for the four threats to validity and 
reliability are all negative for researchers participating in the field with a passive 
presence. However, the implications are all positive for researchers participating in the 
field under the role of limited interactions and active control. On the other hand, while 
the implications for observer caused effects are positive for both the role of observer as 
participant and participant with hidden identity, the effects for both roles are negative for 
observer bias, data access limitations, and complexities and limitations of human mind 
(McKinnon, 1988). 
 Although not acting as a researcher while I participated in the committee for 
potable water in Tonantzintla, had I been, my role would have been closest in kind to that 
of participant with a hidden identity. That is because although I was known to the 
“participants” as a member of the committee, I was not known as researcher. Although 
this role as researcher “offers the advantage of unobtrusiveness […] the price for zero 
disturbance is too high in respect to threats of observer bias and data access limitations” 
(McKinnon, 1988, p. 48). Thus, after five years of participating in the committee, I first 
returned to the research site as a researcher operating under the role of “limited 
interaction.” In other words, using McKinnon’s (1988) terminology, I returned “to clarify 
the meaning of events” that occurred during my time as the committee’s treasurer. I then 
operated as researcher using an “active control” approach guiding conversation through 
“questions on specific topics as they occurred” in two additional citizen committees in 
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which I did not participate. Under the approach to researcher of “limited interaction” I 
was able to talk to the members of the citizen committee in which I had participated 
through “casual conversation and questioning,” and through the ‘active control approach’ 
I was able to obtain information through more formal “interviews.”  
 Despite the threat that my experience as a participant in the potable water 
committee in Tonantzintla could have biased my observation, because there was a time 
lag of five years between my roles as participant and researcher, I was able to separate 
my personal perspectives prior to arrival. Moreover, having spent a long time in the field 
as a resident allowed me to observe community life on a day-to-day basis without the 
pressure to “see patterns, uncover meaning, or develop hypotheses and conclusions” 
(McKinnon 1988, p.40).  Thus, I was able to become ‘genuinely receptive’ to what was 
occurring around me without the “the temptation to seek interpretation and meaning 
immediately (or very quickly) after entering the setting [something which] increases the 
opportunity for observer bias” (ibid). My heightened self-awareness of potential biases 
forced me to prepare interviews that contained internal checks to minimize the 
appearance of biased questions reflecting my personal opinion. There were ample 
discussions with some committee members in which suggestions were made as to how to 
avoid leading questions that would guide the answer of participants. Thus, a conscious 
effort was made to avoid observer bias as much as possible. 
My prior experience residing in the town allowed for a better understanding of the 
cultural constraints that I would be faced with as researcher. For example, residents in 
Santa Maria Tonantzintla have a circular communication style; that is, their answers to 
questions are not always linear. They might answer a question in a story that ends with 
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the beginning of the question. Having experienced this way of communication facilitated 
the understanding of data gathered from interviews with the members of citizen 
committees as well as the residents in the area. Moreover, having been exposed to the 
culture, I was also able to understand that when residents were answering questions, 
many times they were answering how they would like things to be and not how they were 
in reality. Realizing the natural aversion to saying things that would be perceived as 
negative, I had to be prepared to ask them, after they told me how things should work, if 
that is how they worked in a specific event or occasion. Through follow-up questions I 
was able to control or divide statements of what they felt things should look like and how 
things actually occurred during a specific circumstance. I was able to reduce the threat of 
“the complexities and limitations of the human mind” resulting in residents wanting to 
only promote a positive image of their community.  
Familiarity with the “normal” behavior of the residents also made it possible to 
reduce the problems associated with observer-caused effects. Understanding the 
communication style of residents of the study site allowed me to better understand all 
data, including that which was contrary to my preconceptions and expectations. Thus, 
utilizing McKinnon’s terminology, I was able to minimize the number of “interpretation 
gaps” and confront “anomalous data”: “events and statements that may be contrary to the 
researcher’s preconceptions and expectations” (1988, p. 40). Moreover, having spent a 
considerable time in the study site improved my access to the data needed for this 
research.  
As noted by McKinnon (1988), there is a “direct link between the length of time 
spent in the research setting and the reduction of threats to validity and reliability 
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imposed by observer bias, observer-caused effects […] data access limitations [and] it 
may also be argued human mind effects” (1988, p. 41). Although able to reap the benefits 
extended length at the study site of Tonantzintla, as a result of prior exposure, this was 
less of the case in the research site of Tenango del Aire.  However, a prior visit to the 
study site before establishing base allowed for the identification of key informants within 
the relatively small municipality. Unstructured interviews during that visit allowed me to 
determine major differences in the inner workings of the municipality as they related to 
the decision-making processes for allocating SIF and incorporating citizen input to those 
in the municipality of San Andrés Cholula. A four-month stay in the study site allowed 
the formal interviewing of all the concerned participants in the study. Moreover, as a 
researcher with limited interaction and active control, I was able to minimize the threats 
to validity and reliability established my McKinnon (1988). Moreover, the a-priori trip to 
the research site allowed me to establish a good rapport and acceptance within the 
community and more specifically the municipality, which allowed for the acquisition of a 
complete dataset. The first informal interview conducted was with a woman in charge of 
a political organization that aims to obtain funds to combat social ills. This woman 
provided me with the phone number of the municipal president, allowing me to interview 
him within a few days; the same task required several months of effort in the research site 
of Tenango del Aire. Moreover, as McKinnon noted, the “Types of PO which on the 
surface appear most objective and least disturbing of the research setting, in reality 
provide the greatest threats to validity and reliability” (1988, p. 46). 
Unfortunately, as mentioned above, to generalize results from two study sites to 
the overall rural population in México would be dubious. Moreover, generalizability is 
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generally weak in qualitative research. However to improve the external validity of the 
study, or clarify the translatability and comparability, an effort was made to clarify the 
location specific traits of the study sites so future researchers can understand the extent to 
which the results may vary in other settings. Problems encountered in the participatory 
process were noted and I made an effort to record respondents’ recommendations to 
improve the process. 
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CHAPTER 4: LOCAL GOVERNANCE  
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on local level governance in México—the municipal decision-
making process. The ten sections of this chapter provide an in-depth analysis of the 
factors that affect the decision-making process. The goal is to determine how decisions 
are made within a municipality, who participates in decision-making, and what factors 
are taken into account. The next section (4.2) describes the organizational flow charts of 
the municipalities studied. Section 4.3 provides an overview of the decision-making 
process from the perspective of the mayors of each municipality. Section 4.4 examines 
the role of civil service and the level of administrative discretion. Section 4.5 introduces 
the different kinds of leadership exercised at the local level. Section 4.6 discusses 
municipal sources of revenue. Section 4.7 provides the auxiliary perspective on the 
decision-making process. Section 4.8 describes the citizen committees operating in both 
study sites. On the basis of an examination of municipal treatment of its citizen 
committees, the next section (4.9) posits a typology of the citizen committees in 
operation in both areas, which can be expanded in the future by gathering and analyzing 
additional data from other municipalities. After a discussion of the municipal decision-
making process, the chapter concludes with Section 4.9.1, which re-examines my a-priori 
hypothesis on the factors that affect the incorporation of citizen participation in the 
decision-making process in México. It provides remarks on how the hypothesis compared 
to the data gathered from both study sites. 
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4.2 Structure of the Decision-Making Process 
 The federation of México is composed of thirty-one constituent states and one 
federal district. States are further divided into municipalities. The municipal structure is 
headed by the mayor (presidente municipal) who is popularly elected for a nonrenewable 
three-year term and who oversees a municipal council (cabildo). The municipal council is 
composed of a group of trustees (regidores) and a syndic (sindico) in charge of municipal 
laws. Most council members are elected by the mayors’ party slate, with a small fraction 
of members being selected from the highest vote-getting parties that lost the municipal 
seat during that term’s election (Rowland 2001). Prior to the political opening in the 
country, “the council was basically a group of honorary posts, led by the mayor, used to 
reward loyal party service” (Rowland 2001: 1378). Today, except for a small portion of 
the council—composed of individuals from opposition political parties— not much has 
changed.  
 
“While the council does have the responsibility to approve the municipal 
budget, plans and other initiatives, this does not in practice translate into 
effective control of the mayor. Indeed, because electoral rules guarantee 
the mayor’s party a majority in the council, there is usually little need for 
debate or negation on the mayor’s initiatives (Guillen, 1996 cf. Rowland 
2001: 1378).”   
 
In the case of Tenango del Aire, for example, six out of the ten trustees are from 
the mayor’s party slate. Because the elected candidate for mayor ran on a coalition 
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platform, although the president, syndic and four of the trustees belonged to the 
Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, PRI), two 
additional trustees were from the other coalition parties: one from the Ecologist Green 
Party of México (Partido Verde Ecologista de México) and one from New Alliance 
(Nueva Alianza). The remaining four trustees were from the opposition: two from the 
Party of the Democratic Revolution (Partido de la Revolución Democrática, PRD), one 
from the National Action Party (Partido Acción Nacional, PAN), and one from 
Convergence (Convergencia).  
The municipality of Tenango del Aire is one of the 126 municipalities of the State 
of México. The surface area of the municipality is approximately 74.15 km2; Tenango del 
Aire has a population of approximately 10,578 inhabitants (Conteo INEGI 2010). The 
municipality is composed of several communities. However, because of the small size of 
the overall municipal territory, these communities do not possess auxiliary juntas. The 
communities can chose to elect or appoint a delegate to articulate any concerns in the 
area to the mayor but, according to interviews with the community and government, these 
volunteers are not active or functioning in the municipality.  
The organizational flow chart of the municipal council (Figure 1; provided by 
Tenango del Aire) depicts the civic commissioners, the mayor, the Syndic of Estates 
(property taxes) and Public Safety, the General Secretary, and the trustees: 1st Trustee of 
Public Services; 2nd Trustee of Urban Development and Public Works; 3rd Trustee of 
Education and Culture; 4th Trustee of Commerce, Street Markets and Tourism; 5th Trustee 
of Public Health and Social Development; 6th Trustee of Environment, Ecology and 
Territorial Limits; 7th Trustee of Promotion of Agriculture and Rural Sustainable 
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Development; 8th Trustee of Parks, Gardens and Cemeteries; 9th Trustee of Sports and 
Attention to Youth; and, 10th Trustee of Public Safety and Civil Protection. These 
individuals work together to resolve problems within the municipality. However, 
according to the interviews I conducted, power is not shared equality within the 
municipality; power is centralized in the hands of the mayor, who has ultimate discretion 
in the decision-making process. The Municipal Secretariat (Secretario del H. 
Ayuntamiento) coordinates, facilitates, and implements all the activities the mayor 
proposes to accomplish during the year. 
Within the municipality, there are several commissions: the Commission of 
Municipal Development Planning (Comisión de Planeación para el Desarrollo 
Municipal), which is in charge of promoting and helping in the formulation and 
actualization of the Municipal Plan of development; the Municipal Human Rights 
Commission (Coordinación Municipal de Derechos Humanos), which receives 
complaints from the citizenry regarding human rights abuses; the Internal Municipal 
Comptroller (Contraloría Interna Municipal), which supervises the use of financial and 
human resources in the municipality and the entities involved in the implementation of 
projects, including the popularly elected citizen committees called Comites Ciudadanos 
de Control y Vigilancia (COCICOVI) (Citizen Committees of Control and Vigilance, in 
English); the Commission of Municipal Programs (Coordinación de Programas 
Municipales), which supervises and expands special municipal programs that are not part 
of the municipal plan for development; the Finance Commission (Dirección de 
Finanzas), which organizes, directs, and controls the financial resources of the 
municipality to prioritize projects and programs with the designated budget; the 
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Commission of Urban Development, Public Works and Services (Dirección de 
Desarrollo Urbano, Obras y Servicios Públicos), which is in charge of public services, 
maintaining public infrastructure, and coordinating municipal actions in implementing 
public works projects and formulating municipal plans for urban development; the 
Directive of Municipal Public Safety (Dirección de Seguridad Pública Municipal) 
oversees the municipal police force; the Municipal System or Integral Family 
Development (Sistema Municipal para el Desarrollo Integral de la Familia [DIF]), 
which develops and implements institutional programs for the State and Federal DIF; the 
Civil Registrar (Oficialía del Registro Civil); Auxiliary Authorities (Autoridades 
Auxiliares), which in the case of Tenango, is composed of three delegates who volunteer 
to facilitate the administration of social services, programs and projects by coordinating 
with the municipality and their fellow neighbors. 
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Figure 1 
 
           The municipality of San Andrés Cholula, located in the state of Puebla, covers a 
surface area of 414.69 km2. San Andrés Cholula is composed of six auxiliary juntas. 
Among the most important and most populated is the cabecera municipal of San Andrés 
Cholula, where government offices are located. The other five auxiliary juntas are Santa 
María Tonantzintla, San Francisco Acatepec, San Luis Tehuiloyocan, San Rafael Comac, 
and San Bernardino Tlaxcalancingo. The governance of San Andrés Cholula, as it relates 
to the governance of the rural auxiliary junta of Santa María Tonantzintla, is of interest to 
this study. Unfortunately, the information available in the 2010 census of the population 
of Santa Maria Tonantzintla was not consistent—population estimates vary between 
5,697 and 10,000 inhabitants. Santa Maria Tonantzintla is further divided into three 
principales (barrios); San Miguel, San Diego de Alcala, and San Pedro. Moreover, it also 
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contains two colonias (neighborhoods), San Isidro Buenos Aires, and San Martin 
Cuachitla and one ejido, Cuachitla.  
The flow chart of the municipal government of San Andrés Cholula is the 
following (Figure 2):  
 
Figure 2. 
 
Unlike the structure of Tenango del Aire—where the General Secretary manages 
the overall administration directly under the supervision of the Mayor—in San Andrés 
Cholula, the General Secretary manages only specific tasks further down the flow chart. 
The mayor presides at the top of the flow chart; below him are two different but equal 
bodies. The first to the left is comprised of the trustees. The trustees, in addition to being 
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members of the municipal council—thus, theoretically having the responsibility to 
approve budgets, plans, and other initiatives in the municipality—oversee their respective 
secretarias [departments in English], which oversee various directivos  [directives in 
English]. The structure drawn to the right is the Syndic who is in charge of municipal 
laws. The middle branch flowing directly from the Mayor down further past the first 
division is divided once again into two divisions; to the left, the Delegation of Real Estate 
Development and to the right, the Office of Legal Affairs/Legal Advisors.  
Continuing down the middle branch of the flow chart, there is another dual 
division, to the left, the Social Communications Office and to the right, the Office of the 
Presidency. After these two offices, the power flowing down from the president down the 
middle of the structure is divided into ten branches, from left to right are the: Department 
of Urban Development; Public Safety, Transportation and Civil Protection; Treasury; 
Public Works; General Secretary; Social and Economic Development; Office of the 
Comptroller; Ministry of Interior; Municipal Public Service; System for Integral Family 
Development (DIF). Each one of these divisions (Departments) is in charge of several 
branches/offices (Directives) further down the flow chart. The Department of Urban 
Development oversees the directive of Urban Development, Sustainable Urban Planning, 
and Real Estate. The Department of Public Safety Transportation and Civil Protection 
oversees the directive of Crime Prevention, the Resource Center for International Civil 
Organizations (CERI), Civil Protection, Police and Transportation. The Treasury 
oversees, the Office of Accounting, Expenses, Deposits, Awarded Contracts and Bids, 
and Execution of projects. Public Works Department is in charge of the directive of 
Execution and Control of the Public Works, and of Projects. The General Secretary 
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oversees the County Clerk’s Office, the Municipal Archive, the Civil/Penal Judge, and 
the Qualifying Judge. The Department of Social and Economic Development oversees 
the directive of Education, Tourism, Culture, Agriculture and stock farming, Health, 
Sports, and Anti-rabies directive. The Department of the Comptroller oversees the 
auditing of public works directive; the finance audits directive; internal affairs; the office 
of Transparency and Evaluation of Procedures and Internal Legislation. The Ministry of 
Interior oversees the Auxiliary Juntas, the Directive of Citizen Participation, and the 
Directive of Private Businesses and Commercial Drafts. The Department of Municipal 
Public Services oversees the Directive of General Services and the Directive of 
Municipal Services. The System for Integral Family Development (DIF) provides legal 
orientation, health, community development, family development and food assistance 
programs.  
 In San Andrés Cholula, the Ministry of Interior (which is not linked to the 
Municipal or State Controllers Secretariat) oversees the Auxiliary Juntas and the directive 
of Citizen Participation. Notably, unlike the structure of San Andrés Cholula, there is no 
office/directive of Citizen Participation in the municipality of Tenango del Aire. The 
Internal Municipal Comptroller (Contraloría Interna Municipal), which supervises the 
use of financial resources in the municipality, oversees the citizen committees in the area. 
The Internal Municipal Comptroller reports to the State’s Controller’s Secretariat, which 
regulates citizen participation in the entire state.   
Pertinent to this study is the governance of Santa Maria Tonantzintla, one of the 
rural auxiliary juntas of the municipality of San Andrés Cholula. The government body of 
the auxiliary junta in Tonantzintla is composed of four commissioners—equivalent to 
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paid board-members—who manage the junta. One of the commissioners works for the 
internal ministry of justice within the junta. The other officers within the junta are the 
commissioner of public works, the commissioner of estates and commerce, and the 
commissioner of public education. Then there are five reserved deputies or substitutes for 
each post including a supplement for the head of the cultural house. The money that 
comes into the auxiliary junta is just for salaries, the municipality handles the money 
brought in to carry out any project or program in the area directly. The township 
government is in charge of channeling the demands of its residents to the municipality. 
There are no prerequisites for running for auxiliary government or being appointed for 
any of the posts. Moreover, although there are physical government offices in the center 
of the auxiliary junta, the office does not possess information about its township, the 
nature of the population (e.g., primarily agricultural or other industry; rates of literacy 
and poverty; etc.) nor does it possess information on more technical matters such as 
documentation and records of projects, the cost of projects, petitions made, etc. As noted 
in Section 5.7, these factors and others attributed to the governing of the auxiliary juntas 
affect the decision-making process of the municipality and the distribution of funds to 
these areas. 
 
4.3 The Mayors’ Description of the Municipal Decision-Making Process 
During the study, the mayor of each municipality was asked open-ended 
questions, and more specific questions about the factors (continuity, rules set by the 
state/federal government, the role politics in the availability of federal/state funds, the 
role of citizen participation, and the level of administrative input) that affect the decision-
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making process. Both mayors stated that social infrastructure projects are, for the most 
part, established during the election campaign. When asked how he prioritizes 
infrastructure projects, the mayor of San Andrés Cholula stated: 
  
“That is more of a political matter, you are human and the communities 
that gave you most support well, you feel obliged to show them your 
gratification [...] I decide according to the population and also the 
communities that showed me support, to show them my support.” 
 
Thus, an important consideration when allocating funds was to favor groups or 
communities based on their allegiance the incumbent mayor. Projects are prioritized 
largely around the needs of the constituents in areas that promise to garner more votes. In 
Tenango del Aire, the mayor interviewed for this study ran on a platform of expanding 
the urban development plan in order to incorporate the outskirts of the municipality into 
the urban zone. After eight years of not being modified, the population had expanded into 
the outskirts, and in order to provide them with services—such as water, sewer, and 
electricity—these areas had to be incorporated into the urban plan of the municipality. 
The mayor of Tenango del Aire stated that this was the first time that projects outside the 
city center were being taken under serious consideration—principally due to the 
significant expansion and growth in these areas.  
At the beginning of the term, ‘community needs’ are established on the basis of 
promises set during the campaign. After a more technical examination of the cost of the 
projects and the funds available, projects were prioritized accordingly. Within a few 
 105
months of coming into office, the newly elected mayors have to create a municipal plan 
for development. After deciding which projects of those promised during the election 
campaign to implement, the municipality considers other potential projects. Both mayors 
were asked if the decision-making process is then affected by the need to establish 
continuity and implement some of the projects that were prioritized, but not carried out, 
by the previous administration. The surprising answer given in both municipalities was 
‘no.’ Moreover, it was clarified that the municipalities do not maintain a record of 
projects prioritized or petitioned but not carried out by the previous administration. In the 
case of San Andrés Cholula the president stated, “We don’t see what was prioritized 
previously.” In Tenango del Aire, the mayor stated that, “There were no projects left by 
the previous administration. [Well…] they left us only one project that we had to 
validate, and that was because it was already started and the project needed to be 
completed. But no, no plans left or anything.” Thus, if a project was petitioned but not 
initiated by the previous administration, the project must be petitioned again when a new 
administration enters office. 
When asked how rules set by the state and federal government affect the decision-
making process of what projects to implement, both presidents indicated that the only 
rules are the ones for the use of funds from Section 33. In regard to the earmarked 
resources from Section 33, the mayor of San Andrés Cholula stated: 
“I am not in agreement with them. Sometimes, the areas where you can 
use resources fall where there are no people. So, we end up putting sewage 
or drainage in a street where there is nobody. They determine, according 
to some formula, which I do not know, what areas are marginalized areas 
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and where certain things are needed. Then they say, if we give you funds, 
you have to use it here. But sometimes it causes problems because people 
say, ‘Why are you doing that project there when there are more people 
here?’ And well, I have nothing to do with that. For example, here in the 
main square, we have a major problem with flooding. And we would like 
to use the funds to create a collector of water. But the federal government 
says that they can only put in or change sidewalks, paint walls, or put 
lighting in this area. So, even though it is free for our neighbors to provide 
these services, they get mad because what they want is for us to resolve 
the flood problem, and we can’t. So we end up painting their walls, or 
taking off the sidewalk and putting another when what they want is 
drainage, and they get upset, because they don’t feel it is as important. We 
can’t use funds because they are already earmarked.”  
 
The mayor of San Andrés opposed earmarked funds because earmarking limited 
their potential use for social infrastructure projects in more urbanized zones. These 
resources were specifically designed for use in marginalized, rural areas. Moreover, the 
municipality has more self-revenue coming in than any monetary transfer from either the 
state or federal government, which could be used to resolve infrastructure projects in 
urbanized areas. In addition, funds from the state government are larger than the funds 
from Section 33, and, thus, there is no reason why to only use funds from Section 33 for 
social infrastructure. When asked specifically if self-revenue could be used for social 
infrastructure, he said, “Yes but here we use it for smaller projects, like painting a school, 
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etc. We depend on Section 33 for the major infrastructure projects, like drain and water.” 
The mayor of Tenango del Aire did not have the same methodology for allocating funds. 
Both self-revenue and Section 33 funds were used for social infrastructure. However, the 
mayor from Tenango would prefer greater liberty to use Section 33 funds at will. 
Moreover, in his interview, he noted that once the municipality uses funds from Section 
33 to install drainage, potable water, and pave roads, in a particular area, the federal 
government does not send funds to maintain the newly created infrastructure.10  
When asked if party politics at municipal, state, and federal levels of government 
play a role in the release of funds to municipalities, both mayors indicated that it did not. 
They said these resources are formula-driven. However, both agreed that politics does 
affect which ‘special projects’ will be carried out and funded by state and federal 
governments. For example, in San Andrés Cholula, the mayor indicated that during 
elections at the state level, because the governor was running for a second term in office, 
he (the governor) unexpectedly funded a large project in their area to gain support of his 
municipality. He funded the widening of a connecting road between the municipality and 
one of its auxiliary juntas. A similar example occurred in Tenango, where elections at the 
                                                          
10 It should be noted that SIF from Section 33 is allocated utilizing a formula to account for 
marginalization of the population in certain areas. Understanding the formula helps to establish the needs of 
the community. Unfortunately, neither mayor had a clear idea of what that formula is.  When asked how 
level of marginalization affect project selection and fund allocation decisions, the mayor of San Andrés 
Cholula sated; 
“No, what happens is that we don’t really involve ourselves or rely on that information. 
What we base our decision on does however have to do with the number of people, for 
the cost benefit analysis. Anything else, level of poverty etc. no, we don’t deal with that. 
It could be that the people in charge of vulnerable groups has that information, or the 
economic development.” (Note: the Trustee of Vulnerable groups did not have that 
information) 
A clear understanding of the population and its level of marginalization could inform decisions regarding 
the allocation of resources. 
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federal level influenced the unexpected funding of a large infrastructure project at the 
local level.  
 In more open-ended questions, the mayor of San Andrés Cholula explained that 
for those projects not established during the election campaign, he uses the input of 
auxiliary presidents. “At the beginning of every year we ask for the participation of every 
auxiliary president. This is the person who is closest to the people, and we use [his or her] 
priorities as a base. Here, what we look at is what the auxiliary juntas bring us at the 
moment, which is how we decide what to do”11.  In Tenango del Aire, the municipality is 
open to solicitations for the expansion of services and project proposals made by citizens 
and delegates of each neighborhood. However, it was mentioned that in Tenango, the 
budget is often too small to modify pre-determined plans. Moreover, in the case of 
Tenango del Aire, delegates are given less authority in the decision-making process than 
auxiliary presidents because their job posts are honorary, not paid, and, thus, the mayor is 
in less contact with them than mayors are in contact with the salaried/compensated 
auxiliary presidents.  
When asked how the mayors accounted for citizen participation, the mayor of San 
Andres indicated that every Thursday morning (Jueves ciudadano), the mayor holds an 
open meeting with the public to hear the complaints, demands, or comments of the 
citizenry. However, these meetings occur after the decision-making process and projects 
have been already prioritized. Moreover, citizen participation was noted by the mayor as 
only participation in government meetings and through elections but not in terms of 
citizen committees. When asked about the role citizen participation plays in the decision-
                                                          
11 As will be noted in Section 5.5, the input process in which auxiliary presidents supply the municipality 
with input is flawed. 
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making process, both mayors indicated that there was a lack of participation.  In the case 
of San Andrés Cholula, the mayor commented that: 
 
“We have a severe problem with the lack of citizen participation, I think 
that [is the case in] the whole country. What we have is a problem with 
people feeling the need for a paternalistic government. People see 
government see everything in terms of obligation. You are the 
government. You have to give me everything, drainage, paving streets, 
etc.” 
 
Thus, citizens petition the municipalities directly to implement particular projects, but 
these petitions are seen by the municipality as demands and not citizen participation. In 
addition, the act of petitioning is seen by the municipality as being more common and 
frequent than the act of citizen participation. This concurs with data gathered by the 
nationwide LAPOP 2010 survey, which found that 16.4% of those interviewed solicited 
help or presented a petition to the local government in contrast with only 9% who 
participated in local government meetings, assemblies, and sessions. 
 In Tenango del Aire, citizen participation was accounted for by participation in 
local government meetings and also through elections. Participation was noted to be low 
and was not accounted for through participation in COCICOVIs. When asked about the 
role of input from trustees and department heads in the decision-making process, both 
mayors indicated that while the trustees participate in the prioritization process of public 
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works, as will be noted in the next section, department and administrative input is not 
utilized.  
 
4.4 The Role of Administrative Discretion 
Although the structure of Tenango del Aire suggests equal input or administrative 
discretion in the decision-making process, this is not the case in either municipality. 
Interviews conducted with the mayors, trustees, and heads of departments and urban 
projects in both municipalities confirmed the lack of discretion given to the 
administrative branches of government; administrative discretion is nonexistent.  
In a given municipality, trustees oversee departments, which in turn oversee 
directives. In the municipality of San Andrés Cholula, four trustees were interviewed: the 
trustee of Urban Development, Ecology, Environment, Public Works and Services; the 
trustee of Vulnerable Groups, Youth and Gender Equality; the trustee of Public 
Education and Cultural, Sporting and Social activities; and the trustee of Economic 
Development and Tourism. Four heads of departments were interviewed: the director of 
the Department of Urban and Ecologic Development, the director of the Department of 
Sustainable Urban Planning, the director of the Department of Potable Water (one of the 
case studies analyzed dealt with a citizen committee created to obtain potable water), and 
the director of the Directive of Public Participation. Moreover, various heads of public 
projects within the Department of Public Works were interviewed. In Tenango del Aire, 
the mayor, the municipal secretariat, and three trustees, the 1st Trustee of Public Services, 
the 2nd Trustee of Urban Development and Public Works, and the 6th Trustee of 
Environment, Ecology and Territorial Limits were interviewed. In addition, four other 
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individuals were interviewed, the head of the Commission of Municipal Development 
Planning, the Internal Municipal Comptroller, the head of the Finance Commission, and 
the head of the Commission of Urban Development, Public Works and Services. 12 
According to the interviews, the various departments and directives receive 
petitions from individuals, citizen committees, and delegates (in the case of Tenango del 
Aire) or auxiliary presidents (in the case of San Andrés Cholula) to implement various 
projects throughout the year.13 Their job is to forward the requests to the trustees who 
vocalize solicitations to the mayor who prioritizes the projects during one of the monthly 
meetings with the council.14 Trustees, in turn, in addition to receiving petitions from the 
various department and directive heads, also receive petitions directly from the 
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13 Ironically, the only directive who reported not receiving petitions from citizens pressuring the 
municipality to prioritize a particular project was the directive of Citizen Participation in San Andrés 
Cholula. This may be due to the lack of citizen awareness of the existence of the directive of Citizen 
Participation. None of the members of the citizen committees interviewed, nor the residents of Tonantzintla 
interviewed, knew about the existence of the directive. 
 
14 As noted by Rowland; “today, there is much debate within municipalities about whether the council 
members have legislative functions, or simply serve to receive complaints from the citizens and channel 
them to the mayor” (2001: 1378). As noted in the data collected for this chapter, in both municipalities 
analyzed in this study, the legislative functions of the council were trumped by the responsibility of 
channeling citizen demands to the mayor. 
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population. During the monthly meetings, if they believe a petition is valid, they present 
the petition to the mayor.15  
Officially, in addition to the monthly meetings of the municipal council, the 
municipality meets for a COPLADEMUN (Comite de Planeasion Municipal, Municipal 
Planning Committee, in English) to prioritize works. During the COPLADEMUN, civil 
society, the auxiliary juntas, and some representatives from the state government can 
participate. Unfortunately, according to the trustees interviewed, this is just a formal 
meeting, “nothing is decided there” (from an interview with a trustee in San Andrés). In 
other words, the COPLADEMUN does not occur until after project-selection decisions 
have been finalized. In the municipality of Tenango del Aire, the general secretariat 
indicated that the COPLADEMUN was simply used to coordinate and implement 
projects in the municipality promised by the state or national government during political 
campaigns. For example, he indicated that during the presidential campaign of Enrique 
Peña Nieto, the PRI political party promised the State of México and its municipalities 
that if Peña Nieto won, the PRI would implement certain projects. These projects were 
noted during a COPLADEMUN, which coordinated their future implementation. In other 
words, the COPLADEMUN does not operate to prioritize projects or to coordinate the 
implementation of projects prioritized at the municipal level.  This finding supports 
previous studies indicating that: “the COPLADEMUNs, were either marginalized in the 
discussions of local matters or simply did not exist” (Rowland 2001: 1381). Thus, they 
are irrelevant as mechanisms for citizen participation in political matters of the 
municipality.  
                                                          
15 However, it is important to note that petitions are usually copied to the mayor.   
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When the heads of departments and directives in both municipalities were asked 
about their role in the decision-making process, they stated that they do not participate in 
the decision-making process. Although they receive petitions for services or projects, 
they forward these requests to the trustees. In other words, “Their role was to translate the 
decisions made by the mayor into concrete actions” (Interview with department head in 
San Andrés Cholula). During the interviews, it was made explicit that the trustees do not 
meet with the heads of the departments and directives to create their own plans for 
development. Planning the expansion of services or the building of infrastructure, roads, 
sidewalks, potable water, etc., is not based on projections of growth and predicted 
demand increases. It is based solely on the demands of the people. The decision-making 
process is a one-directional top-down process. Decisions are made on a demand basis; 
promises are made during the campaign. Petitions arrive throughout the year, and based 
on these demands, decisions are made by the mayor as to what projects to implement. 
Departments, even that of Urban Development, do not participate in the creation of plans 
or in the prioritization process of existing demands. 
  However, the 2012 Municipal Plan for Sustainable Urban Development (El 
Programa Municipal de Desarrollo Urbano Sustentable), which lists the projects that 
will be implemented during the coming year, was elaborated by the municipal council of 
San Andrés Cholula in conjunction with the head of the Department of Urban 
Development and Ecology and other pertinent administrative departments, along with 
input from town council representatives and from citizen participants. Moreover, it is said 
to consider state and national plans for development. None of the interviewed department 
heads said they had input in prioritizing plans for community development. According to 
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the director of the department of Urban Development Ecology and Environment in San 
Andrés Cholula, his department deals only with granting permits for use of soil, permits 
for construction, street alignment, and street numbers, etc. It does not contribute to the 
projection of needed infrastructure plans for the municipality. It has authority to deny a 
permit over a citizen-petitioned project, but, as far as projects prioritized by the 
municipality, permits are mostly ceremonial. Moreover, the department  maps out the 
municipality, classifying zones as rural, urban, or ecological preserves, and on the basis 
of this zoning map, it decides whether or not to implement a particular project. However, 
although permit-decisions are made on the basis of the abovementioned zoning map, this 
map does not contain information needed to determine the full impact of any project in a 
particular zone. The zoning map did not use updated census information to classify each 
zone.  Moreover, when the head of the department was asked about census numbers in 
Santa Maria Tonantzintla, he answered that it was approximately 160,000 inhabitants. 
However, according to the latest census, the population was 15,000 and when probed 
further, he indicated that the department did not have an official census of the area. 
Moreover, the township offices also did not have a census of the population or any 
information regarding the levels of poverty, illiteracy rates, percentage of women, 
children, etc. of the township. In addition, when visiting the rural township, several 
buildings under current construction were over three stories high. According to the 
official zoning laws in that particular area, this was not allowed. Local residents reported 
that they did not go to their municipal authority, or township office, to request building 
permits. Local authorities in the township government office, when asked, did not have 
any documents regarding zoning laws or any way of enforcing them. 
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All department heads in San Andrés concurred that they do not participate 
prioritizing projects. The lack of involvement in prioritization was worrisome. When the 
director of the Department of Potable Water was asked about his role in determining 
priorities during the fiscal year, he indicated that he does not participate in the 
prioritization of projects. When probed further, the director indicated his department only 
manages the existing water system but does not play a role in creating plans to expand 
service. Thus, when a community requests the expansion of a service, like potable water, 
the relevant department—in this case the potable water—does not weigh in on the 
technical matters regarding whether or not to expand the service.  
The department heads in the municipality of Tenango Del Aire also indicated that 
they do not have input in creating or proposing projects to be implemented in their 
respective municipalities. The technical expertise of department heads is not utilized to 
program the expansion of services required as a result of population changes in their 
jurisdiction. In Tenango del Aire for example, the head of the Department of Public 
Education indicated that his department does not determine whether the construction of 
more schools is necessary. The department only participates in building schools when 
petitioned by the mayor. They do not participate in the decision-making process 
determining whether or not a new school is needed. Municipal departments do not create 
projections of demand for services. A similar observation was made for all departments 
in both municipalities.  
In the municipality of Tenango del Aire, the Director of Urban Development 
mentioned that in his municipality, as in San Andrés Cholula, his department is only in 
charge of granting use of soil permits, and occasionally changing the plan of urban 
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development when a project proposed by the mayor extended into an area that is not 
incorporated in the current urban plan. According to the interviews, growth in Tenango 
del Aire occurs from the center out.  Most lands are subdivided among family members 
as a family grows. Thus, the municipality does not need to do much to extend service 
provision as the population grows. However, sometimes residents sell land they own in 
the outskirts of town and building begins. When this occurs, the municipality must 
modify the urban plan in order to provide services to these lands, which are not included 
in the urban zone. However, as indicated by the Director of Social and Economic 
Development, the Urban Development Plan has not changed since 2004. Changes to the 
Urban Development Plan can have far-reaching consequences on community growth. 
Unfortunately, the department does not project growth and propose its own goals for 
development. In other words, it does not take geographic considerations (for example, 
regional clusters) into account. They do not indicate where (e.g., residential, commercial, 
and recreational areas, etc.) growth and projects should be promoted. In other words, it 
does not produce an “ideal” urban plan that would at least theoretically provide for 
sustainable, ecological, and economically feasible growth. The Department of Urban 
Development does not promote and encourage specific kinds of growth; it only responds 
to requests for services from citizens after growth has occurred. 
 The Department of Urban Development grants use of soil permits to projects 
prioritized by the municipality or solicited by citizens16. While the granting of permits 
provides a yes or no vote on an issue, it does not address the broader question of which 
                                                          
16 According to my interviews, it is very common for  citizens (in both municipalities) to begin construction 
projects without requesting official permits and the municipalities rarely become involved in stopping the 
construction unless officials receive several complaints.  
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projects the municipality ‘should’ fund or promote. The technical expertise of each 
department is not being utilized in planning and proposing a common vision of the future. 
As the trustees interviewed in both municipalities indicated, they do not have the 
opportunity to work with the department heads (which they oversee) to suggest projects 
to the mayor. The trustees and department and directive heads are unable to plan for 
municipal growth. Urban planning on a technical level does not occur. The establishment 
of priorities in the municipality does not follow any technical input from experts and 
department and directive heads. Moreover, every three years, “Every administration is 
renewed with the incoming president and all offices stop working for a while [… people] 
are fired and replaced with the people the president brought in. And others are sometimes 
kept; depending on how many people the mayor had to bring in, […] this includes hiring 
new department heads and other office staff, like the secretaries” (Interview with 
department head in San Andrés Cholula). The policy, therefore, opens the process of 
hiring technical and administrative staff to a system of spoils or patronage.17 The mayor 
appoints those who helped during his election campaign based on loyalty—not 
necessarily professional merit. Additional interviews with municipal staff in both 
municipalities confirmed this custom of changing administrative staff every three years 
for the incoming mayor, although noted to be less common in Tenango del Aire.  
 Record keeping in such a system is thus either very difficult or not a priority. For 
example, when interviewing the trustee of Vulnerable Groups, Youth and Gender 
Equality in San Andrés Cholula, the trustee indicated that the municipality does not have 
information regarding census of the population, let alone the nature of the population 
                                                          
17 The mayor can only be elected for a non-renewable three year term. Even if the mayor performed very 
well while in office, he/she cannot run for a second term. 
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with regard to the percent of elderly people, young adults, or children, or the income 
distribution, level of education etc. in the municipality. This begs the question; if the 
constituents are seemingly unknown, due to the lack of record keeping, how does the 
trustee of Vulnerable Groups, Youth and Gender Equity determined what projects to 
implement to ‘meet the demands’ of her constituency? When interviewing the heads of 
various departments in the municipality of San Andrés Cholula, I became aware that 
there was no record in the municipality of the projects that were petitioned for during the 
previous administration. The same was the case in Tenango del Aire. Specifically, when 
mayors and trustees were asked if projects prioritized during the previous administration 
where considered when deciding what projects to implement during the year, everyone 
answered, “no.” A “no” answer was the norm unless the project prioritized by the 
previous administration had already been initiated and was of a very large scale, such as a 
stadium construction project. Thus, in a system with no record keeping, petitions made 
prior to the incoming mayoral administration are often disregarded; petitions are not 
prioritized based on chronological order of proposal. Moreover, if a community petitions 
a project or expansion of a service that does not become prioritized in the current 
administration, when the new mayor enters office, the petitioning process must begin 
anew because no record of the petition was ever made. 
Administrative discretion of the department and directive heads in both 
municipalities was almost nonexistent; the decision-making process was centralized in 
the hands of a strong mayor who did not take advantage of the input and the technical 
expertise of his administration. Moreover, in regard to professionalism, the importance of 
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hiring administrative personnel based on skill versus political connection was notably 
downplayed. 
The lack of input of department and directive heads in community planning as 
well as the lack of professionalism makes both municipalities resemble those of the 
United States administration during the 19th Century. In the search for a balance 
“between rational, professional administration and democratic openness and public 
accountability” (Box 1998: 4), the United States has passed through various reforms, 
each accentuating the merits of one of the traits mentioned above. In other words: 
 
 “The administrative history of our governmental machinery can be 
construed as a succession of shifts […], each brought about by a change in 
emphasis among three values: representativeness, politically neural 
competence, and executive leadership.” [The] “earliest political 
institutions” [were] reactions to “executive dominance in the colonial era,” 
followed by “extreme reliance” on “representative mechanisms” in the 
nineteenth century, resulting in a negative reaction to “legislative 
supremacy” and the spoils system in which many administrative positions 
were filled on a political basis. This led to the reform efforts of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century, with stronger separation of politics 
and administration, merit-based personnel systems, and administrative 
centralization for efficiency (Kaufman 1969, 3-4)” (Box 1998: 12-13). 
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Recalling U.S. history, during the seventeenth and eighteenth century, the then-
colonies, predecessors of the United States, which were modeled after English 
institutions, were ruled by elites appointed to local government. American independence 
brought with it a wave of democratization “an increasing trend toward active policy 
debate and decision-making by the collected members of the town meeting instead of the 
familiar deference to the wisdom of the select men chosen as town leaders” (Box 
1998:32). The contribution of the United States to the democratic political process during 
this period cannot be undermined. Unfortunately, the newly founded country “harbored 
severe doubts about the ability of bureaucratic organizations to address national 
problems. Indeed, Americans regarded bureaucracies as brute administrative units, not 
planning or policymaking organizations” (Carpenter, 2001: 40). In not attempting to 
build the administrative capacity of the country, this era of Jacksonian Democracy, left in 
its place the “patronage, or spoils, system […] designed to distribute the offices of slate 
to party loyalist [, a] system founded on […] rotation in office” (Carpenter 2001: 41). “At 
every change in presidential administration, much of the federal bureaucracy would flush 
itself out through the rotation of party members in and out of executive departments” 
(ibid.) Moreover, in underestimating the need for technical expertise in managing 
administrative departments, Jacksonian Democrats created a legacy of “clerical 
supremacy” within government organizations (Carpenter 2001). In his discussion of the 
Interior Department in 1909, Carpenter notes that “perhaps the most crippling aspects of 
clerical supervision for the bureaus lay in the reduction of their authority and discretion 
within the department [, …] render[ing] the bureaus not “agents of the Secretary” but 
“foreign organizations.”  [Moreover] because bureau chiefs could communicate to the 
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secretary only through their departmental clerical supervisors, they had little ability to 
sell programs and administrative innovations to the secretary” (Carpenter 2001: 54). In 
other words, “nineteenth-century American political culture disabled bureaucracy by 
casting doubt on governmental careers and bureaucratic effectiveness” (Carpenter 2001: 
40).  
The pressures of industrialization—rapid urban growth requiring the building of 
bridges, paving of roads, and the solving of problems requiring technical expertise—on 
the American administration lead to a new wave of reform, and according to 
Skowroneck, “It is difficult to imagine how corporate capitalism could have thrived in 
America without an alteration of the pre-established institutional supports for American 
democracy” (1882: 17).  For Skowroneck, “The modernization of national administrative 
controls did not entail making the established state more efficient; it entailed building a 
qualitatively different kind of state” (1982: 4). There was a push toward centralization 
and the professionalization/incorporation of merit-based personnel systems in 
government administration. Technical administrative decisions based on proper record 
keeping and scientific information was now favored over decisions made on political 
grounds. Thus, 
 
“In relation to the institution of community governance, much of the 
twentieth century has been spent creating and implementing structural 
reforms to limit the possibilities of patronage, spoils, and control of 
government by political machines, reforms such as at-large elections to 
dilute the political impact of neighborhood (often ethnic) groups, and the 
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council-manager plan, which uses the private corporation model of a 
professional general manager or chief executive officer accountable to a 
broad of directors (in the public sector, the city council, or county 
commissioners).  Such reforms work well where there […] are largely 
physical and technical, such as challenges of infrastructure and finance. 
(Box 1998: 34) 
 
  After industrialization, the management of two World Wars and the establishment 
of the prowess of the United States in the world, it has become apparent that, “The 
twentieth-century rush to professionalism accomplished what was intended, bringing to 
bear efficiency and economy to solve the largely technical concerns of rapidly growing 
urban areas” (Box 1998: 34). Having accomplished its goals, all too well, “the reformist 
zeal [was] generated in reaction to conditions in the nineteenth century” (Box 1998: 35). I 
would argue that more than a “reaction” to the accomplishments of the era of 
professionalism, the new generation of reformers shifted their focus from securing the 
efficiency, economy and competence of government to guaranteeing a more 
representative and accessible government administration. In either case, in the 
contemporary United States, and other developed countries: 
  
“The emphasis [of reformers] is shifting the balance from centralized, expert-
based systems to decentralized, citizen-centered systems. [However, as mentioned 
above,] this shift is only possible because of the success of the reform impulse. If 
the battles for efficiency and effective community government remained to be 
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fought, if streets were muddy dirt tracks and water and sewer systems in their 
crude infancy, if local action was hampered by overly complex governance 
structure and administration was in the hands of political machines and their 
patronage employees, the contemporary discussion about citizen self-
determination would seem trivial and foolish. Instead, we would be worried about 
solving the basic problems of service delivery, as were the reformers a century 
ago” (Box 1998: 36). 
 
 Unfortunately, the administrations of both rural municipalities analyzed in the 
present study appeared trapped in the same traditions that governed the era of Jacksonian 
Democracy in the United States. As mentioned in the previous chapter, in the 1980s, 
México engaged heavily in decentralization policy and citizen self-determination, 
reforms that aimed to end rotation in office and patronage, and encourage 
professionalization. However, municipal department heads and administrative staff 
(secretaries in charge of bookkeeping, etc.) continue to be appointed on political grounds, 
not based on their technical expertise. They are subject to the side effects of the spoils 
system and rotation in office. The municipal administrative staff—which are newly 
installed with each elected mayor—have difficulty adjusting to new conditions and 
determining the inner workings of the municipality, and thus they have difficulty 
smoothly transitioning administrative functions from election to election, being subject to 
rotation in office themselves.18 The rest of the administrative staff, heads of departments 
                                                          
18 Record keeping is just recently becoming a subject of importance. However, each department does not 
maintain its own records; records are held in a central office and in some cases, the outgoing administration 
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and directives (e.g., engineers, architects, public education experts) have little ability to 
use their technical skills to plan and prepare for the future development of their 
communities. Guaranteeing democratic accountability in service delivery is not just about 
guaranteeing citizen participation in the allocation of services but also about the 
responsible allocation of services. Municipal authorities are paid by the citizens through 
taxes to use their technical expertise to guide the decision-making process.  
The input of department and directive heads is not being utilized in decision-
making. Their technical experience should be the main metric used to hire personnel. 
Moreover, the municipality should make an effort to improve its record keeping and learn 
about the nature of the constituents they serve. When the public works office was asked 
how they conduct a cost-benefit analysis for a particular project, using the paving of a 
street as an example, they indicated that: 
 
“This includes an analysis of the costs of the work. What we then focus on 
is trying to give benefit to the largest number of people” (Head of Public 
Works in San Andrés Cholula). 
 
When probed, it was indicated, “The cost benefit analysis does not include 
considerations of whether the street has drainage or potable water. It just includes the cost 
of the paving of the street and if the road is helping to connect two roads, thus giving 
greater benefit” (ibid.). That is, long-term plans for development and future expenses, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
acted consciously ‘not leave a good record trail to make the administration of the new mayor [from a 
different political party than the exiting mayor] more difficult’ (Interview in San Andrés Cholula). 
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like ripping out a newly paved street to add water in the future and then re-paving, is not 
considered.19 Moreover, they do not have a census of the population, so determining what 
work will benefit the largest number of people is not clear. Determining who will benefit 
from the project is determined, for the most part, by the signatures that a particular 
petition has attached to it, guaranteeing that projects exerting the greatest amount of 
popular pressure on the mayor are resolved—even if other projects (championed by less 
mobilized constituents) are of greater benefit and are more urgently needed.20  Under 
such a system of service allocation, the needs of the people are being undercut. 
Decentralization must be followed by an effort to improve the capabilities of the 
administrative staff and end patronage, rotation in office, and other elements that hinder 
good governance. In other words, as noted in the first Inter-American Democracy 
Conference: Democratic Governance and Effective Policy Development (IPMCS, 2014), 
a civil service reform movement is needed in the region of Latin America to complement 
decentralization efforts. 
 
4.5 The Role of Leadership 
One of the goals of this research is to identify the factors that affect the degree to 
which municipalities will incorporate citizen participation in the decision-making 
process. The effect of community leadership on who is heard in the municipality during 
                                                          
19 Interviews with community members of San Andrés Cholula indicated that on several occasions, newly 
paved roads were ripped out by the subsequent administration to change the material and thus the aesthetic 
of the street, without considering that the streets were in desperate need of drains in order to avoid flooding.   
 
20For example, in the auxiliary junta of Santa Maria Tonantzintla, two out of the three auxiliary presidents 
indicated that while attempting to supply the township library with potable water (the bathrooms were not 
functioning because of lack of water), the municipality paved several roads in the outskirts of the town 
center. According to them, this was mostly because the street neighbors were highly vocal and mobilized 
and they still had not collected signatures to add to the request for potable water. 
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the decision-making process cannot be ignored. As was indicated by Box (1998), the kind 
of leadership exercised at the local level can be determined by analyzing the interest 
groups attempting to affect land use. “These people include those most immediately 
connected with land, such as landowners, local businesspeople, investors in locally 
owned financial institutions, lawyers, realtors and so on” (ibid.:48). While for some (e.g. 
‘elite theorist’), the decision-making process is seen as being dominated “by a relatively 
cohesive and closed socioeconomic class, […others, specifically pluralist theorist view] 
community governance [as being] characterized by changing and accessible groups of 
people involved in specific issue areas” (Waste 1986, 13-25, cf. Box 1998: 45).   
In either case, as Paul Peterson (1981) put it, “Urban politics […] is above all the 
politics of land use, […] the factor of production over which cities exercise the greatest 
control” (Box 1998:43). Local governments are, after all, able to exercise control over 
land by using their financial powers (the use of taxation and investment in infrastructure) 
and regulatory powers (planning and zoning regulations). By using their financial and 
regulatory powers, local governments are able to “provide advantages to some people and 
deny them to others” (Burns 1994, 54-7, cf. ibid).  
In the growth machine model advanced by Harvey Molotch in 1976 and 
elaborated by Molotch and John Logan (1987), land is perceived as having two sets of 
value driven characteristics: exchange and use. “Exchange values are those of the 
marketplace, of people whose interest in land is primarily to make money from it. Use 
values are those of people whose primary interest in land is its use for creating a peaceful 
and pleasing living environment for themselves and their families” (Box 1998:49). 
According to Molotch’s growth machine model, “The responses to growth could be 
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portrayed along a continuum that stretche[s] from growth machine dominance to a weak 
growth machine” (ibid.: 59). However, community politics in such a model is seen, for 
the most part, as driven by those promoting the ‘growth machine,’ those elites who are 
aiming to enhance lands exchange value. In other words;  
 
“The underlying concept of the growth machine model, that people 
naturally want to make money from the use of land, it is difficult for 
citizens to resist the growth machine phenomenon and that it takes 
sustained effort to do so. For public professionals, the pervasiveness of the 
growth machine sets clear limits to action, as the “growth machine elite” 
controls the political power in a community and thus can influence hiring 
and retaining decision affecting professional careers” (Box 1998:50). 
 
Building on the idea of leadership molded by major interest groups attempting to 
affect land use, but using a less deterministic and uni-directional approach than that of the 
growth machine, one can create a typology of communities by examining the decisions 
residents have made regarding land use and economic growth in their communities. In 
helping do this, Box (1998) starts by describing and then building on a typology of 
communities proposed by Oliver Williams and Charles Adrian in their 1963 book, Four 
Cities: A Case in Comparative Policy Making. The typology of communities identified is 
fourfold;  
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1. Promotion cities: “The primary concern of the government is the promotion of 
economic growth.” (Box 1998: 51) 
2. Amenities communities: “The primary goal of government is to provide and 
secure life’s amenities, the ‘home environment rather than the working 
environment’ (Williams and Adrian 1963: 25). In such places, growth is often 
seen as a threat to the living environment. Amenities communities tend to have 
relatively homogeneous populations—that is, their residents are sufficiently 
similar in socioeconomic status and desire for a certain type of community that 
agreement on community goals can be reached and kept” (Box 1998: 51).  
3. Caretaker city: In this community type, “Maintenance of traditional services is the 
primary goal of government. Residents of this caretaker city wish to keep taxes 
low, minimize land-use planning and other restrictions on the use of private 
property, depend on the ‘freedom and self-reliance of the individual’ (Williams 
and Adrian 1963:27), and provide only basic and essential services through the 
local government” (Box 1998: 51). 
4. Heterogeneous communities: “The fourth type of community is very diverse, with 
many interest groups competing for political advantage. The function of local 
government in this community type is to serve as arbiter between the competing 
groups. In this hyper-pluralistic environment the highest value is placed on 
political responsiveness” (Box 1998: 52). 
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Box (1998) then draws on the similarities between Williams and Adrian’s typology of 
community orientations to that of the work of Clarence Stone (1993). Stone’s typology of 
community orientations and leadership is also fourfold: 
 
1. Maintenance regime: “(similar to Williams and Adrian’s caretaker community) 
that preserves the status quo and introduces few changes” (Box 1998:52). 
2.  Development regime: (similar to Williams and Adrian’s promotion community) 
and “‘concerned primarily with changing land use in order to promote growth or 
counter decline’ (Stone (1993: 18)” (ibid.).  
3. The middle-class progressive regime: (similar to Williams and Adrian’s amenities 
community) “focuses on ‘such measures as environmental protection, historic 
preservation, affordable housing, the quality of design, affirmative action, linkage 
funds for various social purposes’ (Stone 1993:19)” (ibid.). 
4. The regime of lower-class opportunity expansion: “It is different from than 
Williams and Adrian’s arbiter community, in which there are many competing 
interests, because the arbiter community may or may not emphasize a particular 
policy orientation, such as expansion of lower-class opportunity” (ibid.) Stone’s 
fourth regime proposes lower-class opportunity expansion “through programs 
such as ‘enriched education and job training, improved transportation access, and 
enlarged opportunities for business and home ownership” (Stone 1993:20, cf. 
ibid.). 
In both Williams and Adrian’s (and Stone’s) typology of communities, the 
decisions residents make regarding land use and economic growth in their communities 
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are diverse, resulting in diverse communities. Community leadership pushes decisions 
and as Box notes, “There is a continuum of responses to pressures for growth” (1998:57). 
As mentioned by Box, “Though a particular community is likely to be a mixture rather 
than a pure example of one of Williams and Adrian’s four types of community 
orientation or one of the four types of community response to the growth machine in the 
‘expanded’ growth machine typology, there are very real differences in local political 
environments” (1998: 62). The directions that community leadership pushes the 
allocation of value on land in the municipality of Tenango del Aire and San Andrés 
Cholula are very different. The allocation of value on land in Tenango del Aire focuses 
more its use values “creating a peaceful and pleasing living environment for themselves 
and their families” (Box 1998:49) while in San Andrés Cholula, the allocation of value is 
focused on exchange or “those of the marketplace, of people whose interest in land is 
primarily to make money from it” (ibid.).  
Tenango del Aire was the first municipality in the country to elect a mayor, in 
1985, that was an opposition candidate from the political predecessor of the PRD party. 
The party ran on the issue of securing free potable water and maintaining low taxes. 
According to the current political administration, the municipality still has difficulty 
collecting user fees for services and raising taxes due to the ideology established during 
the reign of the PRD predecessor. Although a coalition party currently manages the 
municipality, this municipality leans more toward PRI and PRD support, having never 
elected a PAN mayor. In any case, the residents’ ideology of maintaining low taxes and 
securing basic services makes the municipality resemble the caretaker city, where 
“Maintenance of traditional services is the primary goal of government [and] residents 
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[…] wish to keep taxes low” (Williams and Adrian 1963:27, cf. Box 1998: 51). The main 
business in the area is a bakery/coffee shop and restaurant (only open on weekends 
located above the bakery and owned by the same family) located in the town center. The 
family that owns the establishment has operated the business for several generations and 
is very active in the community. The bakery, which has operations in other municipalities 
in the state, is a main tourist attraction for outside visitors and is the main social meeting 
place for locals in town. The current owner has formed her own civic organization 
dedicated at providing aid to the poor. Moreover, she is very well connected with the 
local government and, ‘regardless of political affiliation,’ has always had a connection 
with the government. There are other active (yet smaller) business owners in town, and 
after conducting interviews, I noted they are primarily concerned with keeping the 
traditional feel to the town. Growth has been promoted over the years from the town 
center outward with priority given to the projects in the center of town. It was not until 
the current administration that attention was given to incorporating the new outgrowths of 
the municipal center into the urban plan. However, élites who own local business in town 
still prioritize the preservation of the center. For the most part, the municipality 
recognized that as in the middle class progressive regime the community focuses on such 
measures as historic preservation. 21 
As in Williams and Adrian’s amenities community, with the exemption of a few 
families, Tenango del Aire has a “relatively homogeneous population—that is, its 
residents are sufficiently similar in socioeconomic status and desire for a certain type of 
community that agreement on community goals can be reached and kept” (Box 1998: 
                                                          
21 In analyzing the municipal plan for development, a trend emerges: prioritization of development from the 
inner municipality center outward (GACETA, 2014). 
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51). However, the decision-making process is influenced by what Waste (1986), would 
call “a relatively cohesive and closed socioeconomic class” (cf. Box 1998: 45). A small 
portion of the population, the business class, is fairly active and has close ties with the 
government.22 During and after elections, this group of the population interacts with 
government on a regular basis for the functioning of its non-profits, social programs, etc. 
Thus, for this group of individuals, there are inlets for communication with the 
municipality, albeit non-official ones. If a citizen is not part of the ‘in-group’ of the 
socially active business class in the community, there is limited un-official contact with 
the municipality.23 Membership of the active business class is rather difficult to penetrate 
because social mobility is a slow process, resulting in relatively stable elite groups. These 
groups interact with government in a casual manner and indirectly affect the decision-
making process. The municipal authorities interviewed for this study indicated that other 
than promoting social works and projects (historical preservation, etc.) through non-
profits, these groups limit their participation to activities that occur during election 
cycles. The municipality did not recognize petition for services or projects as citizen 
participation. Moreover, municipal authorities indicated that more often than not, there 
are not enough funds to modify priorities established during the election campaign. Thus, 
the decision-making process—the governance process—is closed. Thus, the community 
of Tenango del Aire shares some characteristics with the Amenities community and 
                                                          
22 Interviews with the community members and government officials. 
 
23 Having access to one of the prominent families in town guaranteed me immediate access to the 
government. I had requested interviews through official means, but was unsuccessful. A casual 
conversation with one of the notable families in town resulted in a call to the municipality (a conversation 
with a family acquaintance) and an immediate scheduled meeting with the mayor and access to all the staff.    
Without this contact, the interview process would have taken several months. Being acquainted with a 
member of the in-group in the community granted me access to the local government and communication 
allows for the sharing of ideas about what priorities are and how growth should be shaped, etc.  
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Caretaker city described by Williams and Adrian (1963) and the Maintenance regime and 
the middle class progressive regime presented by Stone (1993). Moreover, community 
leadership can be described utilizing the lenses of the ‘elite theorist.’ 
The Municipality of San Andrés Cholula has a stronger affiliation with the PAN 
political party. As mentioned in previous chapters, some of the party’s doctrine and 
themes utilized for the mobilization of local elites has been anti-satetism translated as a 
“critique of centralization, [paternalisms] and the defense of private property” 
(Mainwaring & Scully 2003: 225). Moreover, the PAN has “a close rapport with business 
groups, notably the Confederación Patronal de la Republica Mexicana (Confederation of 
Mexican Business, Coparmex) and other parapolitical ultraconservative associations, 
such as the Desarrollo Humano Integral AC (Human Development Association), for 
whom the state was the worst enemy” (Mainwaring & Scully 2003:230). In other words, 
the party’s main focus was on pro-business policy that supports the urban middle and 
upper class. The affiliation with the PAN political party in the municipality of San 
Andrés Cholula makes it more disposed to hearing the interests of the business elites. The 
municipality is much larger than Tenango del Aire, and its population is fairly 
heterogeneous. Thus, it resembles Williams and Adrian’s (1963) heterogeneous 
communities: “The fourth type of community [which] is very diverse, with many interest 
groups competing for political advantage” (Box 1998: 52). As noted by Box, “in this 
hyper pluralistic environment the highest value is [usually] placed on political 
responsiveness” (ibid.). Moreover, the decision-making process is usually “characterized 
by changing and accessible groups of people involved in specific issue areas” (Waste 
1986, 13-25, cf. Box 1998: 45). According to interviews, this municipality does receive 
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and respond to petitions/demands made after the election process. However, although one 
can adopt the pluralist view of community leadership, ties of the municipality with the 
PAN political party makes the primary concern of the government the promotion of 
economic growth, as in the promotion cities. Or, as in the development regime proposed 
by Stone, the municipality is “concerned primarily with changing land use in order to 
promote growth (Stone 1993: 18)” (ibid.).  
In San Andrés Cholula, the pluralist lens offers the best view of community 
leadership, highlighting the ever-present pressure felt by the municipality from diverse 
groups trying to affect the decision-making process. Municipal authorities in San Andrés 
Cholula received petitions throughout the year for various infrastructure projects. They 
recognized that in many cases, private funding to match government investment 
influenced the prioritization of projects. The municipality acknowledged giving 
preference to proposals which could be partly funded by the private sector. Thus, the 
municipality can be viewed as Accessible and as having an Open Governance system, 
especially if the interests pushing for influence are in alignment with the growth machine, 
the pushing for a vision of community as a marketplace. 
San Andrés Cholula is composed of six townships; the township of Santa Maria 
Tonantzintla is a rural township competing for resources with more urban and wealthy 
townships in the municipality. For example, the Angelopolis zone is one of the most 
urban and wealthy zones in the metropolitan region of the municipality and the home of a 
shopping mall, Centro Comercial Angelopolis (which contains a movie theater, and 
several high end retail shops like Lacoste, Hugo Boss, Mango, Tous, Omega, Prada, etc.), 
and various wealthy home residency enclosures, such as La Vista Country Club and 
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Lomas de Angelopolis, as well as several sky scrapers. An astrophysics institute is 
located within Santa Maria Tonantzintla, which attracts students and professors from 
around the world; however, this sector of the population, has, with an exception of a short 
period of period of time in the 1980s24, remained fairly insulated and not involved in 
local politics. Hence, community representation and leadership is exercised from 
agricultural constituents. According to the literature, “There are tensions between the 
relatively urbanized “capitals” of municipalities (cabeceras) and their rural hinterlands, 
which also fall under the jurisdiction of local authorities. The traditional complaint [… 
being] that the areas outside the administrative center of the municipality are neglected 
even by the local government (for México, see Fox & Aranda, 1996)” (Rowland 
2001:1381). Interviews with the auxiliary presidents of Santa Maria Tonantzintla 
indicated that their township was neglected by the municipality not because it was 
outside of the ‘capital’ but because its constituents represented an agricultural base 
instead of a pro-growth business class. 
 
4.6 Sources of Revenue  
The self-governing status of the states and municipalities is constitutionally 
entrenched in national level legislation. However, the nature of intergovernmental 
relations has for the most part implied that states, as well as the central government, play 
an important role in municipal affairs (Rowland 2001). As Rowland has pointed out, 
“until national constitutional reforms in 1999, municipalities in México were technically 
an administrative branch of each state, and loyalties within the PRI (ruling party) 
                                                          
24 Interview with community activists indicate that during the 1980s, the institute’s faculty actively 
promoted community development.  
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traditionally meant the subordination of municipal government to the wishes of the state 
governor (Fagen & Tuohy 1972; Graham, 1968)” (Rowland 2001: 1378). Prior to the 
constitutional reforms of 1999, states had the authority to take over local tasks, such as 
the management of municipal public services, without the consent of the municipalities. 
The reforms of the 1990s, as well as the election of mayors and state governors from 
opposition parties, have altered municipal-state relationships; however, states still hold 
some power over municipal affairs (Rowland 2001). For example, municipal budgets and 
other development plans still require approval from state legislatures (ibid.). 
Overall, however, the allocation of responsibilities and sources of revenue to 
states and municipalities follows the guidelines for decentralized government (Rowland 
2001). Municipal governments have exclusive authority over property taxes and charges 
for local public services; however, for most local governments, the main source of 
income continues to be monetary transfers from the central government (ibid.). Transfers 
from the central government are twofold. The system of federal revenue-sharing 
(participaciones) transfers funds from the central government (20% of the national 
income from taxes) to the states (according to a formula that accounts for tax effort, 
population, and poverty levels), and then states allocate funds (approximately 4% of the 
total national fund) to their local jurisdictions (ibid). As of 1998, municipalities also have 
access to formula driven direct/targeted funds from the central government 
(aportaciones) that bypass the state government (ibid.). Section 33, which transfers direct 
grants from the central government to states and to municipalities, is divided into eight 
funds that are distributed according to a formula that accounts for municipal population, 
poverty, and the isolation of the jurisdiction. The eight funds comprising Section 33 are: 
 137
Funds for Basic Education (FAEB); Funds for Public Health Services (FASSA); Funds 
for Social Infrastructure (FAIS) which includes (a) Funds for State Social Infrastructure 
(FISE) destined for public infrastructure projects of general benefit/intra-municipal and 
(b) Funds for Social Municipal Infrastructure (FISM) destined for public infrastructure 
projects in municipalities;  Funds for the Federal District (FORTAMUN-DF), Funds for 
Multiple Use (FAM) such as (a) Social Assistance used for alleviating extreme poverty 
and (b) Funds for Educational Infrastructure for basic and higher public education such as 
construction, equipment and rehabilitation of physical infrastructure; Funds for Adult & 
Technical Education (FAETA) including (a) Information Technology Programs and (b) 
Adult Education; Funds for Public Safety (FASP); and Funds for the Strengthening 
Federal Entities (FAFEF) (ORIFIS 2013).   
            Three sources of revenue—self-revenue (which is money collected from granting 
building permits, licenses, etc.), federal revenue-sharing funds, and direct grants—
compose the total municipal funds available. In the case of San Andrés Cholula, self-
revenue comprised 51.33% of the funds available to the municipality in 2012, and was 
the largest source of revenue, followed by funds distributed by the state, which comprised 
21.94% of the municipality’s resources, and federal ‘earmarked’ funds, or Section 33, 
which comprised 20.66% of the funds available (from financial records provided by the 
mayor). In contrast, self-revenue was the smallest fund available to the municipality of 
Tenango del Aire. According to interviews with the Secretary of the Municipality of 
Tenango del Aire, his municipality has access to approximately one million pesos yearly 
from self-revenue, approximately ten-to-thirteen million pesos yearly from Section 33, 
and approximately one-to-two million pesos from the state government. In general, 
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municipal funds are used for recurrent expenditures rather than investments (Rowland 
2001). Mayors from both municipalities indicated that funds given to them for social 
infrastructure by the federal government are formula driven. In my interview with Juan 
Marcos Gutierrez Gonzalez25, he acknowledged that—a result of constitutional change—
politics are no longer a factor in the release of funds. Prior to the constitutional change, 
‘aportaciones’ were distributed at the discretion of the national government. Sometimes 
they would be withheld depending on political issues. Now, funding through Section 33 
follows a particular procedure and municipalities know exactly how much and when 
funds will arrive—and this is not subject to last minute changes (ibid.).  
 In both municipalities, mayors were asked about the discretion granted to them in 
decisions regarding the allocation of social infrastructure funds and any restrictions 
associated to specific funds. This was done in order to determine how autonomy or lack 
thereof affected the municipal decision-making processes. Mayors in both municipalities 
concurred that they had full discretion in determining where to allocate resources 
obtained from self-revenue. They also had full discretion over the allocation of resources 
obtained from participaciones. However, for projects requiring funds from Section 33, 
both mayors were aware of the restrictions imposed and the resulting limitations to their 
discretion when using them. 
 
 
 
                                                          
25Juan Marcos Gutierrez Gonzalez was a principal actor in reforming the Fiscal Coordination Law in 
México; this reform assured the release of funds, through federal transfers, to states and cities and assured 
transparency of the shares in 1999. 
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4.7 Auxiliary Perspective  
In San Andrés Cholula, auxiliary presidents were noted by the mayor to play an 
important role in the decision-making process. Thus, three successive auxiliary presidents 
from Santa Maria Tonantzintla were interviewed.26  Auxiliary presidents are elected 
every three years. The township of Tonantzintla is composed of three boroughs, San 
Miguel, San Diego de Alcala, and San Pedro.  According to interviews with the residents 
of the township, representatives from each borough take turns running for office and 
running the administration. Thus, the auxiliary president in office from the latest term 
included in this study (May 2011-May2014), was from San Miguel, the president before 
him was from San Diego, and the one before him represented the residents from San 
Pedro. The election process of auxiliary presidents, based on rotation in office according 
to borough, is un-legislated, but was confirmed by all three auxiliary presidents. 
According to an auxiliary president, this rotation of representation takes place “It is not a 
tradition. It was a decision [...].  It happened because people from only two barrios, San 
Miguel and San Diego, were being elected. So now, yes, we have a rotation” (auxiliary 
president May 2008-May 2011 term). The system of rotation was adopted from the 
religious practice of rotating representation of each chapel, and its parish, in the 
administration of main church in Santa Maria Tonantzintla (ibid.).  
                                                          
26 The term limits and respective boroughs of the interviewed auxiliary presidents were the following: 
President C. Samuel Tecuatl Toxqui (May 2011-May2014) from San Miguel, Lic. Guillermo Ramos 
Cuautle (May 2008-May 2011) from San Diego, C. Salomon Huepa (May 2005-May 2008) from San 
Pedro. 
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Each one of the boroughs in the township of Santa Maria Tonantzintla has a 
chapel that is run by individuals referred to as “principales”27. According to interviews 
with community members and the auxiliary presidents, the “principales” from each 
chapel take turns being “mayordomos”28 for the town church of Santa Maria 
Tonantzintla. The practice of rotating representation by borough, in the administration of 
the main church, was adapted ‘unofficially’ by the civil sector to guarantee the equal 
representation of boroughs in administration of the auxiliary junta of Santa Maria 
Tonantzintla29. As noted by a resident speaking of the township politics, “The church 
                                                          
27 The term “principales” appears in the literature on the evolution of 16th century status groups in México 
and the cargo system (also known as the civil-religious hierarchy, fiesta or mayordomía system). According 
to Chance’s (1985) discussion on 18th century status groups, there were “the caciques (those who claimed 
descent from pre-Hispanic ruling families), principales (second-echelon nobles), and macehuales 
(commoners). […] only the rank of cacique was determined strictly by inheritance. The statuses of 
principal and macehual were determined by a contradictory mix of both ascription and achievement (via 
cargo service). It was often said that there were two kinds of principales de-nacimiento (by birth), and de 
oficio (by office). […]Since these were small communities, this ladder of achievement was open to all. […] 
The civil cargo system thus had a well-defined internal structure and set of motivations that were 
responsible for its perpetuation. Caciques and principales by birth sought political office as a means to 
legitimate their high rank in the absence of wealth or other tangible indicators. Macehuales sought the same 
offices in order to escape their com-moner status and enter the ranks of the lower nobility. The rewards that 
the system offered its participants were not all internally derived, however. The […] hierarchy was a 
creature of colonialism in the fullest sense” (Chance 1985:16).  Today, indigenous men, after passing 
through a series of ranked offices, "cargos," both civil and religious, which make up the cargo system,  and 
entail “taking on civic duties one year, sponsoring important religious fiestas celebrated in the community 
the next, and so on. […] as old men, they attain the status of elders, or "principales," and have considerable 
authority in local decision-making)” (Friedlander 1981:132). 
 
28 “The mayordomo is a secular figure responsible for organizing major fiestas in small communities 
throughout México and is generally in charge, or financially responsible for, the local saints. These 
individuals often represent the parishioners [of their chapel] before the parish priest” (Camp 1997: 26). In 
Tonantzintla, in addition to the mayordomos’ duty planning parties, they maintain the inside of the church, 
they serve as a Sacristan. The principales from each borough in Tonantzintla take turns serving as 
mayordomo in the town church.  
 
29 The specific date when the adoption of this system of rotation was adopted by the local government was 
not clearly indicated in the interviews. However, upon further inquiry, it was noted that what was being 
observed was an adaptation of the cargo system (also known as the civil-religious hierarchy, fiesta or 
mayordomía system) in the civil/political life of the township. Specifically, the essential features of the 
cargo system (civil-religious hierarchy) identified by Dewalt (1975) are the following:  
“1) it involves voluntary service without remuneration (although in most communities 
there are strong social and/or physical pressures upon individuals to participate in the 
system); 2) holders of civil or religious offices (cargos) perform most or all of the 
 141
                                                                                                                                                                             
functions necessary for the running of the local government and/or the church; and 3) 
tenure in these offices is rotated, usually annually, to other members of the community. 
[…] Traditionally, passage through the complete system of hierarchically based offices 
has been the most important means of acquiring prestige in the community” (ibid.: 90).  
The series of ranked offices ‘cargos, in Spanish’ was established during the colonial era when 
“villages came under the control of the religious orders” (Friedlander 1981:69). Because the indigenous 
members of society were not allowed to become priests, the Spanish missionaries established an elaborate 
substructure of religious posts to accommodate them and to facilitate their religious conversion and 
instruction (ibid.). Moreover, they combined secular and religious duties. “In keeping with the traditions of 
the peninsular Church, [were] encouraged […] to organize elaborate processions with crosses, saints, 
incense, flowers and music [… which] ensured a generally high spiritual level in a village as their members 
could be counted on to monitor others in the pueblo” (Friedlander 1981:69). In Santa Maria Tonantzintla 
there are several processions and fiestas (parties in English) to honor particular saints. Each chapel in the 
township, for example, has a patron saint that is celebrated. These parties include free food (usually mole) 
for the participants, music and dance as well as firecrackers and fireworks displays—the cost of which add 
up to a substantial amount. In addition to the fiestas celebrating saints, the main church of Santa Maria 
Tonantzintla has its own parties celebrating the Virgin Mary and Christmas. The ‘principales’ and 
‘mayordomos’ are obligated to incur the cost of feasting or to gather the funds from the community. 
“Ethnographers characterize the ‘traditional’ or ‘classic’ form of the system as a 
hierarchy of ranked offices that together comprise a community's public civil and 
religious administration […] All local men are expected to ascend this ladder of 
achievement during their lifetimes, alternating back and forth between civil and religious 
posts. Each elective office, or cargo, is held for one year and there are numerous ‘rest 
periods’ along the way. The higher the cargo served, the greater the prestige enjoyed by 
the carguero and his family. Such rewards do not come without a price, however, for 
many cargos, especially the higher ones, require substantial financial outlays. Those who 
have the resources and longevity to make it to the top of the hierarchy retire from the 
system and join a select group of town elders. These elders, or principales, are men who 
have proven their moral worth and often exert considerable influence in local affairs. 
Overtly Spanish in structure, but with some indigenous underpinnings, this classic form 
of the system includes the offices of municipal government on the civil side, and 
positions in sodalities (cofradias or mayordomias) honoring the Catholic saints on the 
religious side. The expenses and associated prestige are connected with individual 
sponsorship of fiestas and other ritual occasions held for the local saints.” (Chance 
1985:14) 
As the cargo system evolved, “details varied from village to village, but all hierarchies were similar in that 
they encompassed the formal political offices introduced by the Spanish, as well as a few more lowly posts 
that probably had a pre-Hispanic basis” (Chance 1985:14). Moreover, as noted by Eric Wolf (1982) "The 
civil-religious  hierarchies thus installed a system of elite domination within the communities, while at the 
same time allowing that elite to represent the community as a whole before external power holders and 
authorities" (ibid.: 148). Under this system, indigenous residents assumed the responsibility of organizing 
fiestas and managing local administrative affairs (Friedlander 1981). The system was so successful that “it 
[was] adopted by the defiantly anti- Catholic post-revolutionary government. […M]any twentieth-century 
secular ideologues, like their religious predecessors of colonial times, have been providing the spiritual 
justification for a socioeconomic policy that maintains an identifiable indigenous population. To transmit 
the modern version of the old message, the government uses the structure of the traditional fiesta system, 
encouraging local political leaders, who represent the PRI platform, to take an active role in sponsoring the 
celebration of México's major national heroes and events” (ibid.: 139). More recently, programs like 
PRONASOL have utilized traditional indigenous practices to induce civil participation (Beneria & Breny 
1995). Moreover, although “today the civil offices and the mayordomo positions do not have an explicit 
relationship to one another […] it is not unusual for a villager seeking a political career in the pueblo to 
volunteer regularly to serve either as a mayor-domo in a religious fiesta or as a presidente de fiestas patrias 
in the secular cycle” (Friedlander 1981: 140). Interviews with residents of Santa Maria Tonantzintla 
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plays a big part. We say it doesn’t, that the church is very different and independent from 
Cesar, but as they say, customs become laws […] sometimes there is a conflict with the 
church officials, someone will be running for president with support, but the church says 
it is not their turn, and then he doesn’t win. So that is how politics works.”   
 One of the questions sought after was if, as a result of this system of rotation, the 
auxiliary presidents felt obligated to prioritize projects from their borough over projects 
of general benefit. The simple answer was yes. As stated by one of the auxiliary 
presidents, “The rotation is illegal. [And] it is not a tradition; it was a decision by not-so-
wise people.  […I]nstead of projects being carried out that benefit the whole community, 
we have to meet the needs of the people who we promised we would help. We get 
pressure to get these projects done first” (auxiliary president from the May 2008-May 
2011 term). Thus, after meeting the demands set during the election campaign, the 
auxiliary presidents create plans for development, including large-scale general benefit 
projects. Unfortunately, the auxiliary presidents interviewed indicated that they believed 
the municipality does not like to, or does not have the funds to, implement these projects. 
Thus, the desire of the municipality to fund several small-scale projects instead of fewer 
large-scale projects reinforces the prioritization of the projects promised during the 
campaign, which for the most part, only represent the needs of a specific borough. As 
noted by another auxiliary president; “They [the municipality] obtain property taxes, fees 
from permits for businesses, federal funds, but [we are] not allowed to collect money to 
implement any projects. As money came in, we carried out projects; unfortunately every 
                                                                                                                                                                             
indicated that this ladder of ascension into political life is often used in the community. While further 
investigation as to the inner functioning of the cargo system in Santa Maria Tonantzintla would provide 
insight into the nature of leadership in the community, for this particular section what was of interest was 
understanding how this rotation in office affected the decision making process of local auxiliary presidents. 
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year the municipality decreases the funding of projects” (Auxiliary president May 2005-
May 2008 term). Because of the lack of money, and “because we already committed 
ourselves to specific, smaller projects promised during the campaigns, the funds get used 
up quickly in small things from one borough” (ibid.). Moreover, it was noted that in 
general, the municipalities prefer to implement smaller, less expensive projects.30 As a 
result, “[…] people say they want a road, not drainage because it looks better. And 
because it is cheaper at the moment, the government says nothing, it is political. [T]he 
road gets built, not the drainage and everyone loses in the long run” (ibid.).  Likewise, as 
stated by one of the auxiliary presidents regarding a large infrastructure project of general 
benefit he considered during his administration, it “… cost too much, the municipality 
preferred to have 3 smaller impact side roads paved because these cost less” (auxiliary 
president from the May 2008-May 2011 term). The neglect of projects of general benefit 
in the township center is coupled with the problems resulting from a lack of proper record 
keeping.   
When an incoming auxiliary president enters office, he/she aims to address 
obligations and actions pledged during the campaign;  there are no regulations for record 
keeping and continuity to economic development policy, so projects that were under 
consideration by the previous administration are not initiated. When asked if past 
projects—prioritized by previous administrations but not implemented—influenced the 
selection of potential projects, all three auxiliary presidents indicated that previous 
administrations did not maintain a list of suggested projects.  However, when the 
                                                          
30 The consensus was that in general, large projects of general benefit are rarely implemented and when 
they are, they are mostly taken up by the municipality without direct consultation with auxiliary presidents 
and for most projects proposed by the auxiliary junta; only small projects seem to be prioritized by the 
municipality. 
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presidents were asked if they left a list of suggested projects for the incoming president to 
consider, one of the three auxiliary presidents indicated that yes—he had left a list. All 
the projects on his ‘list’ were of general benefit:  
 
1. The creation of a craft/artisanal center to create local jobs and help the 
economy; 
2. The expansion of the local cemetery, which is currently filled beyond 
capacity; 
3. Expansion of the auxiliary junta; 
4. The purchase of a field for recreational purposes (e.g., Soccer, etc.) (Auxiliary 
president from the May 2005-May 2008 term). 
 
The auxiliary president emphasized that none of the presidents who had taken office after 
his departure in 2008 have given priority to any of those works. He felt that they are 
important and should be considered. When probed further, the president who came after 
him indicated that “Yes, presidents can leave a list of projects that they feel should be 
carried out, prioritized by the next president. However, it is up to the next president 
whether or not to prioritize them, or carry them out. However, typically no projects are 
left undone and thus are not resumed by the incoming president” (Auxiliary president 
from the May 2008-May 2011 term). 
When asked about rules set by the municipal/state/federal government regarding 
the use of funds, all presidents indicated that there were none. As noted by the auxiliary 
president from the term between May 2011 and May 2014, “We don’t have any rules as 
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to how to use funds. We depend on monthly allotments from the municipality. This 
covers salaries. We don’t get funds from the state or the federal government. If we do get 
money, it goes to the municipality and this is then distributed to the juntas auxiliaries […] 
but overall, we have autonomy from the municipality to allocate it where we want it.”  
Notably, two auxiliary presidents31 indicated that relationship quality (i.e., good 
standing/bad standing) between the municipal, state, and federal governments—in terms 
of political party-affiliation at each level—is a factor in implementing projects.  As one 
president indicated, “It has a big role; it is important that the political party at the 
municipal level is the same as that in power of the state and federal level. It has a big role 
in terms of carrying out more public works. Lots of times when the municipality is of one 
color [political party], and the state is of another, there are difficulties when the 
municipality tries to obtain funds” (Auxiliary president from the May 2008-May 2011 
term). However, the other auxiliary president indicated that if the political parties in 
power at the auxiliary and municipal levels differ, the auxiliary office can directly 
petition the state for funds (if the same political party is in power at the auxiliary and 
state levels). As indicated by one of the auxiliary presidents, “Sometimes a municipality 
has one party, and the state is another, you can jump to the state” (Auxiliary president 
from the May 2005-May 2008 term). For example, this interviewee continued, “To fund 
the potable water project, the auxiliary government wanted to carry out the project but the 
municipality was putting it off, so we approached the state government for help in getting 
the project prioritized” (ibid.). He cited an example of a secondary school that needed 
                                                          
31 Only the current president (C. Samuel Tecuatl Toxqui) (May 2011-May 2014) of San Miguel indicated 
that it did not play a factor. 
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new classrooms, and he obtained funds from CAPCE (comité administrador del programa 
federal de Construcción de Escuelas), and jumped the municipality level (ibid.). 
 All auxiliary presidents interviewed indicated that there was no set amount of 
money they were told they would receive during their administration for public works. 
They indicated that there was no formula-driven allocation of resources and no 
transparency in the allocation of funds from the municipality to their respective auxiliary 
juntas. Moreover, two of the auxiliary presidents indicated that funding decreased with 
time.32 Every year, less money was received from the municipality to implement projects. 
According to one source, “There is a political part to this funding allotment. If you don’t 
do this, they don’t give you the money. They try to put back projects and not get them 
done. […] And you never know what fund of money they are using [...] if it is Section 33 
or what” (Auxiliary president from the May 2008-May 2011 term). Thus, although the 
fiscal decentralization reforms helped municipalities by making the distribution of federal 
resources formula-driven, such that municipalities could plan for expenditures given their 
expected allotment, auxiliary juntas do not know what they will receive from year to 
year, and, thus, financial planning is not possible. In other words, “The municipality 
handles the money. The money is federal, goes to the state and then to the municipality. 
[…Auxiliary juntas] are not the ones who have money, […they] just push for projects 
and they [the municipality] say whether or not they have the money” (Auxiliary president 
from the May 2005-May 2008 term). 
Projects are prioritized during the election campaign of the auxiliary presidents; 
these projects, for the most part, represent the needs of only a subset of residents from a 
                                                          
32 The most recent auxiliary president had just entered office and thus had no experience with receiving 
funds. 
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specific borough within the auxiliary junta. However, auxiliary presidents indicated that 
they submit petitions to the municipality throughout the year for projects they aim to 
implement. The projects are sent to the municipality—some are funded and others 
rejected. It is the auxiliary presidents who channel the demands of the citizen committees 
under study.  The citizens who organize themselves into committees for a particular 
social infrastructure project can petition the municipality directly, but as noted through 
interviews33, the support of the auxiliary junta in which they reside is very important. “If 
an auxiliary president doesn’t act, the project doesn’t get carried out. Lots of times the 
presidents don’t pressure and nothing gets done.  We can solicit 20 works to be carried 
out but only three-to-four will be carried out” (Auxiliary president 2005- 2008 term).   
 
4.8 Citizen Committees 
As mentioned above, Section 33 of the Fiscal Coordination Law (LCF) transfers 
resources from the federal government to the municipalities. These resources are 
earmarked for projects that meet the basic needs of municipal residents. In other words, 
they are earmarked for the creation of infrastructure for potable water, sewage systems, 
drainage and latrines, urbanization, electrification of rural and poor neighborhoods, and 
basic health infrastructure, infrastructure for primary education, improvement of local 
housing, rural roads, or infrastructure for the promotion of productive rural areas 
(FUNDAR February 2006). 
According to the laws regulating Section 33, municipalities, in order to receive 
resources from FISM and FORTAMUN-DF, have to prove that there was citizen 
                                                          
33 Interviews with citizens and citizen committees 
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participation in the processes of planning, prioritizing, monitoring, controlling and 
evaluating the projects to be implemented with these funds (ORIFIS 2013). Thus, in the 
planning and controlling of the public works utilizing FISM resources, the municipal 
authorities must identify the form of citizen participation utilized. A study conducted by 
the FUNDAR Center of Analysis and Investigation in México found that there were 
several instances of citizen participation named by municipalities when discussing FISM 
resources in México. At the community level, the level of interest for the present study, 
FUNDAR (2006) noted the mention of “Comités de obra pública” (Public Works 
Committees, in English) which operated at the neighborhood level and were comprised of 
individuals who benefited from the public work being carried out. At the municipal level, 
the instances of citizen participation noted were, “Consejos de Desarrollo Social 
Municipal,” and “Consejos de Participacion Ciudadana.” Moreover, in the State of 
México, FUNDAR also noted the mention of “Comites Ciudadanos de Control y 
Vigilancia (COCICOVI)” (Citizen Committees of Control and Vigilance, in English) by 
municipal authorities in relation to the inclusion of citizen participation in the use of 
FISM resources (ibid.). COCICOVIs were also said to operate at the neighborhood level, 
as were the “Public Works Committees.” In any case, all the “instances” of citizen 
participation working at the neighborhood level are the descendants of Solidarity 
Committees and what this study designates as citizen committees. 
The predecessor of Section 33, PRONASOL hoped to increase transparency and 
accountability in the use of funds for social development projects through the use of 
Solidarity Committees, the descendants of the current-day citizen committees or 
“instances of public participation at the neighborhood level.” PONASOL introduced, for 
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the first time, the intervention of the beneficiaries of public works as vigilantes, 
monitoring the use of funds and the quality with which public works were implemented 
in their communities. These mechanisms of citizen participation (solidarity committees) 
developed under the structure of PRONASOL (specifically under the Ministry of 
Programing and Budget, Secretaria de Programacion y Presupuesto) and subsequently 
placed under the supervision of the Ministry of Social Development (Secretaria de 
Desarrollo Social, SEDESOL). At a general level however, it was the Ministry of the 
Controllers (Secretaria de la Contraloria General de al Federacion, Secogef), today’s 
Ministry of Public Administration (Secretaria de la Funccion Publica, SFP), which, 
through the predecessor of the current Integral System of Social Accountability (Sistema 
Integral de Contraloría Social, SICS), was placed in charge of sanctioning the public 
functionaries when and if they were not following the new regulations for promoting 
transparency in the use of funds (Fernandez Mejia 2012:15).  
In the study sites utilized for the present investigation, citizen participation 
operating at the neighborhood level differed in each municipality. In Tenango del Aire, 
participation occurred through COCICOVIs whereas Public Works Committees (Comites 
de Obra) operated in San Andrés Cholula. Notably, compared to San Andrés Cholula, 
which has a Directive of Citizen Participation, in Tenango del Aire the Internal Municipal 
Comptroller (Contraloría Interna Municipal) supervises financial and human resources 
in the municipality and oversees the COCIVOVIs. The Internal Municipal Comptroller, 
in turn reports to the State’s Controller’s Secretariat (which regulates citizen participation 
in state municipalities), which in turn reports to the federal Ministry of Public 
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Administration. This organizational feature resembles that which was originally 
stipulated by PRONASOL. 
As mentioned above, the predecessor of the Ministry of Public Administration, an 
agency of the Federal Executive, through SICS, was the umbrella organization that 
monitored adherence to the law and penalized those administrations that were not 
complying with the regulations of PRONASOL. The Integral System of Social 
Accountability was designed to promote participation from direct beneficiaries of public 
policies, and the general citizenry, in the care and vigilance of social programs with two 
main goals: (1) to prevent corruption and (2) to promote active participation and 
responsibility of all sectors in society to fight against corruption and to promote a culture 
of transparency regarding the law (SICS: 2004). Tenango del Aire is one of the twenty-
four municipalities on the eastern part of the State of México. Thus, the Internal 
Municipal Comptroller of Tenango del Aire responds to the Easter Zone Delegation of 
the State Controller, whose office is in the municipality of Chalco.   
This structural feature—positioning COCICOVIs under the supervision of the 
Internal Municipal Controller—contrasts with that of San Andrés Cholula. In the 
municipality of San Andrés Cholula, citizen committees in San Andrés are placed under 
the supervision of the Directive of Citizen Participation, which falls under the direction of 
the Ministry of Interior, which also oversees the Auxiliary Juntas but is not linked to the 
Municipal Controller’s or the State Controller’s Secretariat. The Municipality’s 
Comptroller is a separate branch within the municipality that oversees the Auditing of 
Public Works, Finance Audits, Internal Affairs, the Office of Transparency and 
Evaluation of Procedures and Internal Legislation. According to my interview with Juan 
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Marcos Gutierrez Gonzalez,34 the placement of citizen committees within the 
organizational chart of the municipality varies from municipality to municipality as a 
result of the liberty granted to them to specify and regulate the citizen participation 
needed to solicit funding from Section 33.  
The inclusion of citizen committees as a requirement for the assignment of FISM 
from Section 33 of the Fiscal Coordination Law (LCF, Spanish acronym) has had a far 
reaching effect on the allocation of all resources for social infrastructure. When mayors in 
the study sites were asked if the state or federal governments regulate allocation of funds 
by the municipality, both answered that the only rules for the allocation of SIF are for the 
allocation of resources from Section 33 of the LCF.  However, the head of a project in 
San Andrés Cholula indicated that although for “the money we collect from licenses, 
permits, etc., there are no rules because we are a ‘free’ municipality, we try to utilize the 
same rules [for Section 33] because that guarantees us that there is more clarity in the 
way we use the funds.” The use of the same rules from Section 33 in the allocation of all 
funds was clarified to mean, that among other things, that the municipality tries35 to use 
citizen committees when investing in social infrastructure with a municipality’s own 
revenue, not just when using revenue from FISM.  In the municipality of Tenango del 
Aire, the use of COCICOVIs is mandatory, regardless of the origin of funds, according to 
state law. Both Public Works Committees and COCICOVIs are instances of citizen 
                                                          
34  Juan Marcos Gutierrez Gonzalez was a principal actor in reforming the Fiscal Coordination Law in 
México; this reform assured the release of funds, through federal transfers, to states and cities and assured 
transparency of the shares in 1999.México 
 
35 As will be noted later, ‘public works committees’ are not always used.  
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participation that can be considered citizen committees and their differences will be noted 
later in the text. 
 
4.9 Function and Treatment of Citizen Committees in Each Municipality: A 
Preliminary Typology of Citizen Committees 
As discussed above, in the Municipality of Tenango del Aire, COCICOVIs are 
supervised by the Internal Municipal Controller, as their predecessors, the Solidarity 
Committees under PRONASOL also fell under the supervision of a financial 
accountability controller’s office, albeit at the federal level.  Moreover, as indicated by 
the head of the Internal Municipal Controller’s department, “The function of the 
COCICOVIs is to monitor the responsible execution public works,” much as the 
Solidarity Committees were to provide care and vigilance over the execution of social 
programs provided by PRONASOL.  
The Internal Municipal Controller’s department is comprised of three employees 
who maintain constant contact with the Public Works Department (who informs them of 
the project that will be implemented during the year) and the State Controller’s office in 
Chalco who “gives them the paperwork to form COCICOVIs” (ibid.).  As stated by the 
head of the department: 
  
“When the Municipal Plan of Development and the priorities have been 
established, we go to the neighborhoods where the projects are to take 
place and inform the public by calling a meeting. At least a minimum of 
twenty people go to these meetings. The day of the meeting we go, along 
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with the state [controller’s] office and ask the public to form a group 
[COCICOVI …]. We don’t place them, they vote for themselves who they 
want to have as representatives. They are given the paperwork of the 
project: the physical plan of the project, the estimated costs of materials, 
labor, etc. and a timeline. They are to monitor that the project takes place 
accordingly.” 
 
Consequently, the Internal Municipal Controller’s office is charged with informing and 
involving the public once the priorities in the municipality have been established. 
According to my interviews, when the municipality has prioritized a public work, the 
office of the state Controller in Chalco sends a delegate to observe the formation of the 
committee: the COCICOVI. The citizens are given the physical plan of the project that is 
to be implemented, including budget and timeline. Paperwork on the group members is 
maintained not just in the municipality but in the state’s controller’s office. Thus, the 
state office plays a central role in overseeing groups and monitoring and abating 
(indirectly) use of funds by the municipality.  
Because private companies are contracted in Tenango del Aire to implement 
public works, COCICOVIs monitor use of public funds by private entities. Citizen 
participation through citizen committees in Tenango del Aire is a mechanism of control, 
supervision, and vigilance over contracted public works companies as well as a 
mechanism for maintaining fiscal transparency. All the public functionaries interviewed 
indicated that a COCIVOVI needs to be formed to implement all public work in the 
community. As mentioned above, citizen participation is a requirement to receive federal 
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funds from Section 33. However, the municipality sees themselves using COCICOVIs to 
implement all projects. Thus, COCICOVIs are not just mechanisms of financial control 
and vigilance of FISM resources from Section 33, but all resources in the municipality 
used for public works. The COCIVOVIs function to monitor that projects are 
implemented as specified, but also to promote transparency regarding use of funds and 
the cost of projects. Their lifespan is limited to the period after the project has been 
selected until project completion.  There are no other forms of citizen participation 
recognized by the municipality that resemble citizen committees. Moreover, other than 
citizen participation in elections, the data gathered from municipal interviews points to a 
lack of participation in the decision-making process. As stated by the mayor of Tenango 
del Aire, “The municipality is very apathetic. They don’t participate outside of 
elections”36. 
As noted above, positioning COCICOVIs under the supervision of the Internal 
Municipal Controller, instead of under the directive of Citizen Participation—like the 
Public Works Committees are in San Andrés Cholula—is one of the many differences 
between the citizen committees in each municipality.  The directive of Citizen 
Participation in San Andrés Cholula, which “is in charge of citizen participation in the 
whole municipality” (interview with head of directive), is comprised of five people. 
Because they are not tied to the Internal Municipal Controller, their official “function is 
not to secure the proper use of funds by the municipality” (ibid.). According to the 
interview with its director, “the official task of the directive is to try to get people to 
participate” (ibid.). Unfortunately, according to them, “people don’t know what citizen 
                                                          
36 The citizen participation inlets open to NGOs, and the business community, allows for un-official 
networks to develop that do allow for a sharing of ideas regarding priorities in the municipality.   
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participation is, so people go directly to the auxiliary junta but not to the office of citizen 
participation” (ibid.). As a result, “the office does not get consulted by citizens soliciting 
public works, services or representation” (ibid.). Thus, as stated by the Director of 
Citizen Participation “[Their] job is to work as part of the municipal authority trying to 
facilitate the carrying out of specific projects prioritized by the government.”37 And 
although they “have no authority in the decision-making process or in determining the 
allocation of funds from Section 33, […they] do serve to overlook the formation and 
actions of the ‘Comités de obra pública’ (Public Works Committees, in English)” (ibid.). 
According to my interview with the head of Citizen Participation, their relationship with 
citizen committees is direct, starts with the formation of the citizen committee, and is 
mostly one directional. When asked if citizens or group members come to the office 
soliciting a public work, or needing help or backing to promote a particular project, the 
director stated;  
 
“No, we go to them. Once a particular project has been prioritized, we go 
to the specific auxiliary junta; we call a meeting to make sure everyone is 
aware that a certain project is going to take place. We go door to door and 
make sure they are informed of what is going on. And then we record the 
members of the newly formed group. We try to make sure that the right 
individuals are chosen, the ones most affected, and we also try to make 
sure they pick people who will be successful, who will not obstruct the 
                                                          
37 Every Thursday morning (Jueves ciudadano, in Spanish) the mayor holds an open meeting with the 
public to hear the complaints, demands, or comments of the citizenry. However, it is the mayor himself 
who is in charge of carrying out these events. The current mayor decided to open up the government to the 
people, and not the directive itself. 
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public work.  They are going to be the ones of facilitating the work; we 
don’t want the work stopped, and we want a smooth process to take 
place.”  
 
Moreover, the group essentially dissolves once a public work is completed. “The 
lifespan of the group is the lifespan of the project. Once the project is done, the members 
of the group have to sign off stating that the work is done, that they are content with the 
work” (ibid.).  In this aspect, they were similar to the citizen committees used in Tenango 
(i.e., the COCICOVIs). When asked if citizen committees always formed when the 
municipality initiates a project (e.g., construction, service expansion), the answer was no. 
However, the director indicated that for the most part, the municipality tries to form 
committees for all public works. In his words, “Well, up until this point this has been the 
most efficient way to get consent for a project and get a project done. So, yes, we count 
on them.” Exceptions to the norm of having Public Works Committees formed to support 
public infrastructure works were noted, for example, regarding schools; the interviewee 
indicated that he does not deal with construction of schools or school-related projects;  
 
“No, we don’t deal with the construction of schools; that is public 
education. It is separate. They have committees themselves, unique to 
them. It is not part of us. The trustee of public education is in charge of 
them. He [the trustee of public education] deals with those committees to 
carry out those projects. So, I don’t know of projects with schools. We 
only deal with drainage, water, paving of streets. Hospitals are also 
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different so yeah, they must deal with someone else, also building of 
stadiums or large-scale projects.”  
 
The other funds from Section 33, such as that for public education38 and health, do not 
require proof of citizen participation and thus the municipality does not utilize the input 
of the directive of citizen participation to form citizen committees to partake in 
implementing those projects. In any case, the director of citizen participation indicated 
that he maintains a record of all the citizen committees formed39; 
 
 “Yes, we have a document for each public works taking place in the 
municipality. The public works office also has a file of the documents 
with the cost of the projects, etc. We just have information of the 
committees. We help with the social part of the project, making sure that 
the committee keeps on working with the people of their community to 
make sure the project takes place.”  
 
Unlike the municipality of Tenango del Aire, the state government does not maintain 
records of public works committees. Moreover, the directive of citizen participation does 
not maintain a financial record of projects as the Internal Municipal Controller does for 
                                                          
38 However, to understand what committees were formed to support public education infrastructure, the 
trustee of Public Education was also interviewed and he signaled the use of parent committees to oversee 
the projects implemented in their area. 
 
39 However, he did not have a file of the works implemented during the previous administrations. 
Moreover, as mentioned above, because there is rotation in office, most departments and directives clear 
out their offices when a new president comes in. 
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projects in which COCICOVIs participate in Tenango Del Aire. This is an important 
difference. The function of the Public Works Committees in San Andrés Cholula is not to 
oversee the spending of FISM funds by the municipality. Public servants view Public 
Works Committees in their municipality as a mere necessity to meet the requirements for 
using SIF from Section 33’s FISM. Moreover, they see them as a tool to help the 
municipality gain community support for its projects. They do not view them as a tool 
that can serve to provide community controls over the assignment or use of resources. In 
general, there is a lack of transparency over the financial information provided by the 
municipality regarding projects carried out utilizing Public Works Committees. The 
Department of Public Works manages financial information as if it were confidential; 
project budgets are not presented to the Public Works Committees who oversee projects. 
After projects are approved, they are implemented and the committees serve as proof of 
citizen participation. There is no oversight by the state government over the directive of 
Citizen Participation and its management and treatment of citizen committees.  
In any case, according to the LCF, beneficiaries of FISM projects operating in the 
municipality may contribute material resources, free labor, or money to projects. 
Nevertheless, such contributions should not serve to impede the implementation of 
projects in marginalized communities. Moreover, the municipalities accepting donations 
should maintain a detailed list of contributions made by beneficiaries (ORIFIS 2013). 
However, as mentioned by the FUNDAR study, states vary in regard to citizen 
participation “instances” named, and, I would add, vary as to whether or not the 
municipality accepted contributions from project beneficiaries. While the internal 
municipal controller of Tenango Del Aire stated that no monetary contributions are ever 
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collected by the COCICOVIs or expected to be made on their behalf or the behalf of 
other of project beneficiaries,40 the Director of Citizen Participation in San Andrés 
Cholula stated that “According to the law, they [citizen committees] have to put 20% of 
the money for the public work to get done”41. To put the comment in context, he went on 
to say: 
 
“Sometimes we get a street paved, and in the process, somebody’s wall 
has to be taken down. We make sure they are OK and that they get 
reimbursed by the rest of the beneficiaries. That money is does not come 
from Ramo 33 but from the community members. That is why we need the 
public works committee, to make sure that things run smoothly and that 
they resolve those kinds of problems. We also answer any questions they 
have, worries etc. We visit them periodically. But the committee has to 
convince the community to get things done. According to the law, they 
have to put twenty percent of the money for the public work to get done, 
and that is to resolve these kinds of problem, like a light post being left in 
the middle of the street. The community has to, once the street is paved, 
put the money in to move the post. That money does that function.”42 
                                                          
40 Interviews with COCICOVIs and community members confirmed the lack of monetary contribution. 
 
41 Section 33 does not require any amount of money to be contributed by beneficiaries.  
 
42 As mentioned by the director of citizen participation, public works for public education are not treated as 
equal to other public works, and the citizen committees do not pass through his office but rather through the 
department of public education; thus, interviews were conducted with schools and the trustee of public 
education on the topic of citizen committees formed to support public infrastructure in schools. The trustee 
indicated that yes, parent groups function as the citizen committees to request public infrastructure for 
schools. Moreover, when asked about the monetary contributions of citizen committees, a surprising and 
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The municipal authorities interviewed, under the guise of avoiding paternalism, 
justified the contribution of funds expected from citizen committees. Moreover, a 
perceived contribution from a citizen committee, to implement an infrastructure project 
(be it through money, materials, and/or labor), was seen as reducing the cost of the 
project and thus an incentive to prioritize that particular project. Thus, during the election 
of public works committee members, individuals seen as potential patrons of the project 
were encouraged by the municipality and the community to fill positions in the citizen 
committees to ensure project completion. In such a manner, citizen committees’ 
monitoring role is replaced with a role facilitating the creation of public works. The lack 
of financial contribution from the residents and members of the citizen committees in 
Tenango del Aire43 contrasts with that in San Andrés Cholula.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
troublesome response was given by the trustee of Public Education in the municipality of San Andrés 
Cholula.  
 “Well, it is important for me to support a culture of participation. We used to have a program 
where the state government contributed to half of the cost of projects and the affected community 
would have to put the other half of the money. This program is no longer in existence, but in order 
to maintain this culture of participation, and do away with paternalism, we only support projects 
where there is collaboration” (trustee of public education in San Andrés Cholula). 
School principals and teachers involved with parent groups were asked about aid received from the 
municipality for infrastructure projects. All confirmed that they needed to form a committee in order to 
promote the implementation of a particular project and to collect funds in order to receive aid. A school 
principal in a middle school visited in Tonantzintla indicated that; 
 “[they] don’t have wealthy parents, and they don’t have water in the bathrooms, the kids 
have to carry water in with a bucket to flush, and because they haven’t been able to 
collect money, the municipality refuses to help” (interview from Telesecundaria).   
When asked how long they have been petitioning for aid, they indicated a timeframe of 
approximately 10 years. Moreover, they had been requesting potable water for the community and paving 
for the main road for well over fifteen years and “the parents had even put money for the committee to 
petition the work” (ibid.) but nothing got done until recently, and we don’t know why they finally decided 
to put water and then pave “probably an election promise” (ibid.). In any case, parent groups and Public 
Work Committees are often made up of the same individuals and solicit the works from both the public 
works office and the trustee of public education.  
 
43 However, interviews with both municipal officials and community members of Tenango del Aire 
indicated that prior to the existence of COCIVOVIs (approximately fifteen to twenty years ago), the 
community was expected to contribute—financially or physically—to the implementation of public 
infrastructure projects. Groups were formed with representatives of the community to gather resources and 
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On the basis of the similarities and differences in function and treatment of citizen 
committees by both municipalities, an approximation of a typology of committees in both 
areas can be made. Albeit the explicit appointment of citizen committee members by the 
government in Riedel’s typology of citizen committees, versus the appointment, self-
appointment of members, or election of citizen committees members by the communities 
they serve in México, Riedel’s typology gives us a model that can be altered to describe 
the treatment and function of citizen committees studied in the present study in México. 
Riedel’s typology of advisory committees is quite extensive; it includes four categories, 
each possessing several sub-categories. Under this classification, the main differences 
between categories have to do with the “implicit [political] motives of the appointing 
body” (p. 22). The categories and the subcategories of Riedel’s typology are the 
following:  
The advisory category has four sub-categories but in general, “advisory” 
committees guide the appointing committee in the decision-making process. The first 
sub-category, “Advisory I,” is intended to provide direction on how to implement a 
decision. “Advisory II” is intended to provide the public with alternative courses of 
action in order for the appointing agency of gauge public response. “Advisory III” is 
designed to identify possible problems and provide alternative solutions. Lastly, 
“Advisory IV” or “open-ended committees” are created when a decision has been 
reached by the appointed office, but the office is open to suggestions to modify its 
decision in the face of possible resistance. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
materials and manage the contribution of physical labor of fellow community members. This use of what 
they called FAENAS changed with the creation of COCICOVIS. 
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 The supportive committee category has three sub-categories. However, in general, 
these committees are formed to legitimize decisions of the appointing office. In other 
words, “experts” might be called upon to form a committee to provide added weight to a 
decision that might otherwise face opposition that is precisely the motive behind creating 
a “Supportive I” committee. “Supportive II” committees are formed to direct the wants of 
the public in a particular direction and are the main tool is designing a “neutral” 
committee that will present the public with “all” acceptable alternatives. “Supportive III” 
or “visiting committees” are appointed to evaluate a particular program. The evaluation is 
kept public or private depending on the results of the evaluation. Decisions that add 
legitimacy to the original decision of the appointed agency are made public; all others are 
held private. 
  Put-off committees, as the name implies, are created to “put off” a decision. “Put-
off I” committees are created when the appointed agency is under pressure to act and is 
unwilling or unable to do so. As a result, the appointed agency consciously selects 
members of a committee who will never agree on an action, putting-off the decision to 
act. The appointing agency can also chose members to create “Put-off II” committees as a 
tool to “put-off” a decision or action accordingly. Members with a “narrow-spectrum” 
perspective are selected so that the rest of the community puts off the decision they reach. 
“Put-off III” committees are created by selecting ‘experts’ or members who will delay the 
decision-making process, lagging until pressure is diverted and hopefully dissipated with 
the passing of time. Lastly, “Put-off IV” committees are formed when the agency does 
not want to take an action because of strong pulls from two opposing political sides. As 
such, the appointing agency selects representatives for the committee from both sides of 
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the issue. Once a decision has been made, the committee then becomes an advisory or 
supportive committee.  
  Sub-categories for “Put-on” committees vary more than the sub-categories of 
Riedel’s other committees. “Put-on I” committees are created when an agency makes a 
highly partisan decision. To mitigate potential outcry from the community, a seemingly 
“unbiased” group of individuals is chosen to reach the same decision as the appointing 
agency. “Put-on II” committees are composed of citizens demanding “broad” government 
action. In order to confuse and diffuse the group enthusiasm, the appointing agency feeds 
the committee complicated material in the hope that the group will reach the conclusion 
that the action is too complicated to be implemented while making the “appointing 
agency look responsive” (p. 27). Lastly, when an appointing agency is aware that a 
problem is out of their control, “Put-on III” committees are sometimes assembled to help 
reach the decision that “intergovernmental cooperation is the only or best hope” (ibid.) 
With this framework in mind, commonalities begin to emerge between specific 
characteristics of categories and subcategories of Riedel’s typology and the function and 
treatment of the citizen committees (COCICOVIs and Public Works Committees) in each 
municipality—these parallels advance our discussion, and enhance our classification of 
these groups towards a typology of citizen committees in both municipalities.  
Unfortunately, no municipal authorities in either study site viewed COCICOVIs 
or  Public Works Committees as a method to guide the decision-making process. When 
mayors were asked how they accounted for citizen participation in the decision-making 
process, “participation in meeting, elections, completion of surveys asking their needs, 
citizen committees, etc.,” both mayors stated that needs were established at the beginning 
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of their election campaigns. Moreover, both presidents indicated that there was a lack of 
citizen participation. In Tenango del Aire, the mayor stated that “Municipality is very 
apathetic, they don’t participate, in election yes but otherwise no.” In the case of the 
mayor of San Andrés Cholula, the mayor commented that: 
“We have a severe problem with the lack of citizen participation, I think 
that the whole country… What we have is a problem with people feeling 
the need for a paternalistic government. People see government see 
everything in terms of obligation. You are the government. You have to 
give me everything, drainage, paving streets, etc.” 
Thus, when running for office, candidates make their promises and if elected, 
account for citizen participation by keeping the promises made to the constituents 
who participated in getting them elected44. Notably, in my interviews, citizen 
participation was discussed as an abstract concept and not in terms of citizen 
committees. In other words, as noted by the FUNDAR study, mayors see the role 
of citizen committees only as one that supports (2006) a previously prioritized 
municipal project—not one that enables community control over the assignment 
of resources. However, while the advisory category of Riedel’s typology can be 
dropped in the context of Tenango del Aire, it cannot be altogether dropped from 
the discussion of San Andrés Cholula, as will be noted later.  
In Tenango del Aire, the role of the COCICOVIs was more straightforward, and 
the implicit motives were made explicit and vice versa. As in Riedel’s supportive 
committee category, COCICOVIs are formed to legitimize a municipality’s previously 
                                                          
44 As noted previously, in the case of the municipal mayor of San Andres, the mayor indicated that every 
Thursday he holds a meeting in a different neighborhood to hear complaints, but not establish priorities. 
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decided matter. They share similarities with Riedel’s “Supportive III” committees or 
“visiting committees,” which are appointed to evaluate a particular program. They are 
assembled to monitor that a project is implemented according to specifications. The 
COCICOVIs oversee a project, ensuring that the standards of the plan are being followed, 
and COCICOVIs provide final approval of the work at project completion. The 
evaluation is kept in the office of the municipal and the state controller’s office. By 
“guaranteeing” that a project was carried out successfully in budget and quality, the 
original decision is given added legitimacy. COCICOVIs provide an added transparency 
to funds utilized for municipal public works. The main difference is that the members of 
the COCICOVIs are not appointed by the municipality; they are elected by community 
members.  
Although the COCICOVIs are not formed to promote any particular project 
during the decision-making process, they do oversee the process of implementing the 
project. During the electoral process, public needs are identified and priorities are set. 
The Internal Municipal Controller utilizes meetings called to form COCICOVIs to inform 
the public about particular projects that will be implemented. They might resemble 
Riedel’s “Supportive I” committees, which are created by the appointed agency when 
contentious decisions are made. It may be that not all municipal residents are content 
with a decision to implement a project. The municipality forms a COCICOVI with 
beneficiaries of the project, and then the project is implemented. In other words, the 
COCICOVI is formed and gives added weight to a decision that might otherwise face 
opposition. The COCICOVI is formed to support the carrying out of the project. 
Moreover, the COCICOVI gives legitimacy to the means with which the projects are 
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carried out. The COCICOVIs are seen as passive recipients of information. Thus, 
although they could be used as Advisory III committees, “designed to define possible 
problems and provide alternative solutions,” the flow of information is one-directional—
there are no feedback loops available for participants to provide input to improve 
implementation of a project. The Internal Municipal Controller’s office is charged with 
informing and involving the public once the priorities in the municipality have been set. 
In other words, as stated by the controller during his interview, “They [the public] don’t 
come to petition to this office. So, here we form the group and keep records of these 
groups. The Internal Controller offers help and explanations as to why a project isn’t 
carried out to specification.” Moreover:  
“COCICOVIs only come here after they are formed if there is a problem, 
for example, if the project doesn’t start during a set time. Complaints are 
received here, and here, we give them an explanation why the problem 
might be occurring. So, for example, sometimes it rains, and we can’t start 
a project within the set dates. So we explain why the construction didn’t 
start on set date. The state brings paperwork to start a COCICOVI and 
collects all the papers once they have signed off on the project. This office 
facilitates the process” (ibid.). 
 
Thus, the Internal Controller’s office sees the Citizen Committees as supportive and as a 
means to ensure a project is implemented effectively and efficiently.45  
                                                          
45 As noted in the next chapter, interviews with the community and citizen committee members indicate 
that COCICOVIs do not always have the knowledge base needed to assess the quality with which the 
projects are being carried out or that the Internal Controller’s office is helping to resolve the problems 
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In Cholula, the implicit motives of the municipality in its treatment of citizen 
committees (i.e., the Public Works Committees) were not always made explicit and vice 
versa. However, as with Riedel’s supportive committee category, these committees are 
officially formed to legitimize the previously decided matter by the appointing office. 
Officially, as Supportive III committees, they are also formed to evaluate a particular 
program, giving their signature to not only serve as proof of citizen participation in the 
utilization of FISM funds from Section 33, but also as a way to guarantee citizen 
contentment with the project. However, as stated by the head of the Citizen Participation 
directive, members are not always “elected” but rather “selected” to facilitate the process 
of signing off on a project. Thus, the role of Public works committees, as “neutral 
evaluators,” is placed at risk and can be contentious in some cases.46 Thus, the motives 
behind the appointment of Public works committees can also resemble Riedel’s “Put on 
I” committees. In the case of the Public Works Committees, the directive of Citizen 
Participation in San Andrés Cholula can select members that will facilitate project 
implementation, no matter how contentious a project may be.  
Although COCICOVIs in Tenango del Aire are not formed to promote any 
particular project during the decision-making process, this is not the case in San Andrés 
Cholula. The head of the directive of Citizen Participation in the municipality indicated 
that Public Works Committees are formed only after a project is prioritized and selected 
for implementation, and indicated that they do not receive calls from non-official groups 
                                                                                                                                                                             
brought to their attention by the COCICOVI and is rather just serving the committees with explanations of 
why the problem is occurring.  
46 The evaluation is just a signature given, or not given, once the project is completed—accepting the 
overall quality of the completed project. It is not based on an evaluation of the costs or time spent 
completing the project. 
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petitioning the municipality for a particular project and asking for their support in the 
process. However, interviews with the Public Works Department, the auxiliary junta, 
various trustees and the mayor in the municipality indicated that they do receive petitions 
throughout the year from “unofficial” committees soliciting projects. Moreover, members 
of two of the citizen committees (Public Works Committees) interviewed indicated that 
they formed their committees before their projects were prioritized, and they 
petitioned/solicited the project to the municipality until it was eventually prioritized.47 
Because these groups are shifting government decisions in their favor, defining 
community problems and providing solutions, the term Advisory committee can be used 
loosely to define them. Once the project is prioritized, and the public works department 
sends information to the directive of Citizen Participation, the committee is officially 
“formed” and recognized as a public works committee. With the “help” of the directive 
of Citizen Participation, the citizen committee continues working with the people of their 
community and the Public Works Department to make sure the project is implemented, 
because, as stated by the directive head of the Citizen Participation Directive, “If it 
doesn’t take place during a set period of time, they have to start over.” In other words, if 
the project does not begin within the allotted time period, it is dropped from the list of 
priorities and must go through the petitioning process all over again in order to be re-
prioritized.  
                                                          
47 Some members of citizen committees indicated that in order for the municipality to take their requests 
under consideration, they had to be notarized as an official group prior to consulting the municipality about 
a particular project they wished to have carried out. According to the interview with the directive of citizen 
participation, however, when asked if the groups have to be notarized to submit a request, he indicated that 
“this is not necessary because the forms they need to fill out are official. 
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As mentioned above, in San Andrés Cholula, the auxiliary presidents also play a 
role in channeling the demands of the citizenry to the municipality. They prioritize 
projects during their election campaigns and receive petitions for projects throughout the 
year, some of which they channel up to the municipality for consideration.  The citizens 
who organize themselves into committees for a particular SIF project can petition the 
municipality directly, but as noted in the interview transcripts above, the support of the 
auxiliary junta in which they reside is very important. Moreover, as stated by one of the 
auxiliary presidents of Tonantizntla: 
 
“Even when people mobilize to form groups, and ask for funding, 
‘comités de obra’ only become a legal entity when they are lucky, and 
their project is prioritized by the municipality. Then, a meeting is called 
and a group is ‘formed.’ If a group forms before that, and begins 
petitioning, then they are pinpointed out and labeled as subversive, 
problematic. […] So then that group gives up. Or, an interesting thing 
happens. The authority of the municipality tells these groups that the work 
is not being done because the auxiliary president didn’t turn in their forms. 
But then, if they do get formed because the work gets prioritized, if the 
group doesn’t keep on pressuring, then the municipality says that the work 
did not get done because of the lack of action of the group. There are lots 
of projects that have been prioritized and thus far, this year, only one road 
is getting paved, because of this situation. Moreover, [… sometimes the] 
government will not make a move until people pa[y]. […] Those with 
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money get their work done, those without, get left out” (auxiliary 
president from the May 2008-May 2011 term). 
 
Thus, Public works committees in San Andrés Cholula can also resemble Riedel’s 
“Put-on II” committees. “Put-on II” committees are created when the agency is under 
pressure to act and is unwilling or unable to do. In order to confuse and diffuse the group 
enthusiasm, the appointing agency feeds the committee complicated material in the hope 
that the group will reach the conclusion that the action is too complicated to be carried 
out while simultaneously making the “appointing agency look responsive.” As in “Put-on 
II” committees, the municipality of San Andrés Cholula can prioritize a project, have the 
directive of Citizen Participation legally form a Public Works Committee, and then put 
traps or requirements (for example, demand monetary contributions from the committee48 
or complicated paperwork49) in the process creating a delay in the process, lagging until 
pressure to act is averted and dissipated with the passing of time. The municipality also 
receives petitions from unofficial committees not yet legally recognized by the directive 
of citizen participation. These citizen committees, which are formed after the 
municipality has decided its priorities, can become “Put-on II” committees simply by 
                                                          
48 According to interviews; “citizen committees must be formed in order to obtain funds” (Auxiliary 
president of May 2005-May 2008 term). Moreover, “they [the municipality] always talk[s] about having 
the community pay their share” (Auxiliary president from the May 2008-May 2011 term). In other words; 
there is an expected monetary contribution that residents must make to ensure that their projects are carried 
out. Specifically, once the municipality has gotten back to the auxiliary junta, indicating what projects it 
will implement, citizen committees become officially recognized and in addition to working to oversee the 
project, they must match 20% of the project costs. When probed further, the auxiliary junta indicated that 
the 20% is variable: sometimes less, sometimes more. However, all auxiliary presidents indicated that a 
contribution is expected. 
 
49 As will be noted in Chapter 5, several of the citizen committees in Tonantzintla felt that the steps and 
paperwork required from them, including obtaining environmental impact studies, were very complicated 
and one of the reasons previous groups had failed to gain initiation and completion of their projects.  
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remaining unofficial and by not being made aware of and directed to the Citizen 
Participation directive, which can legally recognize them as public works committees 
simply by having them fill out paperwork. That said, the unofficial citizen committees 
might also be able to spur the municipality to act (especially if they have funding to 
supplement the investment made by the municipality, making it more economical for the 
municipality to implement the project) in the process becoming an Advisory III or 
Supportive III committee. 
 In light of the data gathered from the citizen committees in both municipalities, 
the Put-off category of citizen committees from Riedel’s typology is not present in either 
site. Moreover, several of the subcategories of Advisory, Supportive and Put-on 
committees must also be dropped in the discussion of these two municipalities. The 
citizen committees present in each municipality vary considerably. In Tenango del Aire, 
COCICOVIs resemble Supportive III committees; they are utilized to evaluate a project 
and gain legitimacy by making sure it is implemented in accordance with specifications. 
Hypothetically however, they can also be used as Supportive I committees in that their 
presence is used to legitimize to a project that is not necessarily supported by the 
community. In San Andrés Cholula, the term Advisory Committee can be used loosely to 
describe unofficial citizen committees who might potentially affect the decision-making 
process by signaling the importance of a project and thus gaining its prioritization. 
However, once legalized by the municipality, registered by the directive of citizen 
participation, public works committees could become Supportive I, III and Put-on II 
committees.           
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4.10 Conclusions 
The primary goal of this research is to identify the factors that affect the degree to 
which municipalities incorporate citizen participation in the decision-making process. In 
the last chapter, it was noted that one of the theories posited in the literature was that in 
municipalities “where social movements operate in an oppositional, revindicative mode 
(or ‘expressive-disruptive’ rather than ‘integrative-corporatist’) and are strongly allied 
with the party in local government, participation will be more difficult to institutionalize” 
(Goldfrank 1998: 11-12). These two different strategies for contesting power, “co-
government and opposition […] the former [which] involves contributing to the workings 
of the institutional arrangements of which it is part [and] the latter [which] involves 
blocking the functions of government […] with a view to achieving power,” were 
observed in PAN and PRD strategies designed to deal with perceived electoral fraud 
(Mainwaring & Scully 2003: 201). Moreover, following this train of thought, it was 
hypothesized that PAN’s ability to compromise with PRI and adopt a co-government 
position promoting decentralization policies; it would be more likely that it would 
incorporate participatory mechanisms in the municipalities it controls. On the other hand, 
PRD’s adoption of an opposition strategy in dealing with the PRI administration in the 
20th century, and PAN after the 2000 year election, would indicate that the municipalities 
governed by PRI and PRD would be less likely to incorporate participatory mechanisms.   
As noted in the previous section, the use of citizen committees in Tenango del 
Aire is more restricted and more uniform in treatment and function than in San Andrés 
Cholula. Section 33 of the LCF allowed great flexibility to the municipalities in 
determining how to incorporate participatory mechanisms. Having a legacy utilizing 
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Solidarity Committees, most municipalities simply adopted and adapted this model of 
citizen committees to meet their own unique needs.  The state government of Tenango 
del Aire, the State of México, is involved in monitoring COCICOVIs while the state of 
Puebla is not involved in monitoring the use of “public works committees” in its 
municipalities.  One of the hypotheses set forth at the initial stages of this research that 
party affiliation would affect municipal willingness to incorporate participatory 
mechanisms. 
Tenango del Aire is currently run under a coalition party, and this municipality 
leans more to PRI and PRD support, having never elected a PAN mayor in the 
municipality and having been the first municipality to elect a candidate from the political 
party that preceded PRD. The municipality belongs to a state that is a traditional PRI 
stronghold. Cholula’s current and past mayors, since 1995, come from the PAN political 
party. The state of Puebla has a current governor, Rafael Moreno Valle Rosas (2011-
2017) who belongs to the PAN party. Nonetheless, all previous governors belonged to 
PRI. Functioning citizen committees were present in both municipalities. State 
involvement in COCICOVIs—and the absence of state involvement in citizen 
committees in San Andrés Cholula—could be a result of the centralization tendencies of 
PRI and an effort to manipulate and regulate its municipalities. In other words, the 
function of the COCICOVIs in the State of México may be seen as an effort to monitor 
municipal use of resources by the state rather than promote citizen participation in the 
decision-making process. The willingness of Tenango del Aire to allow state involvement 
in its use of COCICOVIs could be due to the lack of decentralization doctrine followed 
by the political parties in charge of the local administration.  On the other hand, the lack 
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of state involvement in the functioning of the “public works committees” in San Andrés 
Cholula could signal that their function is not to aid state government in monitoring 
municipal action, but rather truly enable citizen participation in the decision-making 
process. Because San Andrés Cholula was run under PAN leadership, known for 
advocating decentralization doctrine and promoting municipal autonomy, it might have 
been more open to accept the authority granted to regulate its own citizen committees 
without state oversight. Interviews with state-level government officials are needed to 
understand why this difference appears. Moreover, in order to draw such conclusions at a 
more aggregate level, a quantitative study is needed to analyze the relationship between 
state involvement in the oversight of citizen committees, and political party affiliation at 
the local and state level.  
As per the a priori hypothesis, data gathered from interviews in both 
municipalities indicated that neither municipality viewed citizen committees as playing 
an important role in the decision-making process or as an essential element in their efforts 
to increase citizen participation.  That said, the more diversified typology of citizen 
committees observed in San Andrés Cholula, and specifically the appearance of 
seemingly Advisory committees, could be interpreted as an increased municipal 
willingness to accept citizen input in its decision-making process. However, it could also 
be a result of more funds available in the municipality and thus more willingness to make 
changes to pre-determined plans in response to the pressures made by well-organized 
citizens. Moreover, once recognized by the municipality, or legalized by the directive of 
citizen participation, Advisory “public works” committees could become Supportive I or 
Put-on II committees, in the process, making the decision-making process closed to 
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citizen input. Moreover, although the citizen committees observed in Tenango del Aire 
merely resembled Supportive committees, they did provide for more citizen participation 
in assuring government accountability and transparency in the use of funds than those 
observed in San Andres. Thus, although efforts to gauge if one municipality is more 
willing to incorporate citizen participation did support the apriority hypothesis, a 
cautionary note is needed indicating that more case studies are needed to make any 
generalizations. Moreover, the present study found that local context (traditions of 
residents) and the leadership exercised in communities affected whose voices are heard in 
the decision-making process. As stated in Section 5.5, leadership, a government’s 
response to growth, and whether “community” is seen as a marketplace or “community” 
is seen as a living space, determines if a municipality will be accessible and open or 
exclusionary and closed, affecting who will participate and whose interests will be taken 
into consideration in the decision-making process.   
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CHAPTER 5: CITIZEN COMMITTEES: Formation and Involvement; an 
Evaluation of the Participatory Mechanism  
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents and discusses the data gathered on citizen committees in the 
two research sites in México (the municipality of San Andrés Cholula and the 
municipality of Tenango del Aire). Citizen committees were treated as nested cases from 
which information could be gathered on the factors that affect committees’ formation and 
involvement in rural Mexican administrative decisions. In total, nine citizen committees 
were chosen from both municipalities. I aimed to highlight the factors that affected 
formation of these groups, the factors identified by group members as aiding them in 
their participation, and documenting the perceived treatment these groups received from 
government officials and the perceived impact of these groups on the quality of 
government services rendered. Three citizen committees were chosen from the rural 
auxiliary junta of Santa Maria Tonantzintla in the municipality of San Andrés Cholula 
and three citizen committees were chosen from the overall rural municipality of Tenango 
del Aire. In addition, in Santa Maria Tonantzintla, the staff of three public schools was 
interviewed to understand the role, if any, that citizen committees play in public 
schools.50 Several community members were interviewed from both study sites to 
corroborate the role and the impact of these committees on the provision of government 
services. The chapter is divided into seven sections. Section 5.2 provides the narrative 
and the data gathered from the ‘public works committees’ in the township of Santa Maria 
                                                          
50 When possible, citizen committees were treated as focus groups—all members being interviewed at the 
same time. Questions were posed to the group and individuals were asked to clarify and expand on 
statements made by others. 
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Tonantzintla. Section 5.3 provides the narrative and the data gathered from the local 
schools in the area. Section 5.4 provides an overview of the factors identified as affecting 
the formation of citizen committees in San Andrés Cholula. Section 5.5 provides the data 
gathered from COCICOVIs in the municipality of Tenango del Aire. Section 5.6 
discusses the factors that affect the formation of COCICOVIs in Tenango del Aire. This 
chapter concludes with Section 5.7, which focuses on how these group members—as well 
as their communities—feel their participation in the groups: affected government 
performance; promoted accountability; improved governance, ethics, economy, 
efficiency, effectiveness, and responsiveness; and established cost recovery mechanisms. 
and provided an evaluation of the participatory process utilizing the criteria specified by 
Rowe and Frewer (2000). 
 
5.2  Santa María Tonantzintla ‘comités de obra’51 
Community meetings have historically been called by ringing the local chapel’s 
bell. These meetings concern church related affairs, parties celebrating saints, and 
holidays, etc., and the formation of fundraising committees and designation of 
sponsorship of events. However, these meetings are also used to deliberate the general, 
secular needs of the community. For example, discussions are held on the need to create a 
new school, pave a road, or petition for a service. It is in these meetings that the 
community decides which needs are a priority for the community. Once needs are 
established, if a particular project cannot be carried out through private sponsorship, 
fundraising occurs and if need be, the government is solicited for aid. Church 
                                                          
51 In English ‘public works committees’  
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participation is important to maintain abreast of community affairs.52  Once needs are 
determined and prioritized, the chapel leadership holds meetings to inform the public of 
any progress made on the matter. 
 
1.    Potable Water Committee:  
In the 1990s, Latin American countries began implementing new water resource 
management and water-related public service reforms that shared the commonality of 
broadening and strengthening decentralization processes. Most countries, for example, 
applied the suggestions made by the World Bank and adopted institutional arrangements 
that allowed greater stakeholder and private sector participation. Moreover, countries 
began adopting the view that water is a natural resource as well an economic good with 
social and environmental dimensions (Wilder and Lankao 2006, Trejos et al. 2008). 
These policies altered the dynamic and role of stakeholders involved in both the demand 
and supply side of the water sector. In México, the implementation of the 1992 National 
Water Law (Ley de Aguas Nacionales) transferred water management responsibilities 
from the federal government to municipalities (Wilder 2005). Coupled with the adoption 
of PRONASOL, which altered the funding mechanisms for infrastructure projects in 
municipalities, the reforms allowed for the creation of democratized spaces for 
participatory water management.   
After the chapel meeting held in Santa Maria Tonantzintla on June 5, 2002, 
members of a newly formed citizen committee walked to their township government, and 
in the presence of the auxiliary president, asked the secretary to create a document legally 
                                                          
52 In interviews with members of the community who were not originally from the area, few knew that the 
ringing of the chapel bell represented a call for a general community meeting discussing secular matters.  
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recognizing the committee and their demands for potable water.53 The auxiliary president 
was in his last year in office and no record was found that he ever informed the 
municipality of the request for potable water made in his township. The potable water 
citizen committee did not become officially recognized by the municipality of San 
Andrés Cholula until May 20, 2005, when the project was finally prioritized by the 
municipality. The committee dissolved in 2008 when the project was completed. Water 
resource management plays an important role in both poverty reduction and sustainable 
development and in recognition of the significance that obtaining potable water in a 
community is, this case study is highlighted in this chapter. 
 
Factors that affected the formation of the Potable Water committee: 
 
Citizen 
Committee 
Year 
Formation 
Year 
Recognized
# of  
Members
# 
Elected 
 
Age: 
above 
30 
Year Project 
Completed 
Potable 
Water 
2002 2005 6 4 5 2008 
                                                          
53 According to interviews with community members and members of the citizen committee, efforts to 
obtain potable water date back to the early 1980s. Because, in their majority, community activists depended 
on unofficial meetings with local government officials to gain prioritization for their projects and because 
their methods did not leave a paper trail, only verbal accounts of such efforts remain. These accounts 
include claims of corruption and false promises resulting in delayed action by government to provide 
potable water. One such claim, reported by several interviewees from the community, was that a past 
auxiliary president had already collected money from the community to build a well. However, it is said he 
kept the money, built a well on his land, and then began his own business selling water via water trucks at a 
very high cost. This action reportedly demoralized the community such that the collective action to re-
prioritize and petition the installation of infrastructure for potable water was delayed for several years.  As 
described by a member of the water committee when relaying the story; “The majority of the people here 
don’t know their rights and they just feel these injustices happen but nothing can be done. That is why it 
was so hard to motivate them to start working on the project again.”  In the meeting in 2002, there was a 
heated debate between those who wanted to prioritize the paving of the main road and those who wanted to 
first create the infrastructure for potable water and then, in the future, petition to pave the main road in the 
neighborhood. This was the first effort to obtain potable water that left a traceable paper trail. Two of the 
members of the citizen committee had retained a copy of the legal document recognizing the group in their 
personal files. However, a copy of these documents were not found in either the municipal or auxiliary 
government offices. 
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When speaking to a member of the water committee, the interviewee stated:  
“If government came and did the work, without a committee, then 
we would not find the need to meet and form a group. But, the way things 
work is that if we don’t ask, it doesn’t get done. And as far as working 
government is concerned, you can’t just come with 200 people and ask 
that something get done, the government wants to know who they are 
dealing with and ask we form a group. You have to a call to the 
community to get together. Then you pick a president, treasurer, etc. to 
represent the community and go to register the group. Because the potable 
water project was big enough to need collective sponsorship as well as 
government aid to be carried out, a committee needed to be formed.”  
Lack of government community planning and action was seen by residents and 
committee members as a reason why secular community needs were discussed in church 
meetings and why they felt the need to form citizen committees. They felt that if they did 
not incite the government to act on specific issues, the government would not, and 
nothing would get done in their community. 
This particular committee was composed of six members: president, treasurer, 
secretary, and three individuals charged with disseminating information. Four of the 
members were nominated and elected by the community (males) and two were self-
nominated (females) filling positions that were left empty by a nominated (male) member 
of their family who could not take responsibility at that time. Members of the committee 
were asked open ended questions about the nomination process as well as some yes and 
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no questions of potential factors—identified in the literature—that could have affected 
the election of citizen committee members.  
When asked specifically about the role that gender, participation in the church, 
personal economy, and political aspirations played in the nomination/self-nomination and 
election of citizen committee members, the results were as follows: 
 
Citizen 
Committee 
Member 
Gender Participation in 
the Church 
Personal 
Economy 
Political 
Aspirations 
President Some 
 
Some 
 
Some 
 
None 
Secretary “Definitely, they 
wanted my 
husband […] but 
when he couldn’t, 
they accepted me 
reluctantly to 
represent him.” 
Some: 
“In my case no 
[…] but you see 
our president was 
mayordomo” 
 
Some: “We have 
to run around for 
copies and pay 
those processes 
that might not be 
much for us, but 
do add up.” 
None 
Treasurer Yes ---------- Yes None 
1.Vocal Rep. “Yes, just recently 
a woman ran for 
auxiliary office and 
she didn’t win 
because she was a 
woman. And it is 
the same for the 
nomination of 
women in public 
work’s 
committees.” 
“Unfortunately, 
women are still not 
given the 
opportunity as they 
should be.”  
 
“Things are 
changing but 
unfortunately here 
the tradition is that 
women still don’t 
act without their 
husbands.  
Sometimes you go 
ask for their 
“Well, it all has to 
do. […]Any 
participation in the 
community is 
welcome.” 
 
“I was a 
“Mayordomo” of 
the capilla of San 
Isidro in my 
community. 
Through this, 
people saw what 
kind of person I 
was, honest.” 
 
“It is also 
important that the 
community feel 
that you will be 
able to be solvent 
and maintain 
yourself as 
member of the 
group. This is 
because it cost 
money to get 
official petitions 
into the 
presidency and it 
cost money to 
transport yourself 
to the offices they 
ask you to go to, it 
cost money to take 
time off of work. 
So, if you don’t 
count with the 
money to sustain 
yourself through 
the process, the 
community will 
“As far as the 
water, I was going 
to run for the 
position of 
auxiliary president 
that year […] I 
was selected as 
pre-candidate for 
2005. Because I 
had all my 
experience paving 
of Rafael Ramirez, 
participating with 
schools, and they 
approached me, 
Miguel Porquillo 
and others and 
said, you will get 
your water but it 
isn’t your turn to 
be president, and if 
I gave up my 
position, they 
would do the water 
and the road, and 
as you can see, 
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signature and they 
say no, my husband 
is not here, even if 
you are asking for 
her signature.” 
“Our people still 
say no, how is a 
woman going to 
come and tell us 
what to do? How is 
a woman going to 
do more than a 
man?” 
 
“Men represent the 
family unit he is 
the one who speaks 
up.” “Sometimes 
women themselves 
don’t give 
themselves credit. 
They say they can’t 
decide, that their 
husband decides 
and that holds us 
back, that they 
can’t be 
independent.” “So 
it is unfortunate 
that women […] 
they don’t make 
their rights counts, 
the rights they 
already have.”  
 
“Back then women 
were more valiant 
[…] even though 
they didn’t have 
the capacity, they 
would kick out 
presidents… etc. 
[…] But now they 
don’t decide 
without their 
husbands.” 
probably not 
select you to be a 
part of the group. 
If you don’t have 
personal money 
then sometimes 
nothing gets done, 
you might want to 
but you can’t 
afford the process.  
So, some people 
who would like to 
participate say, no, 
I don’t have the 
money to miss a 
day of work, etc. 
Personal economy 
is important. 
 
Moreover, they 
don’t want you to 
take off with the 
money collected 
from the group. In 
order for lots of 
projects to take 
place, you have to 
show the 
government that 
you are, as a 
community 
willing to take on 
some of the cost, 
so, you collect 
money and they 
don’t want you to 
steal it and they 
don’t select 
you.”54 
 
they did it. It was 
Salomon’s turn. 
They told me, if 
you want to wait, 
wait 9 years and 
you will get what 
you want but you 
won’t get water or 
the road, better 
sign with us.  
 
2.Vocal Rep. “Well, I am going 
to be frank, yes.” 
 
“In this community 
people are very 
religious and this 
“Yes, you have to 
have the money to 
do all the 
No 
                                                          
54 Follow up question: Do people really steal the money? Answer; “Yes, on several occasions, so then 
people don’t want to give money for a project even though the government requires a contribution from the 
population. […] So there is an apathy resulting in the community. Because a few rotten apples, things don’t 
get done, or it takes longer than it should to motivate people.” 
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plays a major role.” 
 
paperwork they 
require of you.” 
 
3.Vocal Rep. Some Yes Yes “I am a 
business man and 
people see how I 
do business.”  
 
No 
 
In this case, gender played a role in the selection of community representatives. 
Four out of six members answered yes, gender plays a role in the election process. The 
women in the group felt they had been elected by default when the husband of one, and 
the father of the other, had been nominated but could not serve. Men have traditionally 
been the ones trusted to represent their families outside the home and in official matters. 
Although, as noted in one of the interviews, women are active in the community in un-
official matters, and in school parent groups, women are not preferred as representatives 
in public works committees. That said, change is occurring slowly and as noted by a 
member of the committee for potable water, in a later community meeting prioritizing the 
paving of a street in the same neighborhood, a woman volunteered to serve on that public 
work committee. At first, a participant of the meeting said “there should be no women 
but, in recognition of the work done by the women in the potable water committee, and 
using them as an example, other participants defended the woman volunteering and she 
got the post.”  
According to interviews with community members,55 participation in the church, 
as an extension of the variable trust, helps people feel secure that they are selecting 
someone who has either been trusted by the church to administer money and/or has high 
moral character. Notably, according to the LAPOP 2010 study, citizen participation in 
                                                          
55 30 members interviewed. 
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México occurs mostly within religious organizations. Thus, it could be that those who 
participate in the church are active members of the community and thus also active in 
community affairs. In either case, for this particular case study, participation in the 
church was viewed as a positive trait in elected community representatives in the potable 
water committee.  
 Personal economy was also seen as an important factor when selecting 
representatives to form part of this public works committee. Level of income served two 
functions. First, it helped ensure that people who participate could support themselves 
economically through the demanding process of petitioning the government for project 
prioritization. It also served as a way of ensuring trust in the administration and collection 
of funds from township residents. According to interviews with community members and 
members of citizen committees, because people who serve in public works committees 
sometimes stealing the money they collect from the community, selecting people based 
on their personal economy (i.e., level of individual wealth) makes community members 
feel more secure that theft will not occur due to personal need. Moreover, people with 
higher incomes were seen as capable of matching the funds needed to complete the 
project out of pocket, if need be.  
Lastly, regarding political aspirations—the last factor queried in the yes or no 
questions with citizen committee members—only one out of six answered that he had 
political aspirations. The literature had suggested that participation in citizen committees 
helps people become more engaged in local government and more likely to become 
leaders. Thus, participants in the citizen committees were asked if they held a position or 
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agreed to serve the term because of political motivations. In general, service in citizen 
committees was not seen as a channel to pursue higher political posts.  
During open ended questions with citizen committee members and community 
members regarding election/self-nomination criteria, trust emerged—as suggested by the 
literature—as an overriding factor in the selection of committee members. The members 
of the committee concurred that being a long standing member of the community was 
very important in the nomination process. As stated by a community interviewee, “more 
than anything, what is important in this community, is that the person is well known, 
from the community.” “The people in a town already know each other and they know 
who works well, so they themselves choose, nominate people to be part of a committee 
and then vote” (vocal representative 1). Being a member of the community for an 
extended period of time increases a candidate’s chances of being elected to a public 
works committee.  
In any case, four members of the committee indicated that they had participated 
actively in past community affairs. Five members indicated they had been members of 
parent committees at their children’s schools, two had served in a religious volunteer post 
for the chapel, and one had been a previous auxiliary president from 1993-1996. Only 
one member had never participated in a community post prior to becoming a member of 
this committee. 
Factors identified by committee members that helped them attain their goals  
When committee members were asked during a group interview what 
characteristics made their committee successful, four factors stood out: following official 
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channels/establishing a paper trail, having a certain level of literacy, jumping government 
tiers, and money. 
1. Following official channels: 
All members agreed that obeying official government procedures, and thus 
leaving a paper trail of efforts, was important. As described by some of the interviewees:  
“Sometimes people think that by meeting with someone [in government] their 
project will get done, but the paperwork is important, the experience to know it matters 
made a difference. They [the government] can say they are going to do something but if 
they don’t sign then ‘they forget’ and they don’t do anything” (committee president).  
“Sometimes people don’t know what all that paperwork is for, […] sometimes 
they don’t know they have to do it” (Vocal representative 1).  
“People who have been in committees are people well respected and who usually 
have a connection to the people in government, it used to help pull strings to have them in 
committees. Then they might think they are taking a shortcut by just meeting and talking 
with a local politician or government official, they don’t realize that it is better to follow 
procedure and take the long road to get there” (committee president). 
“So, [keeping record is important because] even though the municipality doesn’t 
want to spend the money and they ‘lose’ the paperwork, [in our case] we had a copy of 
the petition and the prioritization by the SOAP and the state and the federal government 
[…] they had to pay attention, and thank goodness we knew we had to go and keep track 
of these things” (Vocal representative 1). 
 187
 All these statements make it clear that understanding the importance of following 
official channels and leaving a paper trail are important to gain prioritization for a 
project. Members of the committee concluded by indicating what differentiated their 
committee from prior committees—and what was a major factor in helping their 
committee attain its goals—was being persistent and keeping track of their progress and 
requests through the maintenance of a paper trail. 
2. Literacy 
Related to the points above, on the importance of following official channels for 
putting in requests to the local government, it was noted by committee and members of 
the community, that these channels demand a certain level of literacy. In other words, 
knowing how to read and write is vital. One interviewee described personal committee 
experiences and other, unsuccessful committees, which did not attain their goals due to a 
lack of literacy. The interviewee used agriculture as an example: campesinos (farmers) 
were attempting to protect their lands while ejidos (the commons, communal lands) were 
being dissolved due to legislation undermining their legal protection. He stated:  
“Look with agriculture, the ejidos are almost gone […] but anyhow, the only 
people who can get organized to petition for help when there are agricultural problems 
are the people who controlled the ejidos, who might not even use the land but they know 
how to read and write and petition for help. But the poor campesino who doesn’t know 
how the system works? Well, he doesn’t even know how to petition for help when he 
needs it because he can’t read or write, it is the same with these works” (Vocal 
representative 3). 
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The committee president added: 
 “Most groups don’t know what the government is asking from them; like they 
asked us for an environmental impact study […] I was lucky I knew the paperwork had to 
get done” (committee president).  
Interviews conducted with community members concurred in indicating that some 
of the previous ‘active members’ of the community, especially the elderly population, did 
not know how to read or write. However, in prior years members of this now elderly 
population were primary contributors of physical labor to construct the community’s 
chapel and schools and organize town parties for the church. However, at present, these 
members of the community are no longer effective participants and thus are no longer 
asked to participate ‘officially’ because they are illiterate.56  
3. Jumping government tiers 
Members of the potable water committee identified that asking for government 
help from different levels of government was a major factor contributing to the 
prioritization of their potable water project. As noted by an interviewee when speaking 
about why prior committees failed in their efforts to obtain potable water: 
“Well, maybe [they failed] because they didn’t know how to work the system […] 
how to go to the state government or the federal government to ask them for help. That is 
important. That is why we got the water project done. Because there are laws that 
prioritize the water. So, even though the municipality doesn’t want to spend the money 
                                                          
56 An elderly woman credited by the potable water citizen committee for being in charge of ‘unofficially’ 
facilitating the collection of funds from the community as well as disseminating information on the 
progress of the potable water committee was also interviewed for this study. She confirmed that she would 
have preferred to participate as an official member of the committee, but she was embarrassed because she 
could not read or write and she was a woman—and women like her are not typically elected to represent 
the community.  
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and they lose the paperwork, we had a copy of the petition and the prioritization by the 
SOAP and the state and the federal government […] they had to pay attention” 
(committee president). 
 Another committee member noted:  
“Yes, we wrote a letter to the governor, he responded and then the municipal 
president had to say yes, we will consider the project, we threatened we would write 
another letter until he acted” (Committee secretary).  
4. Money 
All committee members confirmed that a considerable amount of money is 
necessary to complete the paperwork required from them by the municipality. Some of 
the interviewees described this issue; 
“You need personal money to get copies, to drive or take a bus to different 
government offices to get documents stamped, to take time from work to turn documents 
in, to ask for signatures, etc.” (Secretary). 
 As stated by another member of the committee: “having the funds to follow 
through is important, every step has a cost, we paid for the land where they built the well, 
the legal work to get it legally transferred in our group name, and then the legal work to 
transfer it to the government and then they [the government] paid for the well” 
(Committee president). The project “was done in parts, buy the land, get the water well 
built, get the tubes installed etc.” Thus, “it [the process] requires personal funds and then 
money from the community for the large costs” (ibid.). 
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“We were lucky, my girl who just graduated from primary school, they [the 
students] spent 5 years waiting for a ramp for disabled students to use in emergencies to 
be built in the school. They [the government] were asking too much money [from the 
families of the children represented by the parent committee] for it to get it done. In this 
case, we had the money” (Vocal representative 2).  
In other words, having the money to be persistent and follow through with all the 
government requests was seen as very important and one of the leading factors that 
contributed to the successful completion of the potable water project. 
 
On the Typology: Treatment received from the Municipality  
The typology of citizen committees used in the present study is based on an 
adaptation of Riedel’s (1972) model, which utilizes municipal treatment of citizen 
committees to establish a typology. For the present study, in an attempt to classify citizen 
committees according to a typology, not only is the verbal account of the perceived 
function of these groups by municipality important but also the perceived treatment 
received by the citizen committees. Thus, all citizen committees were asked about the 
treatment they received from local government when attempting to attain their goals. The 
potable water committee, in response to questions on the treatment they received from the 
municipality during a group interview, answered as follows:  
“Polite yes but how many times did they lose our petitions?  I can’t even count 
them anymore” (committee secretary).  
“What happens is that government doesn’t give the people what they need if one 
doesn’t ask. And yes, citizens have to do their part, but then the bureaucracy sais ok, 
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well, come back in one day, in two, in three, in a week, in a month, and time passes” 
(Vocal Representative 1). 
 “I have the impression, they try to have you give up, they make you run around, 
they ask you for millions of copies of the signatures you have collected, for an 
environmental impact study [which cost the committee money], or to go write a petition 
to take to another department, to get permits or whatever and then they tell you are too 
late for that fiscal year” (Secretary). 
 “Well, you see, in our case, they had decided that they were not going to do our 
project so, they said that the auxiliary president never turned in the forms […] and then 
they lost the ones we turned in and they gave us more paperwork to take care of, they 
made us get a geological study carried out, when they are the ones who are supposed to 
do it, and we paid for that […] all this to make sure we didn’t’ get our way, because they 
knew they had to prioritize us but really had no intention to do so” (Vocal rep. 3).  
Another committee member stated “they made us waste time. Then the state 
government prioritized us but the auxiliary president and the municipal administration 
term was over, and a new one began so, we had to start petitioning from scratch. And 
then it was done in parts, buy the land, get the water well built, and get the tubes installed 
etc. all this took time and money, and did they help us with getting money from the 
community to buy the land? No.  Or did they help with the complicated paperwork? No. 
They were not helpful” (Vocal Representative 1).  
Based on the group interview conducted regarding perceived treatment of the 
potable water committee from the municipality, members felt they were a ‘put off’ 
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committee—designed as a façade of citizen participation, but in reality intended to put off 
the action of prioritizing and implementing the potable water project in their community. 
 
Outcome: Perceived impact of participation 
It was a goal of the present study to analyze the impact that these groups have on 
government accountability, transparency, efficiency, and improvement of overall 
government performance. In an attempt to clarify the role of the potable water citizen 
committee in the process for establishing potable water in the community, an interview 
was conducted with the director of the Operation of Potable Water in the Department of 
Urban and Ecologic Development.  
According to this interview, a citizen committee must be present to implement 
public works related to potable water. In this particular case, funds came from Section 33 
and “the company who carried the work out was chosen from a group from the private 
sector who presented their proposals, the most economical and most efficient and 
effective one was selected to carry out the project.” The department does not maintain 
contact with citizen committees after project completion because after the infrastructure 
is created, the municipality becomes responsible for providing the service. According to 
the interview, initially about 214 families were provided with service, and then 43 were 
added later. The department is charged with chlorinating the product and maintaining a 
constant supply. The monthly per family average cost is around 78 pesos and this price 
was based on “the cost of salaries, electricity, maintenance cost, repair, etc. but not the 
initial sunk cost of the project.”  “The infrastructure money was provided by the federal 
government [and] we don’t have to pay that money back, even though the Law on water 
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and its related treatment in the State of Puebla, indicates that the initial investment is 
recoverable, and retrievable, through the monthly bills etc., we don’t try to regain that 
money back, in this case the community was really supported.” However, “Only 30% of 
the people who receive the service pay for the potable water, 70% doesn’t pay.” When 
asked if the committee could help inform the community of this service and promote that 
they pay, the interviewee stated: “The committee is gone at this point, and we inform the 
people by passing out a flyer stating how much they need to pay. They still wait to pay as 
long as they can, some haven’t paid in two years and then they can’t pay and then they 
want to petition for help so they don’t’ have to pay, it is complicated.” Thus, even though 
decentralization reform promoting citizen participation is designed to aid in cost recovery 
for infrastructure, this did not occur in this particular case study.   
When questioning members of the citizen committee and the community about 
the potable water committee’s impact on the project, especially with regard to improved 
governance, transparency, cost effectiveness, accountability, and overall project quality, 
the results were as follows. Neither the members of the community nor the citizen 
committee knew the final, total costs of the potable water project. The citizen committee 
knew only of their personal expenses and only kept track of the use of the contributions 
collected from the community. As stated by an interviewee of the committee: “As far as 
transparency, we were never informed on the cost of the project, they chose their own 
construction firms and they dealt with their budget in doors” (committee president). Thus, 
little can be said about the cost effectiveness of the project from the perspective of the 
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citizenry.57 “In terms of government accountability, there is nothing we can do to make 
them accountable for the things they do wrong, and well, sometimes there is no 
accountability even within the committee” (community resident). This comment was 
made in reference to a misuse of funds by one of the members of the potable water 
citizen committee, who, after being accused of stealing money, was removed from the 
group but was not forced to return the funds.  
When asked about the quality of the project, a member of the committee 
answered; “Well, people don’t know what a water project is supposed to look like, and 
sometimes even if people are not happy, they are pressured into signing when the work is 
done” (vocal representative 3). When asked if this member felt pressured to sign to 
accept the project he said, “kind of but look, have you seen the street Benito Juarez, up by 
the church? […] when that road was put in, they left it with a light pole right in the 
middle [and when they complained] the community was told that the municipality put in 
the road and the neighbors had to put in the money to change the place of the pole, [not 
them,] so they signed, they didn’t have the money” (ibid.). In questions regarding level of 
satisfaction with the potable water project, the answers from committee members 
interviewed as a group were mixed. This mixture of feelings was exemplified by one 
interviewee, who was asked if the project was implemented in a satisfactory manner: “yes 
and no, I have seen that where the water is collected it overflows and well, they waste 
water, they turn it off certain days of the week but other than that, yes we are satisfied 
with the quality of the project” (committee president). Others said they were happy about 
the water, but worried the supply plumbing pipes were too small and made of material 
                                                          
57 The government officials interviewed indicated that the project costs were $2,290,736.54 pesos from 
FISM 
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that would deteriorate with time. Two committee members indicated the location of a 
leak in the pipe system that occurred shortly after project completion and that they have 
been asking the municipality to fix to no avail, adding to the concerns over the overall 
quality of the project. The same concerns were expressed by members of the community. 
There were equal amounts of pro and con comments—and many “yes, but” comments.  
 
2. Tepoxtla Street Paving Committee:  
Factors that affected the formation of the committee: 
According to the interviews with this citizen committee, and residents living on 
Tepoxtla Street, neighbors began petitioning the local auxiliary government to pave their 
street approximately six years prior to the public work being prioritized. One day, the 
Mayor of Cholula “unexpectedly showed up [on our street] with the auxiliary president 
looking for people to gather and form a group so that we could begin the process of 
getting the road paved. We [the group that formed] filled out the paperwork in the 
auxiliary office and they then took it to the municipal offices and we became a 
committee” (president of the committee).  
As narrated by the committee president, the group of neighbors who met upon the 
arrival of the mayor was small (9 people). The auxiliary president met two people on the 
street and walked with them to the local store on the respective street. He called the store 
owner to meet with him at the store, asked him to become the president of the committee 
and call his ‘compadres’58. The newly nominated committee president called his 
neighbors (friends, male businessmen living on the street) and along with the three other 
                                                          
58 ‘friends in English’ 
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neighbors present in the store (they recall two women and a man), discussed the street 
paving prospects with the Mayor and the auxiliary president.  The remaining citizen 
committee members (all friends with the store owner) self-nominated themselves to 
support the efforts. The composition of the groups is as follows: 
 
Citizen 
Committee 
Year 
formation 
Year 
Recognized
# of  
Members
# Elected 
 
Age: 
above 
30 
Year Project 
Completed 
Tepoxtla 
Street 
2005 2011 6 5 self- 
nominated; 
1 
approached 
by 
auxiliary 
president 
 
6 2011 
 
  
All members of the committee indicated that their project was likely prioritized 
because the mayor was originally from the township of Tonantzintla and he probably 
wanted to “give back” to the community, even though he had not been elected based on 
any such promise. In open ended questions, when asked about the factors that affected 
individual selection/self-nomination of committee members, two factors emerged. One 
was being well-connected, and the other was being known by the community as trusted 
and active members of the community. “Everyone who nominated themselves was 
active” (committee treasurer), and “we all knew each other and everyone knows and 
trusts us because we are active” (vocal representative one). When asked about specific 
factors such as gender, participation in the church, personal income and political 
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aspirations—and the role these factors play in the formation of these types of 
committees—the results were as follows: 
 
Citizen 
Committee 
Member 
Gender Participation in 
the Church 
Personal 
Economy 
Political 
Aspirations 
President “Yes, even in 
the other 
committees, the 
ones for the 
drain and the 
light, it was 
men, because 
they have 
power.”  
“I have been 
and an active 
member of the 
community, I 
have sponsored 
several events, 
that is why I 
accepted the 
nomination.” 
“Yes, we have 
to put the cost 
ourselves of the 
sidewalks. [... 
Moreover] we 
need gasoline 
to go here or 
there to copies, 
or have a 
meeting and 
give a drink 
(soda), it all 
comes from 
us.”     
Some 
Secretary Some Some 
 
Yes None 
Treasurer Some Some Yes “I don’t but 
some in the 
group do and 
this might have 
affected their 
wanting to be 
part of the 
group.” 
 
1.Vocal Rep. Some Yes “Yes, we have 
to pay for the 
sidewalk” 
Some 
2.Vocal Rep. Yes  Some Yes None  
3.Vocal Rep. “Yes, here we 
were all men.” 
 
Some Yes None 
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Gender was identified as a factor in participation of public works committees, not 
just by members of the street paving committee, but also by community members who 
resided on the street in question. Participation in the church and personal income were 
also seen as influential in the selection of participants. It appeared that those who are 
involved in the church and sponsor parties are also more likely to sponsor or contribute 
financially to public works in the area. Three members of the committee identified that 
participation in public works committees was a way of attaining political clout and aid in 
attaining future leadership positions. The remaining committee members and most 
community members did not indicate this was the case. 
 
Factors identified by committee members that helped them attain their goals  
Because the work was in its initial stages, committee members were asked only 
what factors, thus far, were facilitating work progress. The answer identified by all 
members was ‘being persistent’: “We try to go once a week, at least every two weeks” 
(committee president). Moreover this group also recognized, as the potable water 
committee recognized, the importance of jumping government tiers—in other words, as 
noted by a member of the committee: “going to the municipal government directly is the 
best” (vocal representative 1). This committee consulted directly with the municipality 
instead of approaching the auxiliary government.  
 
On the Typology: Treatment received from the Municipality  
When individual committee members were asked about the treatment they 
received from the municipality, members indicated that at the beginning, the municipal 
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mayor was very helpful: “the mayor this year is from this area so, that helped [but then,] 
well, they have a lot of work. We almost felt they forgot about us, so we go and put 
pressure and I think persistence is why they will get it done, they know we will not 
forget” (committee president). Because the project was not completed, little could be said 
about the impact of this group on government performance. As far as transparency is 
concerned, none of the members of the committee knew how much the street would end 
up costing them or the municipality.59 All they knew was that they, the committee, would 
end up having to collectively cover the cost of the sidewalk. The members of the 
committee were not sure if that cost would come out of pocket or if they would put a part 
and collect the rest from their neighbors. 
2. Paving of Revolución Street: 
Factors that affected the formation of the committee: 
Discussing the committee’s formation, the committee president indicated: “We 
had been working to get this road done for such a long time, and we were not just waiting 
but calling every day to see if there was any movement. We are lucky, some neighbors 
have been waiting for 15 or more years and because they don’t get along with the local 
politicians their streets never get done. Then they give up.” Because of the system of 
representation and election by borough in the government in Santa Maria Tonantzintla, 
the committee had to wait for an auxiliary president from their barrio to be elected before 
their street was prioritized: “This should not play a factor but as you can tell it did. The 
street in San Pedro got paved but ours didn’t’ and well, we had to wait for the next 
                                                          
59 According to the municipality, this project will be funded through FORTAMUN (2011) and would cost 
$3,339,392.73 pesos.   
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president but by then we had already given up and gone directly to the municipality” 
(committee secretary). To get the committee formed, “we had to go to the auxiliary 
president to get recognized as a group and make your petitions” (committee president). 
This group had only one woman member, self-nominated to join the group after the 
remaining male members were elected. 
 
Citizen 
Committee 
Year 
Formation 
Year 
Recognized
# of  
Members
# Elected 
 
Age: 
above 
30 
Year Project 
Completed 
Revolución 
Street 
1999 2006 5 4 elected; 
1 self-
nominated
5 2007 
 
 When asked about the role that specific personal factors played in the election of 
members to the committee, the results were as follows: 
 
Citizen 
Committee 
Member 
Gender Participation in 
the Church 
Personal 
Economy 
Political 
Aspirations 
President Some None Some “Yes, well, I 
love politics 
and getting 
involved and 
no because I 
don’t run for 
office, maybe I 
should. But I 
won’t.” 
Secretary “Yes, 
unfortunately 
yes. Men are the 
ones elected and 
I nominated 
myself, I do feel 
that it plays a 
“No. I am not 
an active 
participant in 
the church and 
although that 
plays a big 
factor for lots of 
“Yes, I saw 
that that played 
a role in who 
got selected, 
usually people 
who have a 
store or who 
Some 
 201
factor.” things, my 
neighbors were 
willing to 
overlook that 
and they didn’t 
give me any 
pressure for it.”  
 
have more.” 
Treasurer None None “Some, we 
have to pay for 
lots of legal 
processes and 
most people 
can’t afford 
them.” 
None 
1.Vocal Rep. -------------- ------------- ------------- --------- 
2.Vocal Rep. ----------
-- 
----------
-- 
----------
-- 
--------- 
 
Factors identified by committee members that helped them attain their goals  
In interviews, committee members indicated that working directly with the 
municipality, “bypassing the auxiliary junta (the township gov.) was useful because it 
helped keep track of who was really going to conduct the public work” (committee 
secretary). “Unfortunately, from the year the committee started requesting the work, there 
were two municipal elections and the petition process had to start all over again” 
(committee president). In other words, with each election for mayor, because of the lack 
of municipal record keeping, the committee had to submit a new petition from the group 
to the administration to have them re-consider paving the road. Moreover, during that 
period, the committee lost two of its members, complicating matters for the group.  
Unfortunately, one of the members never saw the project reach its goal. Committee 
members indicated that even more than working directly with the municipality, 
persistence in petitioning the work was important. “Every year the municipality would 
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ask [them] to do something new, get a plan made, get more contributions for the 
sidewalks, re-register when new elections came in, etc.” (committee treasurer). When 
they had to re-register the group after the elections form mayor with the new 
administration, they felt that maintaining good relations with the auxiliary government 
was important because government personnel could create a document recognizing that 
the committee was indeed long-standing—and not forming for the first time. “Money was 
also important, we got a lot of money stolen [from politicians promising favors] but 
regardless, even if some was stolen, we were happy to have it because, without it, we 
would not have gotten our street paved” (committee president). Each committee 
process/activity required some amount of money, and it was important to have funds 
readily available.  
On the Typology: Treatment received from the Municipality  
When asked about the municipality’s treatment of the committee, one member 
answered:  
“In our case, they made things more difficult than they had to be. For 
starters, it became obvious that the auxiliary president didn’t want to get 
our road paved. So, we still formed a committee and waited while one 
road, the one he lives in, in San Pedro got paved. [After that one got 
done,] still, nothing. Then, we jumped right to the municipality, which 
unfortunately also gave us trouble; they would give us the run around. 
Sometimes, they would even send us to meet with someone who really 
was not the person we were asking to meet and they would say it was. I 
recognize faces, I am not stupid” (committee president).  
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Another committee member continued; 
“Then, one day, his guy from a political party came and said he would do 
what he could to get the street paved but that we needed to pay for a study. 
He convinced our committee to pay him, from our pockets, you know you 
get frustrated and just pay out of your pocket what you can, 5,000 pesos to 
get the study in. The study was a line on a paper nothing, nothing. So, we 
kept it but we got ripped off. The municipality didn’t need it. Then, while 
the same president was in power, we would go to see when our street was 
going to get paved. Believe it or not, they would say, we don’t’ have a 
record of your petition. How could they not? Good thing we kept our 
study and our petitions and then started to bug and bug and bug, like every 
other day we were calling” (committee treasurer). 
 The other committee members had similar comments on the treatment they received 
from the municipality, indicating that the municipality was treating them as a put off 
committee.  
Outcome: Perceived impact of participation 
Lastly, committee and community members were asked if they were content with 
the quality of the road. Most said, ‘I am happy it is done.’ However, committee members 
indicated that although they were happy with the road, they were not absolutely 
convinced that the work was completed correctly. They lacked trust in the workmanship 
because “when they were putting in the road they discovered that the drainage of our 
street was never connected to the main line. So, that is why there was always moisture in 
that lot at the end of the street, we had worked to get that drain in years back and well, 
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look how that turned out so, who knows who this will end up, thus far fine” (committee 
president). Neither committee nor community members knew the project’s final cost; 
moreover, they were not aware if the government maintained records of the work.  
 
Section 5.3 SIF and Public Schools; ‘padres de familia’60 
In the township of Santa Maria Tonantzintla, personnel from three (out of eight) 
public schools were interviewed to gain understanding of the role that citizen committees 
play in implementing public works at these institutions. Interviews were conducted in the 
middle schools ‘Telesecundaria Alejandro García’ and ‘Secundaria Enrique Erro,’ and 
the high school ‘Bachiller Guillermo Haro.’ Interviews were not conducted in elementary 
schools or kindergartens because the municipality, specifically the trustee of public 
education, stated that while middle and high schools are overseen by the municipality, it 
is not directly responsible for elementary schools and kindergartens. Although public 
works committees/citizen committees operated in the initial stages of the creation of 
schools, after the schools were operational, parent groups/‘padres de familia’ took charge 
and citizen committees dissolved and no longer participated in school affairs. 
1. Escuela Secundaria Luis Enrique Erro, C.C.T. 21EEO3172; 
Interview with school vice-principle, Miguel Joaquín Quiroz  & two teachers.  
In response to a question about the role of citizen committees in implementing 
public work projects in schools, the vice-principle of the middle school—Luis Enrique 
Erro—first provided a brief history of the school and explained the critical role that a 
citizen committee played in its creation: 
                                                          
60 Parent groups in English 
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“In 2002, a citizen committee who had been petitioning for several 
years to get a school built, and had already bought the land where the 
school they wanted would be built, they got the go ahead from the 
municipality to start running a school and I was hired as a vice-principal. 
When I came in we did not have classrooms. No space to give classes. We 
operated from the ‘casa de la cultura’ (municipal cultural house/space in 
English) for the first years and then, for I think for one year, we operated 
from the offices of the auxiliary presidency.  The committee continued 
petitioning for the construction of the school. We could not believe that 
the government would open a school without actually having a school.  
We, the school principal and the parents, and the original committee, 
petitioned and petitioned for the project. It wasn’t until a couple of years 
later that they finally prioritized us and got the school built in 2005. They 
used funding from Ramo 33 to carry out the construction. They built three 
classrooms and a bathroom within the year; two classrooms and one 
laboratory. They left the building empty.” 
The committee that originated the project, and purchased the land for its 
construction61, continued the petitioning process to initiate construction but dissolved 
after the school was built. According to the interviewee, there was no transparency or 
accountability to monitor the cost effectiveness of the project. Nobody knew how much 
the municipality paid to complete construction. Regarding treatment the committee and 
school personnel received from the municipality and auxiliary government during the 
                                                          
61 Utilizing funds they had collected from neighbors. 
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process, the interviewee stated: “We were treated well, but it took three years!!! We had 
to pressure to get this work prioritized […] the auxiliary president had already prioritized 
other works.” When asked if he felt the work would have occurred if the committee had 
not participated in petitioning, he answered; “Definitely not, there was no plan for our 
school to get built.” All interviewees indicated that citizen participation, channeled 
through this citizen committee, initiated creation of the school. There was early 
involvement and persistence throughout the entire process, without which the needs of 
the community would not have been met. 
Once the school was built, and the citizen committee dissolved, a comité de padre 
de familia (a parent group, in English) was formed. It was a parent group that motivated 
the parents of the school to contribute money to equip the laboratory and the classrooms. 
The parent committee received matching funding from the “programa de escuela digna” 
to purchase the remaining benches and black-boards for the classrooms. According to one 
teacher, “the release of funding from the program of ‘escuela digna’ was released because 
of political reasons, elections were coming up.” Regarding the composition and 
responsibilities of these groups, the vice principal stated: 
“The ‘comités de padre de familia’ form every year. There is a 
president, a vice-president, a treasurer, a secretary and 5 vocal members. 
At the beginning of the year they determine how much each parent has to 
pay for the maintenance of the school. The money collected goes for basic 
things like, money for the salary of the maintenance personnel, money for 
the painting the school, the garden, electricity, water, etc. all the 
maintenance. They are in charge of those finances and also working with 
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us to solicit projects from the auxiliary and municipal presidency. They 
are a mixture of males and females and they are usually the parents with 
time in their hands for this kind of thing. There is nothing particular about 
these individuals besides the fact that they are responsible people.” 
As indicated by one teacher, “it was one of these parent groups which took charge 
of the second phase of the schools construction, the building of two other classrooms and 
one computer room which took place in 2009.”  This parent group and the staff who 
worked with them began petitioning for the building of the second story about a year 
after the initial construction was completed. The second stage of construction was 
implemented with money from the Secretary of Public Education, a state entity that pays 
teacher salaries. According to the interviews, there was no transparency in the use of 
funds and no disclosure of the cost of the 2nd stage of construction. When school staff 
was asked if these projects could be implemented or initiated without the intervention of 
the parent groups, one teacher answered: “definitely not, […] we have to push every year 
for anything we want to get done.” Although parent groups currently petition for public 
infrastructure projects at this school, the vice principal indicated that at the beginning, it 
was a citizen committee that served as a catalyst—a citizen committee that later became a 
parent group.  
  
2. Bachillerato Guillermo Haro, Calle Reforma Sur. Interview with 
Directora Matilde Zambrano Teutl & a teacher who facilitates the participation of 
the parent committees in the school.  
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Guillermo Haro is a state school that was built ten years prior to the interviews 
carried out in 2011. The interviews conducted at this school, as with the others, aimed to 
determine the process of implementing infrastructure projects in these institutions and the 
role of citizen committees, if any, in that process. According to the interview with the 
school principal, it is only parent groups who participate in petitioning for infrastructure 
projects—not public work committees. Moreover, according to the school principal, these 
parent committees: 
 “are essential in petitioning for any project, they are elected every 
year. They have to put in half the funding for most projects. For example, 
today we inaugurated the infrastructure or the equipment for the 
laboratory, the parents put half the funding, and the municipality put the 
other half. In addition, the money they collect from the other parents is 
used for maintenance, painting of the school etc.. The parent groups, 
together with me [the principal], have to first petition the auxiliary junta 
and then the petition goes to the municipality and then they decide what 
funding we get, […] you can’t jump the auxiliary junta and the 
municipality, it is not convenient to do so. If you do, you can get in 
problems.”  
It is interesting to note that as with the public work citizen committees, these 
parent groups must also contribute funding in order for their petitioned project to be 
implemented. Moreover, party politics plays a role in the release of funds for schools. 
Specifically, when the party in control of the municipality is the same as the party in 
control of the state government, “things run more smoothly, at least from our experience 
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[and] we have been pretty lucky because these last six years a PAN president has been in 
power and thus the funding has come in quite smoothly” (school principal).  
When asked about the factors that affect the formation and composition of parent 
committees, factors such as gender, income, and participation in church, one teacher 
indicated that “no, there might be a few more women but that is hardly notable […] 
mostly parents nominate themselves and it is not until there really is a lack of volunteers 
that people start nominating each other. It is usually just based on who has more time 
available and nothing else, and no, personal income doesn’t play a role, the contributions 
are made by all the parents so personal income does not play a role and neither does 
participation in the church.” Thus, the factors that affect the formation of the parent group 
differ from those that affect the public works citizen committees analyzed in the same 
area. 
3. Telesecundaria Alejandro Garcia, Calle Adolfo López Mateos. 
Interviews with school principal Mariana Lopez Espinoza and members of the 
staff actively involved with the parent groups. 
When interviews with the school staff were conducted, this school was noted to 
be ten years old and have 52 enrolled students. The staff was asked about public works 
citizen committees, and if they are used by the school to solicit funding for infrastructure 
projects. The individuals interviewed indicated that if there is some collaboration with the 
committees, it is only when they are consulted by a committee because a particular 
community project will affect their school, such as the paving of a road. However, for 
internal matters, it is the parent committees who solicit the funds needed for 
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infrastructure projects. When asked to elaborate on their collaborations with citizen 
committees, it was noted that collaboration is rare and has only occurred twice: once 
when a committee asked the school to collect parent signatures to complement a petition 
for potable water and second when approached by a committee asking the parents to sign 
a petition to pave the street leading up to the school.  
On the other hand, parent committees are used with regularity. These groups are 
composed of members who are elected every year. There is a president, vice president, 
treasurer, secretary and a set of two vocal representatives. Their main job is to collect an 
annual fee (approximately 70 U.S. dollars) from parents and to use these fees to maintain 
the school and purchase material that might be needed for a special event. Their 
secondary role is to annually petition, with the support of the school principal, the 
municipal and state governments for certain infrastructure projects. According to the 
interviews, the only project implemented in the past six years was the paving of the 
school driveway. All the parents contributed around 35 U.S. dollars for the sidewalks. 
According to the school principle, “that is a lot of money considering how many of the 
parents have difficulty paying the yearly maintenance free which for most, has to be 
divided into instalments for them to be able to liquidate.” According to the interviews, the 
parent groups must collect matching funding to implement all projects in the school. 
“Thus, first the projects are delayed because of lack of prioritization by the municipality 
and the auxiliary government, and then projects are delayed because they can’t collect the 
matching funds” (school principal). Government funding mostly comes from a Federal 
program called ‘peso por peso’ (‘dollar per dollar’), which according to the principal, 
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“means we are supposed to pay for half of any project even while our parents have 
difficulty paying the yearly quota!”  
In the past five years, the school petitioned for funding from both the auxiliary 
junta and the municipality, and because of the inability to match the requested funds, 
none of the projects have been implemented. At the top of the list of these projects—
which includes building a fence around the school, building a main office, and building a 
partial enclosure that will allow kids to play outside when it rains—is upgrading the 
school restrooms, which currently do not have running water. Currently, the staff and 
children must transport water from outside to flush the toilets. Government authorities 
have not responded to these projects and the interviewees at the school felt this was 
because the government knows the parents cannot contribute to the cost of the project. 
That said, “Every three years politicians running for mayor come knocking at their door 
making promises that if elected, their special projects will be carried out, but nothing gets 
done” (teacher interviewed).  
When asked in more detail about the formation of these parent groups and the 
characteristics its members have in common, school staff noted that although most of the 
members were females, they were not the overwhelming majority.  Moreover, as noted in 
the other schools, the factors that affect the formation of citizen committees in 
Tonantzintla, (gender, personal income political aspirations, and religious affiliation) do 
not seem to be present in parent committees. Schools that lack resources (i.e., the parents 
have less personal income) receive less funds.  Moreover, all school personnel felt that 
party politics played a role in the release of state funds.  
 
 212
Section 5.4 Determinants of Citizen Participation in San Andrés Cholula 
In the municipality of San Andrés Cholula, projects are prioritized during the 
election campaign. After these projects are prioritized, the municipality opens up its 
doors to requests made by auxiliary presidents and citizen committees. In general 
however, it is the auxiliary presidents who channel the demands of the citizen 
committees.  Citizens who organize themselves into committees can petition the 
municipality directly, but as noted in the interviews, support from the auxiliary junta in 
which they reside can help them gain legal recognition from the corresponding directive 
in the municipality. Until they are legally recognized by the directive of citizen 
participation, un-official public works citizen committees loosely resemble ‘Advisory 
Committees’—that is, citizen committees who can potentially affect the decision-making 
process, signaling the importance of a project and thus potentially gaining its 
prioritization. However, once recognized by the municipality and legalized by the 
directive of citizen participation, ‘public works’ committees, can become Supportive I, III 
and Put-on II committees62.  
In all cases, the municipality expects monetary contributions from its citizen 
committees to match part of the cost of implementing a public work. Moreover, in some 
cases, committees are required by the municipality to aid the process by obtaining the 
legal permits, studies, etc., required to implement infrastructure projects—tasks which 
often require the committees to interact with different offices within the municipality and 
different levels of government. This process requires a significant time commitment from 
                                                          
62 Public work committees can petition the construction of a new school but once a school is formed, 
‘parent groups’ replace these committees in the solicitation of aid from the municipality.  
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members of the citizen committees, a certain level of literacy, political savvy, knowledge 
of the system, good record keeping skills, and a certain level of trustworthiness—
obtained within the community. The following factors, noted by committee members, 
affect the ability of citizen committees to gain attention for their demands from the 
municipality: persistence, jumping government tiers, knowledge of the system (literacy), 
time, and money.  
    Moreover, in the township of Santa Maria Tonantzintla, the following factors 
were identified as affecting the selection of individuals who will form part of citizen 
committees: participation in the church, gender, and personal income. Analyzing these 
factors in detail, parallels emerge between citizen committee formation and traditional 
church-related mechanisms for acquiring leadership roles and administrating community 
affairs—specifically the cargo system. As noted in Chapter 4.7, there was an adoption of 
church practices (i.e., rotating representation of each parish and its patron saint in the 
main church in Santa Maria Tonantzintla) by the civil/political system and specifically 
the township method of electing auxiliary presidents based on the rotation of 
representation of each borough in the township government. Upon further inquiry, this 
study found that a variation of the cargo system (also known as the civil-religious 
hierarchy, fiesta or mayordomía system), identified by Dewalt (1975), is still present in 
the religious life of the township, and I posit, in addition to spilling over and affecting the 
election process of auxiliary presidents, also affects the election of representatives who 
will form citizen committees.  
Under the cargo system, indigenous residents assume the responsibility of 
organizing fiestas and managing local administrative affairs (Friedlander 1981). In 
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alignment with the defining characteristics of the cargo system, as a way of acquiring 
prestige in the community, men in the township boroughs of Tonantzintla volunteer to 
hold a cargo (religious office) and implement the functions necessary to run the church 
and its parishes. As noted in other cases, “traditionally, passage through the complete 
system of hierarchically based offices has been the most important means of acquiring 
prestige in the community” (Dewalt 1975: 90). In addition to installing a system of elite 
domination within the communities, noted by Eric Wolf (1982), the civil-religious 
hierarchies allow “that elite to represent the community as a whole before external power 
holders and authorities" (Chance 1985: 148). The participants in this system “are men 
who have proven their moral worth and often exert considerable influence in local 
affairs” (ibid.). Moreover, although “today the civil offices and the [… religious] 
positions do not have an explicit relationship to one another […] it is not unusual for a 
villager seeking a political career in the pueblo to volunteer regularly [in church posts]” 
(Friedlander 1981: 140). Thus, the participants of the system have a certain degree 
political savvy, especially those who run for office as auxiliary presidents.63 Furthermore, 
the network includes those who have connections to a political circle. 
As noted by Chance, the cargo system requires substantial financial outlays from 
its office holders to sponsor religious activities (1985). In Tonantzintla, those cargo 
holders who cannot afford to privately sponsor a particular party, event, or project collect 
money from the community and administer it accordingly. Participation in a religious 
cargo is one way to demonstrate administrative abilities: one’s ability to collect funds 
                                                          
63 Interviews with community members as well as auxiliary presidents confirm that active participation in 
the church helps build political credibility, and thus many auxiliary presidents emerged as politicos after 
serving office in the church. 
 215
from the community and administer them accordingly to support church activities. 
Ascendance through the cargo system is a way to gain prestige and a certain level of 
trustworthiness. In parallel, the ability to raise funds to match the funding from the 
municipality, and administer them accordingly, is needed by citizen committee members 
to implement an infrastructure project in the current municipal participatory process. 
Citizen committee members must be trusted not to steal or misuse funds to be successful 
in their collection efforts. As noted by Crow, in general, participation depends on the 
confidence of individuals to collaborate (e.g. trust is imperative) (2009). Previous 
experience holding a church cargo is an effective way of proving one is trustworthy in 
managing community funds; If the petitioners are able to prove they have sufficient 
accumulated funds to sponsor the project (either individually or collectively), there is 
increased likelihood that the petition will be considered. In addition, those who have held 
a cargo are also likely to have a network of political connections and clout to aid when 
soliciting a project to be prioritized on behalf of the community. Thus, holding a post in 
the church is a valued trait in citizen committee members. 
Notably, gender played a significant role in electing an individual to a citizen 
committee. If community members are trying to emulate the traits of cargo holders in the 
citizen committees, it explains why men are sought after and not women (cargo holders 
are all males). In any case, as discussed in Chapter 4, community meetings to prioritize 
public works are initiated and held in the boroughs’ parishes. Thus, in general, 
participation in these church meetings facilitates being informed of community affairs. 
Notably, the 2010 LAPOP study found that most citizen participation in México occurred 
within religious organizations. In any case, in the township of Santa Maria Tonantzintla 
 216
in San Andrés Cholula, the process of participation available to citizen committees 
reinforces the selection of members according to old traditions.  
 
Section 5.5 Tenango del Aire’s ‘COCICOVIs’ 
1. COCICOVI Aula Telsecundaria San Mateo Tepopula 
Factors that affected the formation of the COCICOVI committee: 
This COCICOVI was composed of three women who were self-nominated to be 
part of the group monitoring the infrastructure project that was prioritized by the 
municipality in 2009. 
 
COCICOVI 
 
Year 
formation 
Year 
Recognized 
# of  
Members 
# Elected 
 
Age: 
above 
30 
Year Project 
Completed 
Aula 
Telsecundaria 
San Mateo 
Tepopula 
 
2009 2009 3 3 3 2009 
 
As indicated in the table below, none of the factors that affected the formation of 
the citizen committees in Tonantzintla affected the formation of this group.  
 
Citizen 
Committee 
Member 
Gender Participation in 
the Church 
Personal 
Economy 
Political 
Aspirations 
Contralor 
Social ‘A’ 
NONE NONE NONE NONE 
Contralor 
Social ‘B” 
NONE NONE NONE NONE 
Contralor 
Social ‘C’ 
NONE NONE NONE NONE 
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However, committee members were all parents of students in the school where 
the classroom was built and had participated in the ‘parent groups’ within the school prior 
to this work being prioritized. According to Contralor Social A, “we all are active in the 
school and we all knew each other so when the principal called a meeting after school 
and told us [parents] that the classroom was going to be built and that he just needed to 
form a COCICOVI, we all volunteered.” When asked what the difference is between 
COCICOVIs and parent committees, the principal indicated that “that while parent 
groups work on the maintenance of the school and planning of special events, 
COCICOVIs are formed for infrastructure projects.”  According to the LAPOP (2010) 
study, most individuals participating in parent groups are women. Thus, it could be that 
this particular COCICOVI functions more as an extension of a parent group than a 
COCICOVI, because the meeting calling for its formation occurred within the school—
not outside, among the general public. 
 According to the women in the COCICOVI, although they had been presented 
with a study indicating the cost of construction and the timeline in which the project 
would be carried out, they did not feel they had the competency to understand the 
construction plans and ensure that the plans were being implemented in a cost effective 
and adequate manner. The women felt they had access to state and municipal officials in 
charge of the COSIVOVIs when they had questions; however, they felt the project was 
carried out smoothly and thus never consulted them. As the Contralora Social C 
indicated, “I think everyone is happy with the outcome.” All COCICOVI women 
interviewed concurred with the statement. 
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2. DIF Municipal 
Factors that affected the formation of the COCICOVI: 
The current municipal president was elected based on a platform that, in addition 
to including the expansion of services to areas not included in the current urban zone, he 
would also prioritize the creation of a municipal Center for Integral Family Development 
(DIF acronym in Spanish). The prioritization of this project was led by the wife of the 
municipal president, who called for a meeting in the area of affected residents and helped 
the state COCICOVI representatives form a group to oversee construction. The women in 
the group were very excited to be part of this committee but were not completely satisfied 
with the process.   
COCICOVI 
 
Year 
Formation 
Year 
Recognized
# of  
Members
# 
Elected 
 
Age: 
above 
30 
Year Project 
Completed 
DIF 
Municipal 
 
2011 2011 3 3 3 2011 
 
None of the women were involved in the municipal president’s political 
campaign, which called for construction of the DIF.  Moreover, none of the women 
indicated that any of the factors bellow had a role in their selection to be part of the 
COCICOVI. Although none of the women had participated before in a COCICOVI, and 
they had all nominated themselves, they had participated in a parent committee and felt 
sufficiently competent to participate. 
 
Citizen 
Committee 
Gender Participation in 
the Church 
Personal 
Economy 
Political 
Aspirations 
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Member 
Contralor 
Social ‘A’ 
NONE NONE NONE NONE 
Contralor 
Social ‘B” 
NONE NONE NONE NONE 
Contralor 
Social ‘C’ 
NONE NONE NONE NONE 
  
On the Typology: Treatment received from the Municipality  
According to a group interview, the DIF took one year to build. However, the 
community had repeatedly asked the government to create a center for 12 years—with no 
response. Once the women became part of the COCICOVI, they indicated that they were 
disappointed that no meetings occurred after the initial meeting to provide them with 
information on the progress of the project; they were also disappointed when members of 
the community asked for updates on the project, but no information was available. 
Moreover, the project’s final costs exceeded projections, and they felt too much money 
was spent. They felt they did not know enough about construction to assess if the work 
was in compliance with building codes. When community members consulted them with 
doubts about the construction or complaints, the women indicated that it was not easy to 
contact state COCICOVI representatives and the process was not facilitated by the 
municipality. Thus, in addition to complaints about elevated costs, the COCICOVI 
members complained that they were not regularly updated by the municipality or the 
state; in other words, the government was not resolving doubts about the construction of 
the center.  
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3. COCICOVI Pavimento Hidráulico San Juan 
Factors that affected the formation of the COCICOVI committee: 
This COCICOVI was composed of two women and one male. One of the women 
nominated herself and the other two other members were asked by the municipality to 
join the group because nobody else attended the meeting. The project took one year to 
complete (the project stayed within the timeframe allotted) and the committee was 
content with the process of paving the road, especially because they were able to verify 
that the project stayed within budget.   
 
COCICOVI 
 
Year 
formation 
Year 
Recognized
# of  
Members
# 
Elected 
 
Age: 
above 
30 
Year Project 
Completed 
Pavimento 
Hidraulico 
San Juan 
 
2006 2006 3 3 3 2006 
 
The members of the committee were asked why they decided to participate and all 
agreed that it was not so much of a choice but a sense of obligation because they were the 
only ones at the meeting. They had attended the meeting out of curiosity and did not 
engage the municipality to ask questions or be updated. They only attended the first and 
last meeting, which is where they were able to compare the resulting budget and time 
frame with what actually occurred.  None of the members had previous experience with 
COCICOVIs and only one member had participated in a parent group. They all agreed 
that if an election had occurred to elect representatives for the COCICOVI, that none of 
the factors bellow would have affected the nomination process.  
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Citizen 
Committee 
Member 
Gender Participation in 
the Church 
Personal 
Economy 
Political 
Aspirations 
Contralor 
Social ‘A’ 
NONE NONE NONE NONE 
Contralor 
Social ‘B” 
NONE NONE NONE NONE 
Contralor 
Social ‘C’ 
NONE NONE NONE NONE 
 
They were all happy with the treatment they received from the municipality and 
felt that they would participate again if needed. They were especially happy about being 
informed of the project costs and ensuring the project was implemented as promised. 
When asked about the quality with which the project was carried out they said they liked 
the new street but when asked about having it built up to code they all showed 
ambivalence in answering and concluded that, as nicely put by one of the members, “they 
did not have enough construction knowledge to know about the specifications met” 
(Contralor Social ‘B”). 
4. COCICOVI Prolongacion Hidalgo Potable water and Drainage 
Factors that affected the formation of the COCICOVI committee: 
This COCICOVI was the only case studied in Tenango del Aire that was 
composed entirely of men.  Two of the men nominated themselves, one because he had 
knowledge of construction and the other because he was curious about the process of 
participating in a COCICOVI. The other member was nominated to the committee.   
COCICOVI 
 
Year 
formation 
Year 
Recognized
# of  
Members
# 
Elected 
 
Age: 
above 
30 
Year Project 
Completed 
Prolongacion 
Hidalgo 
2010 2010 3 3 2 2011 
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Potable 
water and 
drainage 
 
 
The youngest member of the COCICOVI volunteered because he had political 
aspirations and thought this would be a good way to find out how things were done.  No 
other committee members had political interests and none felt the other factors listed 
below had a role in their election or self-nomination into the COCICOVI. None of the 
members had prior experience working with COCICOVIs. 
Citizen 
Committee 
Member 
Gender Participation in 
the Church 
Personal 
Economy 
Political 
Aspirations 
Contralor 
Social ‘A’ 
NONE NONE NONE NONE 
Contralor 
Social ‘B” 
NONE NONE NONE NONE 
Contralor 
Social ‘C’ 
NONE NONE NONE SOME 
 
The project took a little over a year to complete. Members were content with the 
project and their treatment from the municipality. The member involved in construction 
indicated that he was more actively involved than the other members in monitoring the 
cost and quality with which the project was carried out. He felt that short cuts—in terms 
of quality—were balanced with needs to keep within the budget. The member who had 
political aspirations indicated that although he felt “disappointed because he did not get 
to know more about the general process of how government operates, [he] did enjoy 
keeping members informed when delays occurred and why they occurred, etc.” 
(Contralor Social ‘C’). The Contralor Social ‘B,’ who was nominated and elected, was 
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content but indicated that he only participated in the first meeting and the last meeting 
when the closure of the project occurred—he was not aware of any other meetings. The 
members of this committee did not remember anybody petitioning for the project and all 
were informed that the project would be implemented when the meeting to create the 
COCICOVI occurred. As a result, they were not asked about the process of prioritizing 
the public work. 
 
Section 5.6 Determinants of citizen participation in Tenango del Aire 
In Tenango del Aire, the factors affecting the formation of public works 
committees in Santa Maria Tonantzintla did not seem to affect the formation of 
COCICOVIs. In Tenango del Aire, COCICOVIs were more uniform in function and 
treatment. In Tenango del Aire, COCICOVIs resembled Supportive III committees—they 
were utilized to evaluate a project and gain legitimacy by making sure it is implemented 
to specification.64 They were not required to make monetary contributions for their 
project, and the municipality was more transparent in providing information regarding the 
participatory process available to them. According to interviews in municipality, when a 
public work has been prioritized by the municipality, the office of the state controller in 
Chalco sends a delegate to call a meeting in the area where the public work will occur 
and form a committee with affected representatives: a COCICOVI.  
A COCICOVI is to be comprised of only three people who should be elected and 
who are not expected to make any monetary contribution on behalf of the group or the 
                                                          
64 Hypothetically, however, they can also be used as Supportive I committees in that they are used to 
legitimze a project that is not necessarily supported by the community. 
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community65. This was confirmed by everyone interviewed, including the municipality’s 
controller’s office and most importantly the members of the COCICOVI.66 COCICOVIs 
are not formed ‘unofficially’ prior to the work being prioritized by the municipality to 
promote the project, as occurs in some cases in San Andrés Cholula. The work of the 
COCICOVI is to ensure that a given project is implemented within the time period 
allotted, the budget and within the quality standards predetermined in a study provided to 
the COCICOVI. Although members of the COCICOVIs complained that in some 
instances they did not have the technical skills needed to determine if a project was 
within compliance of building codes, the overall process of participation was seen as 
being clear and easy to follow. The tasks involved with being a member of a COCICOVI 
were not perceived as being complicated.  
Interviews with COCICOVI members indicated that they did not feel anything in 
particular affected their selection or self-nomination67. Interviews with the staff from the 
municipality’s controller’s office, the office in the municipality that oversees the 
COCICOVIs in the area, indicated that they, as the data indicated, found that most 
members were older women who participated in parent groups within the public schools. 
This resembles results found in the nationwide Latin American Public Opinion Poll 
                                                          
65 According to interviews with community members and government officials, as late as the 1990s, 
contributions from the community were required for projects to be implemented. 
 
66 These same interviewees indicated that decades in the past, community projects were implemented by the 
municipality with expected, monetary, or physical labor contributions on behalf of affected citizens. In 
other words, the municipality had a history of using Faenas, the indigenous practice of having community 
members contribute with manual labor in carrying out public works. 
 
67 The exception was one COCICOVI member who nominated himself because he wished to become more 
involved in community government.  
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(LAPOP 2010) survey, which found that most participants in ‘committees for community 
improvement’ (citizen committees) in México are older women.   
 
Section 5.7 Evaluation of the Participatory Process: Conclusions  
As noted in the previous sections, the factors that affected the formation of citizen 
committees differed in each study site. In San Andrés Cholula, the following factors 
affected the selection of individual committee members: gender, participation in the 
church, and personal income. Moreover, the following factors affected citizen 
committees’ ability gain recognition from the municipality: persistence, jumping 
government tiers, knowledge of the system (literacy), time, and money. The factors that 
affected the formation of public works committees in San Andrés Cholula did not seem to 
affect the formation of COCICOVIs in Tenango del Aire. Moreover, in the township of 
San Andrés Cholula, most citizen committee members were men above age 30 whereas 
in Tenango del Aire, the members were mostly women. These factors seemed to vary 
according to the nature of the participatory process, the present typology of municipal 
treatment, and the determinants that facilitated committee efforts to capture local 
resources. 
In the township of Santa Maria Tonantzintla in San Andrés Cholula, the public 
works committees were more diverse in their formation (i.e., some were formed before 
the projects were prioritized and others after prioritization). As discussed in Chapter 4, 
public works committees also varied according to the motive of appointment by the 
municipality and thus treatment received by local government. The treatment these 
groups received from the local government—the municipal willingness to collaborate 
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with citizen committees—affects the level of involvement of these groups in the local 
government. In Tenango del Aire, COCICOVIs were more uniform in function and 
treatment. The COCICOVIs resemble Supportive III committees as they were utilized to 
evaluate a project and provide legitimacy to the project by ensuring it was implemented 
according to specifications. The differences between public works committees in 
Tonantzintla and the COCICOVIs in Tenango del Aire become clearer using criteria 
specified by Rowe and Frewer (2000) to evaluate the participatory processes accessible to 
each.  
Rowe and Frewer (2000) specify the following major points for evaluating  
participatory processes: acceptance criteria, which includes the criterion of 
representativeness (the public participants should comprise a broadly representative 
sample of the population of the affected public); criterion of independence (the 
participation process should be conducted in an independent, unbiased way); criterion of 
early involvement (the public should be involved as early as possible in the process as 
soon as value judgments become salient); criterion of influence (the output of the 
procedure should have a genuine impact on policy); and criterion of transparency (the 
process should be transparent; the public should be able to observe actions and the 
decision-making process) and process criteria, which includes the criterion of resource 
accessibility (public participants should have access to the appropriate resources to 
enable them to successfully fulfill their roles); criterion of task definition (the nature and 
scope of the participation task should be clearly defined); criterion of structured decision-
making (the participation exercise should use/provide appropriate mechanisms for 
structuring and displaying the decision-making process); and criterion of cost-
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effectiveness (the procedure should in some sense be cost-effective) (Rowe & Frewer 
2000). 
When examining the acceptance criterion in San Andrés Cholula versus Tenango 
del Aire, the following was observed with regard to each criterion:  
1. Criterion of representativeness: participants should be “representative of the 
broader public (or the affected subgroups within the population), rather than 
simply representing some self-selected subset” (Rowe and Frewer 2000: 12). 
In both study sites, the citizen committees simply represented a subset of the 
population, specifically a subset comprised of those interested in 
implementing a particular project. In the Auxiliary Junta of Santa Maria 
Tonantzintla in San Andrés Cholula, the selection criteria for electing 
members of public works committees favored certain traits over others, 
typically: being a male, a business owner, and a participant in the church. 
These traits were preferred in the hope that—as a result of selecting a narrow 
subset of representatives—the needs of the group would be more readily 
heard. Thus, this criterion was not met. However, interviews with COCICOVI 
members in Tenango del Aire revealed that their selection or self-nomination 
was not influenced/affected by anything in particular; thus, this criterion came 
closer68 to being met in Tenango del Aire. 
 
                                                          
68 I state ‘closer’ to being met because there were not enough case studies to determine if the groups were a 
representative sample of the population or not. 
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2. Criterion of independence: (1) project managers and facilitators of the 
participation process should be independent of each other; (2) public 
representatives should be independent of the sponsoring body (Rowe and 
Frewer 2000: 13).  In the municipality of San Andrés Cholula, the citizen 
committees studied were diverse in function and treatment. In some instances, 
they form prior to the municipality’s prioritization of a particular project and 
in others, they are formed after prioritization; on some occasions, citizen 
committee members are chosen at the discretion of the municipal 
authorities—a process that does not allow the public representatives to be 
truly independent from the sponsoring body. In general, when Funds for 
Social Municipal Infrastructure (FISM) are utilized from Section 33, project 
managers call the facilitators of the participation process within the 
municipality to visit the project’s locale to form a public works committee. 
The interviewees from the directive of citizen participation indicated that they 
facilitate the plans/actions of project managers instead of helping citizen 
committee members voice their concerns. As a result, the role of the 
facilitators of the participatory process is compromised. Thus, this criterion 
was not met.  
     In Tenango del Aire, all citizen committees analyzed were uniform in 
function and treatment and all were formed after the project was prioritized by 
the municipality. There were institutionalized procedures in place to ensure 
that management was done by an independent wing of the municipality—the 
Internal Comptroller—and with state government oversight. Thus, procedures 
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allowed for project managers and facilitators of the participation process to be 
independent of each other. Moreover, public representatives were also found 
to be independent of any affiliation to the sponsoring body. 
 
3. Criterion of early involvement: public debate should include include 
deliberation of the underlying assumptions and agenda setting and not just 
discussion of narrow, predefined problems (Rowe and Frewer 2000: 13-14). 
The public deliberation process that occurs in the chapels of the township of 
Santa Maria Tonantzintla allows residents to prioritize projects needed in the 
community. Once priorities are established, citizen committees are formed to 
present specific projects to local government authorities. Unfortunately, this 
does not occur in all cases; in some instances, committees are formed after the 
local government has decided to implement a project. Moreover, the general 
public does not decide, once citizen committees are formed, which one of 
those committees should receive backing and support. Thus, this criterion is 
only moderately met. In Tenango del Aire, there is no early involvement; all 
COCICOVIs form after project selection has occurred and thus, this criterion 
was not met. 
 
4. Criterion of influence: citizen committees should not be used simply to 
legitimize decisions or to provide the appearance of consultation without any 
intent of acting on recommendations (Rowe and Frewer 2000: 15). In San 
Andrés Cholula, this criterion is somewhat met.  Citizen committees that exert 
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influence can convince the municipality to act on their recommendation of 
which SIF projects should be prioritized. However, after the municipality 
receives input from citizen committees on which projects should be 
considered, citizen committees do not to participate in the process of 
determining how a project should be implemented. In Tenango del Aire, 
COCIVOVIs function only to monitor the implementation of a previously 
prioritized municipal project and are unable to exert community control over 
the assignment of resources. In other words, as noted by the FUNDAR study, 
mayors see the role of citizen committees as only instrumental (2006), to 
support a previously prioritized municipal project. This criterion was not met 
in Tenango del Aire. 
 
5. Criterion of transparency: The process should be transparent so that the public 
can see what is occurring and how decisions are being made (Rowe & Frewer 
2000). In both locations, the decisions regarding project selection were made 
behind closed doors and without explanation to constituents. The citizenry is 
not allowed into the municipality’s decision-making process regarding which 
projects to implement during the year. Moreover, they are not informed about 
the decision-making process regarding how projects should be implemented. 
 
     In San Andrés Cholula, citizen committee members are not provided 
any information regarding the committee’s specific function and obligations 
nor are they provided with information to evaluate the process of 
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implementing their specific project. When members of citizen committees in 
San Andres Cholula were asked, ‘Do you know how much your project ended 
up costing?’ All group members answered “no.”  Participants recived limited 
or no information on a project’s associated costs, materials used, approximate 
time of planed completion, etc., which impeded citizens from learning how to 
manage information and apply techniques of control, vigilance and 
supervision over the execution of public works.  Although neither public 
works committees nor COCICOVI members were allowed insight into the 
decision-making process, and thus have no real ability to exert community 
control over the assignment of resources, COCICOVI members are informed 
about their specific duties and obligations and are able to monitor project 
execution. The COCICOVIs received project outlines, which included 
information on project costs, materials used, and a timetable of expected 
project completion, etc. Moreover, they are given the contact information of 
project facilitators at the municipal and state levels in case they have any 
questions. Thus, the process in Tenango del Aire allowed for more 
transparency during project execution. Although the criterion was not met in 
San Andres Cholula, it was moderately met in Tenango del Aire. 
 
When examining the process criteria in San Andrés Cholula versus Tenango del 
Aire, the following was observed with regard to each criterion:  
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1. Criterion of resource accessibility: citizen committees should have all 
necessary resources, which “include (1) information resources (summaries of 
the pertinent facts), (2) human resources (e.g., access to scientists, witnesses, 
decision analysts), (3) material resources (e.g., overhead 
projectors/whiteboards), and (4) time resources (participants should have 
sufficient time to make decisions)” (Rowe and Frewer 2000: 15). In San 
Andrés Cholula, this criterion was not met. The participation process required 
financial outlays and excessive time and specialized knowledge from 
participants. The municipality did not compensate citizen committee members 
for the cost incurred or provide them with facilitators to aid and inform 
participants. In Tenango del Aire, the participation process did not require 
financial outlays or significant time obligations. Moreover, facilitators of the 
participatory process helped provide participants with information they felt 
was needed to help them function as project evaluators. That said, the 
interviewed COCICOVI members stated that they lacked knowledge that 
would permit them to monitor and evaluate some of the technical aspects of 
public works. They felt the information provided was not sufficenitly 
adequate to truly help them serve as project quality evaluators. Thus, the 
criterion was moderately met in Tenango del Aire. 
 
2. Criterion of task definition: aspects of the participatory process—the scope of 
a participation exercise, its expected output, and the mechanisms of the 
procedure—should be clearly defined at the outset (Rowe and Frewer 2000: 
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16). As with the criterion of transparency and resource accessibility, this 
criterion was not met for the citizen committees in San Andrés Cholula. 
However, it was met in the cases studied in Tenango del Aire. 
 
3. Criterion of structured decision-making: “The participation exercise should 
provide participants with appropriate mechanisms for structuring and 
displaying the decision-making process [enabling] the underlying reasons 
behind a decision to be examined, as well as the extent to which a conclusion 
was well supported” (Rowe and Frewer 2000: 16). This criterion was not met 
in San Andrés Cholula or in Tenango del Aire.  
 
4. Criterion of cost-effectiveness (the procedure should in some sense be cost-
effective) (ibid.) In San Andrés Cholula, this criterion was not met. The 
participatory process open to citizen committees required significant financial 
outlays on behalf of members and time—which inhibited the cost-
effectiveness of the process. In Tenango del Aire, this criterion was met. 
In general, when speaking to citizen committee members (public works 
committee and COCICOVI participants) and members of the community about the 
impact these groups had on government performance, the promotion of accountability, 
improved governance, ethics, economy, efficiency, effectiveness, responsiveness, and 
establishment of cost recovery mechanisms, the results were as follows. In San Andrés 
Cholula, for questions regarding level of satisfaction with social infrastructure projects 
implemented with the help of citizen committees, the answers were mixed. Although 
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interviewees were happy that the projects were implemented, commentary on the quality 
of the project indicated disappointment. Moreover, they felt they were not qualified to 
assess project quality because they were not engineers. Thus, the overall satisfaction was 
average. Many interviewees indicated that there was no available information on the cost 
efficiency of projects, and in regard to ethics, there were accusations that some 
committee members had stolen funds. The interviewees indicated a lack of trust in the 
government’s ability to hold these groups accountable—or even make their own 
employees accountable for inflating the cost of projects. There was a general lack of trust 
in the government to provide services in a fair and honest manner. In addition, some 
interviewees in Tonantzintla indicated pressure to approve projects and “sign off” in 
approval—despite questions regarding the implementation of projects. These results 
indicate that the participation of citizen committees does not result in the promised 
benefits.  
In Tenango del Aire, results indicated a higher level of satisfaction with 
government performance. There was no indication of misuse of funds or lack of trust in 
the government. Some dissatisfaction was noted with the municipality’s use of 
contractors to implement infrastructure projects. Interviewees felt that private companies 
had hired workers from outside the community—despite a perceived high-level of 
unemployment in the area; hiring local workers could have reduced unemployment levels 
and lowered project costs. But in general, the role of the office of inspector general in 
overseeing COCICOVIs helped guarantee a certain level of perceived accountability and 
pressure to perform and deliver higher quality services and projects than in San Andrés 
Cholula.  
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To place these results (on the level of satisfaction with government services 
rendered in the two municipalities) within the general context of the Mexican population, 
the LAPOP (2010) study is very useful. In México, one in every two individuals 
interviewed felt that services rendered in their municipality were satisfactory (i.e., neither 
good nor bad) in quality (41.3% of Mexicans) (ibid.). On the other hand, 29.4% believe 
that the services are good and 22.4% believe the services rendered are low quality or bad. 
The percentages in the extreme categories, very good or very bad, are less than 10%: 
1.4% and 5.5% respectively (ibid.). Compared to other countries in the Americas, whose 
citizens were asked about their level of satisfaction with services rendered by the local 
governments, México scored worse than half of the other countries in 2010 (LAPOP 
2010). Only four out of ten Mexicans who presented a petition to local authorities had 
their petition resolved (LAPOP 2010:147).  
The LAPOP study also found that level of satisfaction with government services 
determines the degree of citizen participation (2010). Specifically, this study found that 
dissatisfaction with government services makes citizens vote and engage in institutional 
participation less often. Moreover, LAPOP researchers found gender to be a determinant 
of satisfaction in local government services, finding that women are more satisfied than 
men (ibid.). This could be why more women participated in COCICOVIs. The LAPOP 
study also found that most citizen participation in México occurred within religious 
organizations, bringing into question the relationship between participation in the church 
and in public works committees observed in San Andrés Cholula.  
The perception of good government performance is the most important thing in 
maintaining democratic values in the region (LAPOP 2010). Among the multiple factors 
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that affect ‘legitimacy,’ and thus support for a stable democracy, a major contributor was 
the government’s perceived ability to satisfy the needs and demands of its citizens 
(LAPOP 2010). The perceived positive performance of government in its service delivery 
is directly linked to the perceived legitimacy of that government. The hope of 
decentralization efforts was to increase citizen participation in the decision-making 
process and in the process improve government services. Democracy is based on the 
assumption that all citizens should have equal rights and deserve equal representation in 
the setting of priorities in society. In order to guarantee democratic accountability in 
service delivery, the representative nature of the political process must be safeguarded 
and government institutions must be accessible to all citizens, not just citizen committees. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS 
The present study sought to shed light on the decision-making processes of rural 
municipalities and the rural townships associated with more urbanized municipalities in 
México. In general, it found that politics played a prominent role in this process. Local 
politicians were involved in shelving projects from previous administrations, favoring 
projects of supporters rather than works of general benefit, and—despite constraints 
imbedded in earmarked funds—allocating money using personal discretion. Politics 
dominated the decision-making process. In San Andrés Cholula and Tenango del Aire, 
public works were converted into instruments that the government used to reward certain 
groups who supported election campaigns. The selection of projects favored political 
sympathizers. Government authorities did not need to listen to the citizen committees.  
That demonstrated the lack of working procedures that public participation mechanisms 
are intended to avoid: clientelism. Once priorities were established, public functionaries 
in both municipalities went to the communities where the public works would be 
implemented to register participants comprising ‘public works committees’ and 
‘COCIVOVIs.’ This was done to meet the requirements for using social infrastructure 
funds (SIF) from one of the major funding pools, FISM resources, and in the case of 
Tenango, to meet state requirements.  
Neither municipality viewed citizen committees as playing an important role in 
the prioritization process of public works or as an essential element in their efforts to 
increase citizen participation. The participatory process open to public works committees 
in San Andrés Cholula and the COCICOVIs in Tenango del Aire varied in their ultimate 
purpose and the level of empowerment or shared decision-making authority granted to 
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participants. The participatory process open to COCICOVIs fell short of involvement and 
functioned to only inform and consult in the monitoring of project execution. In certain 
instances, the public works committees in San Andres collaborated in the prioritization of 
specific public works, but these committees lacked any authority to dictate how a project 
should be implemented. Public works committees in the township under study in San 
Andrés Cholula, which participated in the prioritization of a specific public work, 
indicated that they formed out of frustration with lack of government initiative and 
action.  Moreover, in San Andrés Cholula, the present study found that municipal 
authorities used the guise of avoiding paternalism as an excuse to not provide services or 
infrastructure without the financial contribution of ‘citizen committees’ and ‘parent 
groups’ (in the case of projects carried out in public schools), despite the lack of legal 
justification for doing so.  
Regarding the decision-making process, the present study found threats to 
fairness, resulting from constraints of the local context, rotation in office, patronage, and 
a general not merit-based personnel system, which resulted in a lack of administrative 
capacity. Reforms to the civil service are needed. Thus, the use of citizen committees, 
specifically public works committees and COCICOVIs, in San Andrés Cholula and 
Tenango del Aire respectively, fell short of providing the promised benefits of utilizing a 
participatory planning and management (PPM) strategy. As noted by Garcia-Zamor 
(1985), PPM can promote the integration of local community interest and the goals set 
forth in developing projects by providing a space for dialogue with various perspectives. 
However, the participatory process open to the citizen committees in both municipalities 
did not allow for a general discussion of at large community goals and prioritization of 
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projects. The PPM did not provide a space for open communications, identification and 
resolution of community needs, and conflictive viewpoints. Citizen committees in both 
areas represented narrow interests rather than broad community priorities. They 
functioned as interest groups promoting specific public works.  Neither the COCICOVIs 
nor the Public Works Committees could be said to be politically aligned, nor associated 
to social movements that could affect the election process in the municipality. The citizen 
committees were too narrow in scope to hold the administration accountable for a 
particular unmet promise or drive any organized campaign to drive out an administration 
based lack of government performance.  
By promoting the involvement of beneficiaries, project performance is said to 
increase because affected members of the community have an intrinsic stake in the 
functioning of the project and have more of an incentive to accept and meet the 
performance criteria. However, participants in both municipalities felt they lacked the 
technical knowledge to assess the quality of the completed work. In the case of San 
Andrés Cholula, members of citizen committees felt pressure to accept projects despite 
their concerns over the quality of the project output. According to the literature, by 
allowing for citizen input, one increases the chance of developing more targeted, useful 
solutions to problems faced in the community. Moreover, by creating a built-in feedback 
mechanism, PPM allows for the early identification of problems associated with the 
project and helps to open the gateway for identifying more effective ways of resolving 
quality output issues and promoting the longevity of the project. However, neither 
participatory mechanism studied allowed for true feedback loops or mechanisms for 
beneficiaries in affected communities to have their voices heard during the prioritization 
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of projects or project development. COCICOVIs were provided with information on 
finalized project outlines but had no input in their development. In San Andrés Cholula, 
projects were also developed by the municipality and in addition, there was no 
transparency during the project execution process allowing for citizens to reflect on the 
process. Moreover, once the projects were completed, the citizen committees in both 
areas were dissolved, preventing their intervention in monitoring the project longevity.  
In San Andrés Cholula, one concern raised about the use of citizen committees in 
the process of carrying out SIF projects was the identification of flaws within the 
participatory process, specifically in the way these committees formed, which created a 
bias toward one group over others. When the municipality was identifying potential 
project beneficiaries, those who were most articulate in an open forum context were the 
most likely have their concerns addressed. The participatory process simply reinforced 
the prestige and wealth of one group over others, over representing the interests of those 
with power positions in society and essentially giving them the power to prioritize local 
needs. Moreover, because the participatory process in San Andrés Cholula required 
financial outlays on behalf of project beneficiaries, this approach did not motivate 
members of society to participate, specifically those struggling with economic hardship. 
In general, because the PPM approach does not produce immediate financial rewards, it 
is difficult to motivate beneficiaries that are at or near the subsistence level. The poorest 
of local residents often find it the most difficult to take time away from work because the 
economic impact of doing so is harder felt. Thus, they often feel content to allow 
wealthier local elites negotiate such projects for their community. Moreover, in San 
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Andrés Cholula, beneficiaries lacked sufficient information to define their role in the 
participatory process. 
In Tenango del Aire, the formation of COCICOVIs was less biased and the 
selection of members was less discriminatory in nature—no funds were required from 
participants, the process was more transparent, and the definition of roles and 
expectations from participants was clear. The more diversified typology of citizen 
committees observed in San Andrés Cholula, and specifically the appearance of 
seemingly ‘Advisory’ committees, could be interpreted as an increased municipal 
willingness to accept citizen input in its decision-making process. However, once 
recognized by the municipality, or legalized by the directive of citizen participation, 
Advisory ‘public works’ committees could become Supportive I or Put-on II committees. 
In the process, making the decision-making process closed to citizen input. Moreover, 
willingness to carry out projects outside those prioritized by the mayor could simply 
reflect the larger budget at the disposal of San Andrés Cholula--- compared to Tenango 
del Aire--- allowing it to make changes to pre-determined plans when pressured by well 
organized groups. In addition, although the citizen committees observed in Tenango del 
Aire merely resembled Supportive committees, they did provide for more citizen 
participation in assuring government accountability and transparency in the use of funds 
than observed in San Andres.  
The lack of state involvement in the functioning of the ‘public works committees’ 
in San Andrés Cholula signaled that their function is not to aid the state government 
monitoring of municipal action, but truly allow for citizen participation in the decision-
making process. State involvement in the monitoring of COCICOVIs in Tenango del 
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Aire indicated that the municipality did not accept the authority granted to it in order to 
regulate the participatory processes without state oversight. The decentralization doctrine 
promoting municipal autonomy adopted by PAN, and not the PRI or PRD, could explain 
this difference. Furthermore, because the Internal Municipal Comptroller, who controls 
the human and financial resources of the municipality, and not a Directive of Citizen 
Participation (as in San Andrés Cholula), regulated COCICOVIs, the function of 
COCICOVIs was interpreted to be aiding in monitoring the use of municipal resources, 
and not promoting citizen participation in administrative decision-making.  
The apparent transparency and higher level of accountability in carrying out 
public works in Tenango del Aire versus San Andrés Cholula is a potential result of the 
State’s authority to monitor the use of COCICOVIs. I suggest accountability and 
transparency in San Andrés Cholula could improve with the willingness and ability of the 
state to impose sanctions against those local governments, which do not respect structures 
for citizen participation. Interviews with state level government officials are needed to 
understand why variations in the oversight function of states upon their municipalities 
appear. The present study supports the hypothesis that political party affiliation at the 
municipal, state, and federal levels of government affected application of participatory 
mechanisms at the local level. However, to draw conclusions at a more aggregate level, a 
quantitative study is needed to analyze the relationship between state involvement in the 
oversight of citizen committees, and political party affiliation at the local and state levels.  
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